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Les progrès des sources électromagnétiques de haute puissance (HPEM) au cours des années 
1990 a soulevé l’inquiétude dans la communauté de la compatibilité électromagnétique (CEM) 
qu’elles pourraient être déployées pour interférer avec le bon fonctionnement des systèmes 
électroniques modernes à des fins criminelles. Il est bien établi que les champs 
électromagnétiques suffisamment intenses peuvent causer des troubles ou des dommages dans 
les systèmes électroniques et, par conséquent, peuvent affecter presque toutes les infrastructures 
critiques (IC) qui sont basées sur les technologies de l’information et de la communication 
(TIC). Ce champ d’étude a d’abord été connu comme le terrorisme électromagnétique, mais ce 
terme a été changé pour le terme plus englobant interférences électromagnétiques d’origine 
intentionnelle (IEMI en anglais). 
La protection contre les menaces IEMI peut être reconnue comme une réminiscence de la 
période de la guerre froide et les programmes de recherche sur la protection contre les 
impulsions électromagnétiques de haute altitude (IEM-HA). Les sources IEMI génèrent des 
perturbations allant de quelques dizaines de MHz à plusieurs GHz. Ces fréquences sont 
significativement plus élevées que celles associées à la foudre et les IEM-HA, et par 
conséquent, les méthodes d’analyse et de protection traditionnels doivent être revues. 
Cette thèse est une contribution aux techniques d’évaluation de la vulnérabilité des IC contre les 
IEMI. Afin de quantifier leur impact, l’environnement électromagnétique créé par des sources 
IEMI doit être caractérisé, les composants et sous-systèmes sensibles des IC doivent être 
identifiés, et les perturbations attendues doivent être évaluées. Les études menées dans cette 
thèse traitent l’amélioration des méthodes existantes pour l’évaluation générale des risques 
encourus par les IC, le classement des sources IEMI existantes, ainsi que l’évaluation 
expérimentale et numérique de la réponse de câbles commerciaux aux IEMI. 
Nous présentons une méthodologie qualitative pour mener à bien l’audit IEMI d’une 
installation. Compte tenu de la complexité du problème, il a été décidé que la vulnérabilité 
d’une infrastructure doit être évaluée de façon qualitative en considérant les conséquences de 
l’interruption d’un service, la probabilité d’occurrence d’une attaque IEMI, et l’état de 
préparation des infrastructures pour résister à une attaque. L’objectif principal de cette méthode 
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est de permettre aux opérateurs de prendre des mesures correctives et de mitigation appropriées, 
d’après les résultats de l’audit IEMI. 
Il est important de comprendre les capacités techniques actuelles dans le développement de 
sources IEMI afin de concevoir des stratégies de durcissement adéquates pour les équipements 
critiques. Nous présentons une analyse actualisée et une classification des sources IEMI 
potentielles qui ont été recueillies à partir d’un grand nombre de publications scientifiques. Les 
sources ont été classées en fonction de leur environnement électromagnétique, leur 
transportabilité, leur développement technologique, et leurs coûts. Il a été constaté que les 
sources conduites sont plus disponibles que les sources rayonnées. En outre, l’évaluation des 
sorties maximales attendues de sources HPEM est fait en regardant les limitations physiques du 
développement des technologies actuelles. Afin d’étudier les caractéristiques spectrales des 
sources, une méthode analytique est proposée pour l’évaluation du bandratio des signaux en 
utilisant l’indice de Blumer. 
Les niveaux de perturbations attendues dues à l’illumination des systèmes de câblage à 
l’intérieur d’un bureau à des hyperfréquences ont été étudiés par des mesures effectuées à l’aide 
d’une goulotte en plastique de 2 mètres contenant plusieurs types de câbles trouvés dans les 
bâtiments commerciaux. La goulotte a été illuminée avec des impulsions HPEM à l’intérieur 
une cellule GTEM et avec des champs de faible puissance à l’intérieur d’une chambre de 
réverbération (CR). Les tests ont révélé qu’à des fréquences basses et intermédiaires, les câbles 
d’alimentation basse tension sont plus sensibles par rapport aux câbles de téléphone ou de 
réseaux. Aux hautes fréquences, le couplage est dominé par des ouvertures et discontinuités 
dans les connecteurs et charges de terminaison déséquilibrées. Comme attendu, les meilleurs 
résultats ont été obtenus avec l’utilisation de paires torsadées blindées. Les fonctions de 
transfert obtenues peuvent être utilisées pour l’obtention des niveaux de perturbation dans des 
analyses des risques IEMI pour les différents types de CI. 
L'un des défis dans le calcul des perturbations IEMI avec l'utilisation de la théorie des lignes de 
transmission (LT) est la possibilité de définir un conducteur de référence pour l'évaluation des 
signaux de mode commun et différentiel. Les immeubles contiennent de faisceaux de câbles très 
longs qui sont généralement flottants à l'intérieur des goulottes ou conduits qui ne sont pas 
nécessairement à proximité de surfaces métalliques. L'applicabilité de la théorie LT dans 
l'évaluation des signaux de mode différentiel de lignes à deux fils flottant au-dessus d'un plan de 
masse a été étudiée grâce à des comparaisons avec des simulations avec des outils full wave. Il a 
été constaté que la présence du plan de masse peut être négligée dans le calcul de l'impédance 
caractéristique des lignes, lorsque la hauteur des fils est supérieure à environ deux fois la 
distance de séparation entre eux. En outre, les résultats ont montré que la validité de la théorie 
LT est conditionnée à une courte distance électrique entre les fils différentiels, quelles que 
soient les distances au-dessus du plan de masse. 
La propagation des signaux IEMI le long de lignes de puissance ou communication est affectée 
par les effets de dispersion qui atténuent significativement les formes d'onde au-delà d'une 
certaine distance en raison des pertes en conduction et diélectriques. La théorie LT est utilisée 
pour évaluer l'effet de ces deux types de pertes dans la dispersion des signaux IEMI injectés le 
long de câbles de puissance et communication en fonction de la longueur de propagation. Un 
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modèle de LT du câblage électrique à basse tension de la goulotte en plastique a été mis au point 
et afin de valider les modèles, les résultats numériques ont été comparés aux mesures obtenues 
en utilisant des techniques de domaine fréquentiel et temporel. 
Certaines installations critiques comprennent des assemblages de câbles complexes, y compris 
des câbles blindés individuellement, ou avec sur-blindages et connecteurs à broches multiples 
blindés. Le couplage électromagnétique à ces câblages est régi par l’impédance de transfert 
globale de l'ensemble. Des considérations générales et des lignes directrices pour l'application 
de la théorie LT afin d'évaluer l'impédance de transfert global de faisceaux de câbles complexes 
sont données. Les résultats de simulation obtenus sont en bon accord avec les données 
expérimentales jusqu'à des fréquences de 500 MHz. Il a été constaté que les impédances de 
contact entre les blindages et les connecteurs, et l'impédance d’interconnexion des connecteurs 
au châssis de l'équipement jouent un rôle très important. Finalement, un modèle amélioré pour 
estimer l'impédance de transfert d'une tresse à deux couches est également proposé et validé à 
l'aide de données expérimentales. 
 
Mots-clés: Interférences électromagnétiques d’origine intentionnelle (IEMI), infrastructures 
critiques (IC), électromagnétisme haute puissance (HPEM), compatibilité électromagnétique 
(CEM), théorie des lignes de transmission (LT), l'indice de Blumer 
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The progress of high power electromagnetic (HPEM) sources during the late 1990s raised the 
concern in the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) community that they could be deployed for 
criminal purposes to interfere with the operation of modern electronic systems. It is well 
established that sufficiently intense electromagnetic fields can cause upset or damage in 
electronic systems and therefore, can affect almost every critical infrastructure (CI) that is based 
on information and communication technologies (ICT). This field of study was initially known 
as electromagnetic terrorism, but was changed to the more encompassing term of intentional 
electromagnetic interference (IEMI).  
Protection against IEMI threats can be acknowledged as a reminiscence of the cold war period 
and the research programs on protection against high altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMP). 
IEMI sources generate disturbances ranging from tens of MHz to several GHz, frequencies that 
are significantly higher than those associated with lightning and HEMP, and therefore, the 
traditional analysis and protection methods need to be revisited. 
This thesis is a contribution to the assessment techniques of the vulnerability of CIs against 
IEMI. In order to quantify their impact, the electromagnetic environment created by IEMI 
sources needs to be characterized, the susceptible components and subsystems of the CIs should 
be identified, and the expected disturbances have to be evaluated. The studies undertaken in this 
thesis deal with the improvement of the existing methods for the general assessment of the IEMI 
risks encountered by CIs, the classification of existing IEMI sources, and the experimental and 
numerical assessment of the response of commercial cables to IEMI. 
We present a methodology to carry out the so-called IEMI audit of a facility. Given the 
complexity of the problem, it was decided that the vulnerability of an infrastructure should be 
evaluated in a qualitative manner by regarding the consequences of interrupting the normal 
provision of a service, the probability of occurrence of an IEMI attack, and the preparedness of 
the infrastructure to withstand an attack. The main objective of this methodology is to enable 
the business continuity management operators to take appropriate corrective and mitigation 
measures, based on the results of the IEMI audit. 
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Understanding the current technical capabilities in the development of IEMI sources is 
important to design adequate hardening strategies for critical equipment. We present an updated 
survey and classification of potential IEMI sources that were collected from a large number of 
scientific publications. The sources have been classified according to their electromagnetic 
environment, their transportability, technological development, and cost level. It was found that 
potential IEMI conducted sources are more available than radiated sources. Also, an assessment 
of the maximum expected outputs of HPEM sources is made by looking at the physical 
limitations that constrain the development of current technologies. In order to study the spectral 
characteristics of the IEMI sources, an analytical method is proposed for the evaluation of the 
band-ratio of the signals by using the so-called Blumer index. 
The expected disturbances due to a high frequency illumination of representative cabling 
systems inside an office were studied through measurements performed using a 2- meter long 
plastic raceway containing several types of cables found in commercial buildings. The raceway 
was illuminated with HPEM transients inside a gigahertz transverse electromagnetic (GTEM) 
cell and with low power fields inside a reverberation chamber (RC). The tests revealed that at 
low and intermediate frequencies, low voltage power cables are more susceptible compared to 
telephone or network cables. At high frequencies, the coupling is dominated by connector 
apertures and discontinuities and load unbalance. As expected, the best performance was 
obtained with the use of shielded twisted pairs. The obtained transfer functions can be used for 
bounding the disturbance levels in IEMI risk analyses for different types of CIs. 
One of the challenges in the calculation of the IEMI disturbances with the use of transmission 
line (TL) theory is the possibility of defining a reference conductor for the evaluation of the 
common and differential mode signals. Office buildings contain very long cablings that are 
generally floating inside raceways or conduits that are not necessarily close to metallic surfaces. 
The applicability of the TL theory in evaluating differential mode signals in two-wire lines 
floating above a ground plane was studied through comparisons with full-wave simulations. It 
was found that the presence of the ground plane can be disregarded in the calculation of the 
characteristic impedance of the lines, when the height of the wires is larger than about twice the 
separation distance between them. Also, the results showed that the validity of the TL theory is 
conditioned upon an electrically short distance between the differential wires, regardless of the 
distances above the ground plane. 
The propagation of high frequency IEMI signals along power/communications lines is affected 
by dispersion effects that will significantly damp the waveforms beyond a certain distance due 
to the conductive and dielectric losses. TL theory is used to assess the effect of both types of 
losses in the dispersion of injected IEMI signals along power and communication cables as a 
function of the propagation length. A TL model of the low voltage power cabling of the plastic 
raceway was developed and in order to validate the models, the numerical results were 
compared against measurements obtained using frequency and time domain techniques.  
Some critical facilities include complicated cable assemblies including individually shielded 
cables, overshields, and multi-pin shielded connectors. The electromagnetic coupling to such 
cablings is governed by the so-called overall transfer impedance of the assembly. General 
considerations and guidelines for the application of the TL theory for evaluating the overall 
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transfer impedance of complex cable assemblies are given. The obtained simulation results were 
found to be in good agreement with the experimental data up to frequencies of about 500 MHz. 
It was found that the generally overlooked contact impedances between the cable shields and 
connectors, and the impedance of the connector backshell interconnection to the equipment 
chassis play a significant role. Finally, an improved model for estimating the transfer impedance 
of a two-layer braided shield is also proposed and validated using experimental data. 
 
Keywords: Intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI), critical infrastructures (CI), high 
power electromagnetics (HPEM), electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), transmission line (TL) 
theory, Blumer index 
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1.1 What is IEMI and why do we study it? 
IEMI or Electromagnetic Terrorism is a relatively new threat to electronic and electric systems 
that has attracted a great deal of attention within the EMC community during the past two 
decades or so. According to the IEC definition [1], IEMI is the intentional malicious generation 
of EM energy introducing noise or disturbances into electric and electronic systems, thus 
disrupting, confusing or damaging these systems for terrorist or criminal purposes. It is well 
established that sufficiently intense EM fields in the frequency range of 200 MHz to 5 GHz can 
cause upset or damage in electronic systems [2] and therefore, can affect almost every economic 
and social infrastructure that is based on ICT services [3]. In the past, the few key electronic 
systems that existed worked at higher voltage levels than today’s machines and at lower 
frequencies, making them less sensitive to EM disruption [4]. Today, the vast majorities of CIs 
are or will be operated through digital control, thus, bringing devastating effects on the 
economy and in people’s lives in the case of a successful IEMI attack [3, 5]. 
In order to quantify the impact of IEMI on critical systems, the EM environment created by 
IEMI sources needs to be characterized. In addition, critical components and subsystems of the 
CIs that might be the target of IEMI attacks should be identified. In this regard, ICT 
infrastructure is expected to be one of the key potential victims. Proper functioning of the ICT 
systems is becoming a major issue for reliable and secure supply of electricity since they 
support the power system operation, critical monitoring and control functions. It has been 
shown [6-14] that an IEMI attack could cause a wide range of effects on electronic components 
and processors, ranging from malfunction to permanent damage. A recent study has pointed out 
the crucial role of ICT in recent blackouts over Europe and North America [15]. 
Among various terrorist threats, IEMI can be attractive to potential attackers since it can be 
undertaken anonymously and at some distance away from physical barriers [16]. Also, unlike 
other means of attack, EM weapons can be used without much risk since an EM attacker can try 
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and try again, and no one will notice until computer systems begin to fail (and the victims may 
not know why) [4]. Possible distances for sabotage of unprotected ICT equipment using small, 
suitcase-size radiating sources are estimated to be of the order of 50 meters and, up to 500 m for 
larger sources that might be fitted into a van [12]. Recent studies by Russian scientists [17] 
showed significant effects of injected pulse disturbances on power, telecommunication, or 
grounding circuits outside the controlled region of power substations causing upset and damage 
of typical power system control equipment, including a SCADA terminal. 
Moreover, criminals and terrorists are already able to build EMI sources that can generate high-
level transient radiated and conducted electromagnetic disturbances [8, 16]. There are several 
reported cases of criminal IEMI attacks that have not been fully divulged for the sake of 
security; but their analysis has allowed to identify the motivation and technical skills of the 
culprits, the characteristics of the generated IEMI environment as well as their effects on the 
target systems [18]. 
The IEMI threats can be acknowledged as a reminiscence of the HEMP era [19], in which the 
relatively new and transportable HPEM weapons [20] have redefined the field amplitudes and 
frequencies under study, and therefore, the traditional analysis and protection methods. This 
threat is now recognized by international organisms such as URSI [21] and IEEE [22] and, as a 
result, IEMI concerns have been the subject of workshops and technical sessions in recent 
scientific symposia (e.g. [8, 23]). 
HPEM source technologies can radiate EM spectrum from tens of MHz to several GHz, 
frequencies that are significantly higher than those associated with lightning and HEMP. For 
comparison, Fig. 1.1 illustrates a rough estimation of the electric field spectra generated by 
different EM phenomena like lightning, HEMP, classical industrial EMI, UWB sources, and 
narrowband sources [1]. Notice that the spectral density of lightning and HEMP are higher than 
that of UWB or some of the narrowband sources. In this work, we have only considered IEMI 
sources that are susceptible to be transported. Therefore, neither HEMP nor heavy HPM sources 
have been included as possible threats within the framework of this thesis. 
1.2 Response of CIs to IEMI 
Although the susceptibility of individual electronic systems to IEMI sources has been the 
subject of many investigations during the past two decades or so (see a list of relevant 
references in [24]), there was little work before 2010 on the response of large and extended 
infrastructures, such as power systems, airports, communications facilities, etc.; and their 
relevant equipment [25-28]. Among the few efforts, the vulnerability of electrified railway 
facilities to IEMI [12, 14] and the general mitigation and assessment methodology against IEMI 
[28, 29] were subject of investigations in Uppsala university. 
As part of another initiative started in early 2007 in Sweden, a consortium was created 
involving Sweden, the Netherlands, and Lithuania to assess the risks, and take measures to 
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prevent the disabling of SCADA systems as a result of an IEMI attack [27]. The consortium 
also initiated a program in which brings together stakeholders of the transmission and 
distribution systems along with experts in IEMI to analyze the possible outcomes of an attack 
against the Swedish grid. 
 
 
Fig. 1.1 Chart presenting the comparison of the approximate spectra generated by different EM 
disturbances. Taken from [1]. 
 
The commission to assess the threat to the United States from an EMP Attack has published a 
very comprehensive report containing a description of the potential vulnerabilities of the US 
critical national infrastructures to EMP threats, with emphasis on NEMP [30]. In the same study 
line, Metatech Corporation presented a report in which the possible impacts of IEMI in the US 
power grid were assessed [31]. In both documents, an outlook is presented of a test program 
targeted at identifying thresholds at which significant control and protective components for 
electrical systems would begin to fail through disruption, false data acquisition, and permanent 
damage. Very recently, in 2010, the US House of Representatives approved a new bill, HR-
5026, known as The GRID Act. The bill enables the FERC to mandate protection of the power 
grid from IEMI. In [31], several vulnerable electronic devices were identified in the power 
generation and transmission systems. Coupling strengths that resulted in either a reboot or a 
reduction of the life cycle of the affected hardware were measured. The effects observed on the 
tested equipment included direct malfunctions of some tested control elements, loss of 
calibration data which required the reset of the device, loss of data transmission and, what could 
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be worse, false measurements from the sensors. In general, the response of the tested equipment 
was found to be highly variable. Nevertheless, the tests performed in [30] showed that every 
tested SCADA system failed when exposed to the simulated NEMP environment. Many of 
these results can be extrapolated to the IEMI environment since the frequency ranges and 
amplitudes in some cases could be the same.  
As a consequence, at generation facilities, the upset of protection and control systems could 
cause the plant to trip or trigger a controlled emergency shutdown. The operations at 
transmission substations are generally operated by using different communication strategies that 
could also be vulnerable to IEMI since the sensors, communications and power connections are 
generally found outdoor with either buried or overhead cabling. If communications were 
completely interrupted, it is still reasonably possible to continue operations. However, the 
restoration without some form of communication would not be possible [30]. 
At the distribution level, the IEMI threat appears to be less dramatic at this time since it has 
been found that these networks barely run with ICT equipment. It is believed that distribution 
networks can be significantly affected only by arcing, which in principle should not occur in the 
case of IEMI attacks due to the low expected amplitudes (in the range of 10kV/m or less). 
However, in view of the trend towards smart and distributed energy systems, it can be 
anticipated that distribution systems will become more vulnerable to such disturbances. 
Besides studying the threat against the generation, transmission, and distribution networks 
themselves, it is of interest to assess the control paths at power control centers. From previous 
studies [30-32], it is expected that a significant fraction of all remote control systems could be 
easily disabled with traditional conducted IEMI weapons. They can be very effective because of 
their large energetic content at low frequencies. Several studies show that conducted IEMI 
propagates easily in buildings through LVP and/or grounding networks [17, 33-35]. It has been 
found that voltage levels between 0.5 to 1 kV could be enough to induce a perturbation on 
traditional PCs [31]. 
The global study of the risk of critical facilities has become necessary to quantify the need of 
hardening and ensure business continuity. A method for the systematic analysis of the IEMI risk 
of a critical facility from the view point of the system owner has been recently proposed in [36]. 
This method combines the IEMI source characteristics, the susceptibility data of the 
components, and an FTA for calculating its failure probability after running several Monte 
Carlo simulations. The practical implementation of such strategy has not been fully investigated 
and there are still open questions about the feasibility of such detailed analysis in complex 
scenarios.  
In 2012, the European Community sponsored three FP7 research projects to ensure the security 
of the citizens from threats posed by IEMI [37]: STRUCTURES [38], HIPOW [39], and 
SECRET [40]. The projects were aimed at generating awareness in the national policy makers 
about the IEMI risks faced by modern CIs (STRUCTURES and HIPOW) and railway systems 
(SECRET), and developing improved protection strategies for mitigating their vulnerability. 
The STRUCTURES project was focused on the assembly of numerical tools to analyze the EM 
interaction of different infrastructures with the environment generated by IEMI sources [41]. To 
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this aim, the EMT concept was used to decompose the general interaction problem into simpler 
sub-problems that were solved with the appropriate method. The EMT concept has also been 
used in the HIPOW project [42] for calculating the EM environment inside buildings with the 
aid of the PWB method. Further explanations about EMT and the state of the art in numerical 
methods for calculating the EM interaction of complex systems will follow in the next 
subsection.  
It is important to mention that many of the findings of this thesis were obtained from the work 
performed by the author in the framework of the STRUCTURES project, and two national 
projects sponsored by the Swisselectric Research Consortium and the HPE Laboratory of the 
Swiss Federal Department of Defense – Armasuisse. The former project was entitled “Impact of 
IEMI on Electric Power Systems”. The final aim of the project was to propose guidelines for the 
mitigation of the risks of an IEMI attack to the Swiss power grid. The latter project was entitled 
“Study of the propagation of IEMI interferences along transmission lines”. This project aimed at 
understanding the possibility of studying the coupling and propagation of IEMI disturbances 
along commercial lines and buildings with the use of the TL theory.  
A new project was recently initiated in Sweden aimed at maintaining the functional safety of 
CIs under an IEMI Attack [43]. Within this project, experimental results on the shielding 
effectiveness of window panes and energy saving windows were obtained [44]. 
1.3 Numerical analysis methods for IEMI 
A general view of the state of the art of the numerical simulation tools for the study of the EM 
interaction with complex systems is presented in this section, which draws heavily from [41]. 
Due to the complexity of the CIs and the difficulty in obtaining experimental data, the use of 
numerical simulation tools to evaluate the effect of IEMI disturbances is desirable. Substantial 
efforts have been made during the last three decades to assess EM field coupling to structures 
and to develop protection against EMI (e.g., [45-49]). Outstanding progress in numerical EM 
simulation tools and computational power have made possible a more detailed and accurate 
modeling of complex geometries that may be encountered in the real world. With the 
appearance of IEMI as a new threat to society, new challenges have been posed to the 
community in terms of the need for methodologies to address the compatibility of facilities 
against radiated and conducted interferences with ranges of frequencies and amplitudes that may 
differ from the traditional disturbance sources (e.g. lightning, industrial noise, communications 
broadcasting). This has led to the trend of providing more efficient modeling strategies for 
analyzing the response of large complex systems such as airplanes [50], cars [51, 52], or 
helicopters [53]; and critical facilities such as electrified railway facilities [12], and electric 
power infrastructures [27, 54]. The main issues that arise when considering the analysis of large 
complex systems are the big amount of required memory and CPU time for handling such 
simulations, and the possibility of including the physical models of the generally neglected 
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components(materials, junctions, slots) that are required to obtain accurate description of 
current distributions [53]. 
1.3.1 Electromagnetic topology 
In order to perform approximate analyses of the response of complex systems, the EMT concept 
[55, 56] has played a key role since it permits dividing a complicated chain of EM interaction 
events into a number of simpler parts. Within an EMT-based analysis, the response of a system 
is obtained by considering independently all the interaction problems that occur; starting from 
the knowledge of the incident field and ending with the internal component response [46]. 
Civil infrastructures like office buildings or commercial infrastructures without any special 
EMC requirement are typically designed without an EM topological division of zones. This 
complicates the decomposition of CIs into topological layers since they are not very well 
defined. Also, many of the EM hardening concepts can be violated. Conceptually, it is easier to 
estimate the response at a specified location inside the CI with the aid of an EMT diagram 
because the interaction mechanisms that are responsible at each stage of the EM penetration can 
be described by separate transfer functions. The chaining of all the associated transfer functions 
will constitute the so-called interaction sequence diagram (for more information see, e.g., 
chapter 1 of [49] or [53]). The interaction sequence diagram of systems exhibiting 
characteristics similar to the CIs under study have already been addressed in the literature (see 
Fig. 1.2).  
According to Fig. 1.2, in many practical cases the largest contribution to a response within the 
system is due to transmission lines which provide a direct propagation path from one point to 
another. Thus, the analysis could be carried out by evaluating only the contribution of direct 
connections to the volume under test. 
1.3.2 Simulation techniques at low or intermediate frequencies 
At low or intermediate frequencies, three different types of fully validated numerical tools can 
be used to solve the coupling problem [53] at each shielding level: 
1.3.2.1 Three dimensional full-wave simulation codes 
In 3-D full-wave numerical tools, the problem is formulated in terms of formal solutions to 
Maxwell’s equations and the appropriate field boundary conditions. Fields are calculated in the 
exterior and the interior of the structures using either a time domain, or a frequency domain 
technique. Even though full-wave approaches can in principle be used at very high frequencies, 
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their application to cases when the size of the system is much bigger than the wavelength might 
become prohibitive in terms of computation time and memory requirement.  
Three main families of fully validated codes may be distinguished [53]: Volumetric codes, 
where the whole calculation volume is meshed into volume shells (FDTD for example); Surface 
codes, where only the surfaces of the diffracting object are meshed (MoM for example); and 
Asymptotic techniques which are based on an asymptotic formulation of Maxwell’s equations 
(PTD and UTD for example). 
 
 
Fig. 1.2 Interaction sequence diagram for shielded systems with unshielded cables. Figure 
adapted from [49]. 
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1.3.2.2 Cable network codes 
Cable network codes are based on the TL theory and are used to solve the problem of 
electromagnetic field coupling to wires and cables, using the previously determined field 
distributions inside the topological shielding level. Within the TL models, several key aspects of 
the wiring in complex systems such as cable shield properties, frequency dependent dielectrics, 
or inhomogeneous propagating media, can be included independently from the cable lengths 
because the bundles are specified by their cross-section. 
It is important to highlight that TL models do not account for radiation and assume a quasi-
TEM distribution of the fields along the transmission lines. Such condition is generally 
observed when the MTL cross section (e.g., height over the reference plane) does not exceed a 
fraction of the minimum wavelength (one tenth or so) [46, 57]. Depending on the frequency, it 
may be desired to account for the backscattering of cables in order to identify resonant 
behaviors in the cavities running the wires. However, as far as the TEM mode approximation is 
concerned, techniques are available to handle the field emission due to cable network-induced 
currents with 3D codes or reciprocity-based approaches [48, 53].  
The EM coupling to cables is represented in the TL model as a set of voltage and/or current 
generators distributed along the wires and expressed in terms of the incident electromagnetic 
fields, namely the fields evaluated in absence of the transmission line. The incident 
electromagnetic fields can be first evaluated using a full-wave approach and then imported into 
the cable network codes. This is how the link between 3D full-wave codes and cable network 
codes is made. The largest advantage of such an approach is that the calculation of the incident 
fields, which takes time whatever full wave technique is used, is made once for all in the 
absence of the cable bundles. Afterwards, the network code solving the field-to-transmission 
line interaction can be launched for various cable topologies, provided that the cable routes 
remain the same [50]. 
Another important advantage of working with TL models is that they can be used with an EMT 
formalism [58] in which the wiring network is decomposed into a set of tubes and junctions 
respectively representing the network branches and nodes. Currents on the branches are 
obtained from the frequency domain solution of the so called BLT equations describing all the 
interactions within the network [50]. The junctions are described in terms of any type of Z, Y, or 
S multiport matrices derived from analysis or measurements. 
When dealing with shielded cables, the coupling between the external currents flowing in the 
cable screens and the internal induced voltages and currents is made through the so-called 
transfer impedance and admittance of the screens [48, 59]. The theoretical estimation and 
measurement of the transfer impedance of common cables at frequencies above 100 MHz 
become an issue, and poses a difficulty for implementing the MTL models. 
Recent efforts to extend the cable models at higher frequencies have provided with methods to 
generalize the TL models to account simultaneously for the propagation and radiation effects 
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[57, 60-62]. These methods are still under development and have only been validated for simple 
geometrical setups. 
1.3.2.3 Electrical circuit codes 
Once the currents and voltages at the cable terminations (equipment inputs) are determined, 
electrical circuit codes such as SPICE can be used to solve the internal equipment response [53]. 
1.3.3 Simulation techniques at high frequencies 
At high frequencies, where wavelengths are much smaller than the dimensions of the system, 
the use of the 3D codes and the circuit and TL theory for the analysis of CIs will get 
complicated. Facilities are not generally conceived from an EMT philosophy and some typically 
made assumptions in EMT analysis (e.g. good shielding approximations, or small apertures) 
may not be applicable. Furthermore, high-frequency responses of systems are very sensitive; i.e. 
very small variations in the geometry, may result in very large variations in the field 
distributions [53]. Since the design and the placement of components in complex systems at 
high frequencies are not well controlled, deterministic models are not favored to be the 
appropriate methodologies for estimating the response.  
It has been suggested that statistical approaches may provide more appropriate tools for 
obtaining the EMC behavior subject to random input parameters [63]. A common approach to 
tackle such a problem has been for years through the well-known Monte-Carlo approach which 
requires a large number of trials of deterministic simulations to obtain the PDF of the output of 
the system [64]. In the kind of models required for EMI studies, where running a single 
deterministic simulation represents a major computational task, the use of the Monte Carlo 
approach might be prohibitive in terms of computation time. Methods like the unscented 
transform [63] or the stochastic collocation method [65], among others, which allow inferring 
the PDF, or at least some of its moments, from a small number of simulations, have shown to be 
promising. However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, their accuracy in modeling real 
system configurations have not been quantified in the literature. 
In the context of IEMI, a statistical approach provides estimates of mean coupling but it does 
not provide any worst case scenario. Physical uncertainties (or variability) in EM quantities are 
generally modeled with Gaussian distributions. This implicitly restricts the analysis to the mean 
contributions of the observables. In security and safety contexts, this kind of restriction may 
reduce the analysis soundness since Gaussian approximations are known to fail in accurately 
modeling rare events which are the most critical in our applications [66]. The application of the 
extreme value theorem and more precisely the excess model has shown to be a useful tool to 
avoid the underestimation of the probability associated with critical extreme events [67]. In 
[67], the Generalized Pareto Distribution was used to extrapolate the very high level of voltages 
and currents that can be induced by IEMI in power distribution networks. 
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The PWB method [68] is another statistical macroscopic approach for the EM coupling into 
oversized complex systems. The PWB method is based on energy equilibrium and has been 
shown to provide satisfactory results at high frequencies. This approach is based on the 
assumption that the EM fields inside the enclosures of complex systems behave as random 
variables, similarly to what happens in an MSC [69]. BLT-like equations can also be derived to 
solve for the power densities and dissipated powers at each node; and as a consequence, the 
PWB method can also be described with an EMT formalism [68]. It has recently been shown 
that PWB can be effectively used to calculate the transfer functions between different areas of a 
building and the exterior of it in order to assess the EM environment in potentially critical 
rooms subjected to an IEMI threat [70]. 
1.4 IEMI standardization and recommendations 
Given its importance to society, the protection of military and civil infrastructures is constantly 
assessed by international organizations and procurement agencies. The global risk of CIs being 
unclear, at the moment, there are not normative standards enforcing a safety qualification of 
systems against IEMI. However, important advances have been made in the last years in the 
generation of recommendations and standards for testing the immunity of electronic systems 
and designing general protection strategies. In what follows, an overview of the standards and 
recommendations generated by IEC, IEEE, ITU, and CIGRE is given. 
1.4.1 Standards and recommendations according to IEC 
The subcommittee SC77C of IEC has dedicated since 1992 lots of efforts to provide 
recommendations and protection guidelines for HEMP, and more recently, for HPEM and 
IEMI. This subcommittee is perhaps the most active committee in this field and usually other 
standardization committees (IEEE, ITU, CIGRE) make reference to the general guidelines, 
environment definitions, and specific protection and hardening strategies defined by IEC-
SC77C [71]. 
A summary of the standards published by the SC77C of IEC is presented in Fig. 1.3. In this 
chart, the standards dealing with HEMP protection are presented with black lines, and the 
standards dealing with HPEM/IEMI environments are presented with red lines. Documents 
under preparation are presented with gray lines. There are six recommendations available for the 
study of the protection against HPEM/IEMI. Among these, three documents deal directly with 
the issue of protection and susceptibility evaluation for HPEM/IEMI environments. 
The recommendation 61000-1-5 [32] covers the general definition of the HPEM threat and 
provides a general overview of the expected effects in civilian systems. This is the first 
document produced by IEC in which specific mention to the IEMI threat was made. A general 
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description of the expected IEMI environments and the documented effects in the available 
literature are presented. Notice that the considered sources in the elaboration of this standard are 
up to 2004. In this thesis, we have made an effort to revisit and update the survey of existing 
IEMI sources. 
The final chapter of this recommendation deals with a brief overview of the suggested 
protection methods. The document focuses in distinguishing the classical EMC measures that 
can be used for the mitigation of the so-called front-door coupling (deliberate penetration) and 
the so-called back-door penetration (inadvertent) [72]. The need of providing the system with 
alternative protection methods including active monitoring, system redundancy, error detection 
and correction is also emphasized. 
The recommendation 61000-5-9 [73] presents a methodology that can be used to assess the 
impact of HEMP and HPEM environments on electronic systems. Since the proposed 
methodology is very general, some application examples are provided in the form of annexes to 
the main document. However, the document does not include safe operation techniques.  
 
 
Fig. 1.3 Overview of the documents produced by the subcommittee SC77C of IEC. Image 
adapted from [71]. 
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This document can be used to determine the status of a particular system (including vehicles, 
aircrafts, and small ships), subsystem, or equipment, with respect to hardening. The proposed 
method is based on low-level (transfer function) and high-level tests (to consider nonlinear 
failures). The techniques presented in this recommendation are very useful for the determination 
of the hardness of a CI as it will be shown in Chapter 2. 
Similarly, the recommendation 61000-4-36 [74] can be used to define the test level conditions 
for the assessment of the immunity of equipment and systems. The strategy considers several 
sources that have been classified according to their far-voltage1 and other criteria like the 
required technical preparation of the attacker, and the deployment scenarios. The existing 
protection level due to the location of the equipment is evaluated based on previous studies of 
building attenuation. Notice that the experimental campaigns presented in Chapter 4 and the 
calculations performed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 can also be considered for the analysis of the 
attenuation due to cable coupling and propagation along commercial lines. However, it is 
advised that the protection level to be calculated is based on on-site measurements. 
Finally, the actual environment in the equipment surrounding is estimated by using the path loss 
due to the distance from the source and the equipment enclosure. The test limits are derived 
assuming that the victim equipment is placed inside a building that is at a certain distance from 
a typical IEMI source. After understanding the EM environment, the assessment options 
presented in Fig. 1.4 [74] can be used to decide the test method that will emulate the equipment 
stress under real conditions. 
 
 
Fig. 1.4 Assessment options for immunity testing according to IEC 61000-4-36 [74]. 
                                                     
1 The far voltage is defined as the range-normalized radiated E-field (see Chapter 3). 
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Depending on the adopted tool, there are generic suggested test levels for radiated and 
conducted susceptibility for all kind of sources: 
(i) Hyperband, mesoband, and hypoband illumination [2]; 
(ii) Damped sinusoid, CW or impulse injection. 
To this end, the source inventory and characteristics presented in Chapter 3 are very useful in 
defining the required test levels and the source type. 
1.4.2 Standards and recommendations according to ITU, IEEE and CIGRE 
Other standardization committees dealing with IEMI include ITU, IEEE and CIGRE. Some 
recommendations have been recently published by each of these organizations and will be 
briefly described in what follows. As it has been already mentioned, some of these documents 
make reference to standards and recommendations of IEC. 
ITU recommendation K81 discusses the HPEM protection of telecommunication systems. It 
proposes a classification scale for IEMI sources and intrusion areas. It also studies the expected 
field levels of several HPEM sources and derives required security levels according to the 
standards complied with by the equipment. Finally, suggested protection levels for data centers 
and similar facilities are provided. 
IEEE has elaborated the standard P1642 [75] for the specific protection of publicly accessible 
computer systems (ATMs, cash registers, computers in stores, banks, etc.). The standard 
recommends protection levels based on a physical security approach and EM topological 
zoning, and the use of modern strategies like fault tolerant computation methods, monitoring 
and alarms. A similar method to that used in K81 for calculating the required protection levels 
for ensuring safe EM environments is also used in this standard. 
CIGRE has elaborated the recommendation 600 [76] for the protection of control centers in HV 
substations. After several visits to HV substations and specific immunity testing of the control 
equipment, CIGRE recommends required protection levels by assuming a typical IEMI weapon 
in the surroundings of the facilities. The protection methods include cable layout, shielding, 
ferrite installation, SPDs installation, etc.  
1.5 Objectives and original contributions of this thesis 
The present thesis constitutes a contribution to the existing methods for the analysis of the 
vulnerability of critical systems to IEMI. Throughout the study, three main research questions 
guided the author in the elaboration of the research work presented in this thesis: 
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(i) The need of a qualitative method for the assessment of a CI: one of the difficulties of 
the application of the existing IEMI analysis techniques is the complexity of the CIs under study 
and therefore the prohibitive time required for an accurate estimate of the IEMI risk. 
(ii) The need of an updated and systematic classification of the realizable IEMI sources: the 
correct understanding of the expected IEMI environments will define the required protection 
techniques. 
(iii) The need of experimental and numerical methodologies to predict the response of 
commercial cables at frequencies representative of IEMI. 
This manuscript contains the most relevant studies and achievements obtained by the author in 
the framework of different collaboration projects between the EMC Laboratory of EPFL and 
other national and international laboratories working in the field of EMC, HPEM, and 
protection against electromagnetic attacks. The original contributions presented in this 
document have resulted in publications in peer-reviewed journals and presented at international 
conferences. A summary of the main publications related to the work presented in this thesis is 
presented in Tab. 1.1. 
Tab. 1.1 Summary of the publications supporting this thesis 
Reference Year Research Area Presented at Chapter 
[77] 2012 IEMI Risk Assessment EUROEM 2012 Conference 2 
[78] 2014 IEMI Source Analysis System Design and 
Assessment Notes 
3 
[79] 2016 
IEMI Susceptibility 
Assessment IEEE Transactions on EMC 4 
[42] 2015 
Transmission Line 
Theory 
Joint IEEE/EMC Europe 
International Symposium on 
EMC 
5 
[80] 2015 
IEMI Susceptibility 
Assessment 
ASIAEM 2015 Conference 
Interaction Notes 
5 
[81] 2013 IEMI Susceptibility 
Assessment 
ICEAA 2013 Conference 6 
[82] 2014 
IEMI Susceptibility 
Assessment AMEREM 2014 Conference 6 
[83, 84] 2015 Transmission Line 
Theory 
IEEE Transactions on EMC 7 
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1.5.1 Contributions to the area of IEMI risk analysis 
Assessing the risk of a critical facility against IEMI has been one of the main subjects of study 
in the last decade or so, and different approaches to the problem have been published in the 
academic literature. The methodology that we introduce in Chapter 2 is one of the many 
possible approaches to the study of the probability of deliberately using electromagnetic 
interference to stop the normal and continuous supply of services from CIs to the society. We 
have tried to put together all the available tools into a single methodology to carry out the so-
called IEMI audit of a facility. The main objective of this methodology is to enable the business 
continuity management operators to take appropriate corrective and mitigation measures, based 
on the results of the IEMI audit. 
Given the complexity of the problem, it was decided that the vulnerability of an infrastructure 
should be evaluated in a qualitative manner by judging the available information with regards to 
the consequences of interrupting the normal provision of a service, the probability of occurrence 
of an IEMI attack, and the preparedness of the infrastructure to withstand an attack. All these 
three criteria can be evaluated by the facility or EMC experts with the aid of the tools that will 
be explained in Chapter 2. The primary objective of the method, rather than qualifying the risk 
of a facility is to be able to identify the critical equipment and coupling paths that may require 
EM hardening. 
1.5.2 Contributions to the area of IEMI source analysis 
The notable progress during the past two decades in the generation of HPEM with rather 
transportable sources has raised concerns about the feasibility of an EM attack against critical 
electronic systems. Understanding the world capabilities in the development of non-lethal EM 
weapons is a prerequisite to design adequate hardening strategies for critical equipment. One of 
the latest surveys about the HPEM generation and protection capabilities around the world was 
published by the IEEE Transactions on EMC in its 2004 special issue on IEMI [85]. A 
compendium that reports the main characteristics of the HPEM facilities of several national 
defense agencies has been also published in 2009 by IEC [86]. 
Given the many advances made in the past decade, in particular in the generation of mesoband 
and more compact sources, we decided to revisit the survey in Chapter 3 by including new 
reported sources. The available sources have been classified, for the first time in a systematic 
way, according to their electromagnetic environment, their transportability, technological 
development, and cost level. We present also an overview of the possible source limitations due 
to physical constraints of the implemented technologies in order to provide some figures 
representing the maximum expected limits of a potential IEMI source. The observed general 
trends in the fabrication of HPEM sources as well as their expected waveform and spectral 
characteristics are very useful for understanding the likelihood of a given EM attack and 
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therefore this chapter constitutes a major contribution for the planning of mitigation strategies 
against IEMI. 
A novel technique for an efficient evaluation of the Fourier transform of the source waveforms 
and the extraction of their spectral characteristics is presented in Appendix A. We also propose 
the use of the so-called Blumer index [87] for improving the time required for estimating the 
bandratio of a given spectrum. 
1.5.3 Contributions to the area of IEMI susceptibility assessment 
In the framework of the IEMI susceptibility evaluation of a commercial building, one is 
interested in the expected levels of EM coupling along typical cable types inside an office; i.e. 
the LVP, LAN, and TEL cabling. The evaluation of wave propagation/electromagnetic coupling 
along cables is customarily made using the TL theory [88] which applies to uniform 
transmission lines with electrically small cross-sectional dimensions, where the dominant mode 
of propagation is TEM. The evaluation of IEMI interferences is a challenging task for a number 
of reasons. First, the applicability of the TL theory to disturbance sources with higher frequency 
content (HPM, UWB, etc.) is a questionable topic [57] since the frequency range of the 
interferences are typically outside the nominal range and therefore the constitutive materials, 
cables’ cross section and connectors are not necessarily conceived for a correct propagation of 
the signals. Second, the random distribution of the lines inside the cable raceways and the cable 
imperfections create non uniformities in the propagation that are complicated to model without 
any experimental verification. 
In order to understand the expected disturbances due to a high frequency illumination of 
representative cablings inside an office, without having to model the complete setup in a full-
wave or transmission line environment, we have built an experimental setup consisting of a 2- 
meter long plastic raceway containing several LVP, LAN, and TEL cables. The raceway has 
been used for two experimental campaigns reported in Chapter 4. The first campaign consisted 
of the illumination of the raceway with an HPEM field inside a GTEM cell. In the second 
campaign, the same raceway was illuminated with a CW signal in a RC. For the first time in the 
literature, three types of cabling were investigated using an identical experimental technique in a 
very broad frequency range, namely from 40 MHz to 6 GHz. The transfer functions derived in 
this work are useful in IEMI risk analyses for many types of CIs, bearing in mind, of course, 
that they are derived from particular experiments. 
Notice that even though it has been mentioned that very accurate modeling with TL theory is 
barely possible in realistic scenarios due to the random configuration of the problem, it is 
important to highlight that educated decisions can still be taken with the use of approximate EM 
models where experiments are not allowed or difficult. This is typically the case of an IEMI 
audit because it is not generally allowed to perform EM testing inside critical facilities, and 
therefore the approximate solutions obtained with TL theory become the primary asset. 
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The propagation of high frequency IEMI signals along power/communications lines will be 
affected by dispersion effects that are generally disregarded at low frequencies. One can expect 
that, for a specific IEMI signal, these signals will be significantly damped beyond a certain 
distance due to the conductive and dielectric losses. In order to further understand the governing 
attenuation and dispersion mechanisms at these frequencies, in the second part of Chapter 5, we 
used TL theory to assess the propagation of IEMI signals along power/communication cables by 
considering a line that is partially illuminated by IEMI, and studying the attenuation and 
distortion of the traveled wave as a function of the propagation length. In Chapter 6, we present 
the TL modeling procedure of the propagation along the LVP network of the raceway. In order 
to validate the models, the numerical results were compared against measurements obtained 
with different frequency and time domain techniques. The contributions of these two chapters 
are useful for understanding the important parameters that need to be considered in the TL 
modeling of a realistic scenario at frequencies that are beyond the classical utilization of these 
networks. 
1.5.4 Contributions to the area of transmission line theory 
One of the challenges in the calculation of the IEMI disturbances with the use of TL theory is 
the possibility of defining a reference conductor for the evaluation of the CM and DM signals. 
We deal with very long cablings that are generally floating inside raceways or conduits that are 
not necessarily close to metallic surfaces. Thus, the evaluation of the conducted disturbances at 
the input of critical equipment connected to LVP, LAN, or TEL cables requires the calculation 
of the DM voltage between two wires (e.g. differential signal pairs, or twisted pairs) at a height 
above the ground plane which is not necessarily electrically small. Provided that the application 
of TL theory requires lines with electrically small cross sections, the accuracy of the DM signals 
becomes questionable.  
The analyses presented in the first part of Chapter 5 were performed for solving some open 
questions that were worth solving before applying the TL models for estimating the solutions of 
the DM propagation: 
(i) As long as the DM between the floating wires is concerned, what is the influence of 
being closer or farther from the ground plane on the accuracy of the solution? 
(ii) If the lines are electrically far from the ground plane, but they remain electrically 
close to each other, are the TL solutions still valid? 
We studied the DM coupling due to a plane wave illumination of a transmission line composed 
of two wires above a ground plane - a topic that has not been specifically addressed in the 
literature, to the best of the author’s knowledge. The results obtained using the classical TL 
theory are compared with full-wave solutions. 
Some critical facilities include more complicated cable assemblies including individually 
shielded cables, overshields, and multi-pin shielded connectors. The EM coupling in such 
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cablings is governed by the so-called overall transfer impedance of the assembly. TL theory has 
been successfully applied to analyze the mutual and external coupling in shielded cables. 
However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, it has never been systematically applied to the 
analysis of the transfer impedance in such complex cable assemblies. Chapter 7 presents the 
general considerations for the application of the TL theory for simulating the overall transfer 
impedance of complex cable assemblies showing very good agreement with measurements up 
to frequencies of 500 MHz. Some of the practical issues that occur in the modeling process of 
various components of cable assemblies, namely connectors, pigtails and backshell are 
discussed and a new formulation for the evaluation of multi-layered braided shield is proposed. 
1.6 Outline of the document 
This document is organized following a top-down approach. The global methodology proposed 
for the qualitative analysis of the IEMI risk is presented in Chapter 2. The required information 
about the IEMI source characteristics is presented in Chapter 3. This chapter is important for 
defining the expected frequencies and characteristics of the sources that are used in Chapter 4. 
This latter presents an experimental analysis of the expected response of commercial cables that 
are commonly found in CIs. If experiments are not allowed due to the complexity of the device 
under test, the general conditions for the correct application of the TL theory in the prediction of 
DM coupling and propagation are introduced in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 illustrates the application 
of the TL theory in the prediction of the propagation of LVP cables and the experimental 
verification of the models’ validity. In order to estimate field-to-cable coupling of complex 
cable harnesses, the concept of the overall transfer impedance is studied in Chapter 7. A 
thorough implementation and experimental validation of the TL model applied to an over-
shielded cable harness is described. Finally, conclusions and future perspectives are drawn in 
Chapter 8. 
 
 
2 Service-Based Risk Assessment 
 
19 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Several methodologies that can be used to perform the audit of a critical facility and decide 
whether a system is vulnerable against IEMI have been proposed in international 
recommendations and scientific publications [28, 36, 73, 89, 90]. These strategies assume that 
the facilities under study have been electromagnetically designed in a topological sense and 
therefore, the points of entry of disturbances are easily distinguishable; which may not be the 
case for civilian infrastructures. Also, the evaluation of the system vulnerability according to 
some of these recommendations relies on susceptibility measurements that are not necessarily 
feasible since the infrastructures under study are critical and not usually available for testing. 
Moreover, the required level of detail in methodologies as e.g. [36] may result in prohibitive 
efforts in terms of the time and technological resources and the obtained results may not 
necessarily differ to those obtained with lighter methodologies. 
Despite the significant advances in electromagnetic modeling during the last decades, the 
prediction of a failure inside a complex infrastructure with the use of computational or 
analytical methods is still a complex task due to the enormous amount of information required 
to generate a realistic model. Therefore, it is desirable to have a method in which by visual 
inspection and few meetings with the facility staff, the relevant information is obtained and a 
general assessment that identifies the possible flaws of a given infrastructure is performed. The 
assessment methods should rely on feasible experiments and simple analyses made with only 
the relevant information in order to infer the degree of hardness of a facility and the possible 
improvements with a reasonable amount of resources. 
Many of the available publications in the area of IEMI have dealt with methods for estimating 
the susceptibility of specific components or subsystems, the induced interference due to cable 
and aperture coupling (back-door coupling [72]), or the effects of direct coupling into a 
reception antenna and propagation of the interference up to the low noise amplifiers (front-door 
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coupling [72]) (see e.g. [12, 64, 72, 91-93]). On the other hand, the application of traditional 
methods to evaluate the overall susceptibility of large and complex infrastructures becomes 
prohibitive due to the large amount of subsystems and cabling. Given the high degree of 
uncertainty of the coupling paths in large structures, no experiments or analyses can certify the 
validity of a worst case scenario evaluation [90]. In practice, the audit of existent facilities is a 
difficult task since many of the building information are non-existent or difficult to find. Also, 
on-site low-power tests are generally not acceptable if they require the interruption of the 
activities. For obvious reasons, on-site high-power tests are neither acceptable if there is a 
possible compromise of ICT equipment involved in a critical process. Thus, the risk assessment 
methodology must remain qualitative but objective enough to provide with guidelines and 
hardening strategies, if required. 
In order to overcome some of the previously mentioned difficulties during the evaluation of the 
IEMI risk of a CI, in this chapter a qualitative method called the service-based risk assessment 
is proposed. The proposed methodology merges the strategies proposed in previous works [29, 
36, 64, 77, 91, 94-98] to qualitatively infer the IEMI risk of the services provided to society by a 
given facility. It provides the suggested methods to obtain the required information for deriving 
the so-called critical equipment list, the relevant coupling paths, and identifying the possible 
protection strategies. This method is oriented to assess the business continuity of the utilities 
and therefore it concentrates only on the equipment involved in the provision of important 
services, and considers the threats imposed by IEMI sources that are likely to occur given the 
accessibility constraints of the facility and the transportability of the sources. 
In this approach, rather than evaluating the electromagnetic susceptibility of a complex system 
integrated by several subsystems and equipment, the possibility of interrupting the provision of 
a given service due to an IEMI attack is evaluated. On the other hand, it also considers the fact 
that critical services can also be provided by other emergency equipment or personnel, and this 
reduces the risk evaluation. This is the case in small infrastructures in which highly trained 
personnel are able to assume emergency operations with little ICT support. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The method philosophy is presented in Section 2.2. The 
suggested scales to evaluate the so-called consequence and likelihood of an IEMI attack and the 
hardness of a service are presented in Sections 2.3 to 2.5. The method for the overall calculation 
of the service risk is explained in Section 2.6. Finally, the assessment workflow is summarized 
in Section 0 and conclusions are drawn in Section 2.8. 
2.2 Method philosophy 
It has been already mentioned that the possibilities of performing quantitative analyses during 
an IEMI audit are reduced and therefore qualitative analyses are easier to implement. In the 
service-based assessment, an EMC expert will make use of the available tools in order to 
evaluate the risk of a service provision. Given the time, budgetary and technical constraints, the 
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EMC expert will try to provide a qualitative answer to the following questions based on the 
available tools: 
(i) What is the impact of temporarily or permanently losing the provision of a given 
service?  
(ii) How probable is that a service could be affected by an IEMI threat given the 
physical conditions of the facility? 
(iii) How probable is that an IEMI source could be transported and operated nearby the 
facility? 
In traditional susceptibility investigations, the effects of disturbances in mission related 
equipment are described as threat levels. The threat levels imposed by a given source can be 
classified as (i) having no effect, (ii) capable to cause disturbances, (iii) capable to cause 
mission kills, and (iv) capable to cause destruction [96]. This can be regarded as a bottom-up 
analysis since the final effect is evaluated after exposing the equipment to different 
perturbations and evaluating its consequence at a higher hierarchical level. 
In a service-based assessment, the analysis is top-down: the possibility of perturbing or 
interrupting the provision of a given service is assessed, and then the possible reasons and the 
equipment involved are identified. The final output is a qualitative judgment of the risk 
according to three indicators (see Fig. 2.1): the consequence and likelihood of an IEMI attack 
and the hardness of the studied service. Each of these indicators is evaluated according to 
several factors that will be explained throughout this chapter. 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 Schematic diagram illustrating all the contributing factors for the calculation of the risk 
of a service against IEMI. 
 
The risk of being able to cause an impact on the provision of a service due to an IEMI threat can 
be mathematically defined as the product of its consequence and its probability of occurrence 
[36, 94]: 
Accessibility
Transportability
Availability
Life/health
Damage/failure
Loss of trust
Legal
Receptivity Redundancy
Hardness
Consequence Likelihood
RISK
2 Service-Based Risk Assessment 
 
22 
 
 ( ),?i i iR C p C   (2.1) 
where Ri is the risk of causing the consequence Ci, and p(Ci) is the probability of occurrence of 
the consequence Ci. 
The possibility of perturbing a service and generating consequence Ci is associated to a set of 
threats Tj that could induce such a failure. The probability of Ci due to all the possible threats Tj 
can be decomposed as the superposition of the conditional probability of Ci given that Tj exists 
times the probability of Tj [36, 94]: 
 ( ) ( / ) ( ).??i i j j
j
p C p C T p T   (2.2) 
If many consequences are evaluated, the total risk can be calculated as: 
 ( / ) ( ).? ?? ? ?i i i j j
i i j
R R C p C T p T   (2.3) 
Thus, the risk of a service against IEMI can be understood as being: 
(i) proportional to the consequence (impact) of losing the service temporarily or 
permanently (see Equation (2.1)), 
(ii) proportional to the likelihood ( probability of occurrence) of the IEMI source (see 
Equation (2.2)), 
(iii) proportional to the probability of inducing a considerable effect given that there is 
an IEMI attack. In other words, the risk is inversely proportional to the system 
hardness [97] 
An accurate estimation of the probabilities in (2.3) is difficult due to the many subjective criteria 
that have to be considered. Therefore, in what follows, the suggested scales for evaluating the 
consequence, likelihood, hardness, and risk of a service will be given in the form of lookup 
tables in which each of the contributing factors is classified according to a reduced number of 
levels (usually 3). These levels denote a high, low and unknown state of the factor under study. 
The choice of including an unknown state was previously suggested in [90] for evaluating a 
factor for which very little information is available during the IEMI audit. Notice that the 
suggested lookup tables are derived according to author’s criteria and are not the result of a 
rigorous mathematical manipulation of the factors. 
2.3 Assessing the consequences of a service loss  
In order to assess the consequences of temporarily or permanently losing the provision of a 
service, a so-called impact analysis can be performed with the facility experts in order to decide 
whether the interruption of a service will: 
(i) generate a legal sanction to the facility, 
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(ii) generate a loss of trust from the clients, 
(iii) generate a damage or failure to a third party, 
(iv) compromise the life or health of an individual,  
(v) result in any other possible consequence. 
Depending on the relevance of each consequence, an importance rating can be assigned to each 
of the categories and a total consequence evaluation can be derived as schematically illustrated 
in Fig. 2.2. While doing the impact analysis, the possibility of reestablishing the service 
provision in a reasonable amount of time or not being able to reestablish should be considered 
separately. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 Schematic diagram illustrating the contributing factors in the evaluation of the 
consequences of a service loss. 
 
Given that the importance rating may depend on the subjective criteria of the facility experts 
[29], a useful strategy is to translate the consequences of a service loss into a budget percentage 
loss, while keeping in mind that a threat to life or health should be the most important 
consequence in all the possible ratings. 
A suggested scale to express the total Consequence is presented in Tab. 2.1: 
 
Tab. 2.1 Suggested consequence level scale 
Consequence Level Description 
-1 Important consequence 
0 Unknown 
1 Less important consequence 
 
In the above-suggested scale, unimportant consequences are deliberately omitted. Notice that 
the possibility of not being able to rate the consequence of a service loss is also valid in the 
consequence assessment and therefore the existence of an unknown level. 
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2.4 Assessing the likelihood of a threat 
Forecasting the occurrence of an IEMI attack is a very complex task since many subjective 
criteria are involved. In general, the underlying assumption is that someone will deliberately 
attack a facility with an IEMI weapon. Therefore, in order to assign a qualitative evaluation of 
the likelihood of a given threat, the possibility of physically approaching the IEMI source to the 
facility is usually studied. 
The possibility of approaching an IEMI source to a facility can be evaluated according to three 
factors that are schematically illustrated in Fig. 2.3: 
(i) the availability of the source: how difficult is to build or acquire a source? 
(ii) the transportability of the source: how difficult is it to transport and operate a 
source close to the facility? 
(iii) the accessibility to the facility: how difficult is to access the facility with a source 
provided that the security and surveillance protocols are working? 
 
 
Fig. 2.3 Schematic diagram illustrating the contributing factors in the evaluation of an IEMI 
source likelihood. 
 
The evaluation of these three factors are subject to the criteria of the EMC and security experts 
of the facility. However, some guidelines for the classification can be obtained from the 
available literature, as will be discussed in what follows. 
2.4.1 Source availability 
The source availability describes its attainability according to the level of sophistication of its 
underlying technologies. Different categorizations have been proposed in the literature to 
evaluate this characteristic (see a summary in [99, 100]). 
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2.4.1.1 Classification by Giri and Tesche (2004) 
Giri and Tesche have proposed in [2] a classification of the source technology according to the 
following categories: 
(i) Low-tech systems: characterized by a marginal performance, minimal technical 
capabilities, and easily assembled and deployed while hiding behind dielectric walls 
in trucks or similar vehicles. 
(ii) Medium-tech systems: require the skills of a qualified electrical engineer and 
relatively more sophisticated components such as a commercially available radar 
system that can be modified to become a dangerous system.  
(iii) High-tech systems: require specialized and sophisticated technologies and perhaps 
even specifically tuned to cause severe damage to a specific target. 
2.4.1.2 Classification by Sabath and Garbe (2009) 
In a more recent publication, Sabath and Garbe, used the term technological challenge to 
describe the knowledge and effort needed to design, assemble and operate a source [96]. They 
suggest considering the level of sophistication of the underlying technologies, the level of 
knowledge to design and operate the source, the availability of the components in the market, 
and the costs in order to classify the sources according to the following categories: 
(i) Low tech systems 
(ii) Medium tech systems 
(iii) High tech systems 
(iv) Highly sophisticated systems 
Unfortunately, there is little explanation about how to decide whether a source belongs or not to 
each of the categories. 
2.4.1.3 ITU Classification (2009) 
In the same year, the term availability has been proposed in the ITU Recommendation [89] to 
measure both the cost and the technological sophistication of a source. The categories proposed 
by the ITU are: 
(i) Consumer 
(ii) Hobbyist 
(iii) Professional 
(iv) Bespoke 
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Unfortunately, there is no explanation about the criteria to place a source in a given category. 
2.4.1.4 Classification in terms of costs  
Among all the criteria that have been proposed in the literature to classify the availability of a 
source, the simplest measure is to use the estimated cost of a source. Sabath and Garbe have 
proposed some reasonable ranges for evaluating the cost category of a source in [96]: 
(i) Low cost: less than 1k€ 
(ii) Moderate cost: between 1k€ and 100 k€ 
(iii) Medium cost: between 100k€ and 1M€ 
(iv) High cost: more than 1M€ 
2.4.1.5 Proposed scale 
Once the method to measure the availability of the IEMI sources has been chosen by the EMC 
expert, the obtained results can be translated to the suggested scale presented in Tab. 2.2. 
Depending on the scenario, the EMC expert will try to answer the question “how difficult is to 
build or acquire a source?”, and the availability level should be chosen accordingly. 
 
Tab. 2.2 Suggested availability level scale 
Availability Level Description 
-1 Source easy to obtain 
0 Unknown 
1 Source difficult to obtain 
 
Notice that the possibility of not being able to rate the availability of a source is also considered. 
2.4.2 Source transportability 
The source transportability evaluates its requirements in terms of size, weight, and energy 
supply so that it can be physically displaced close to a target. The categories for evaluating the 
transportability of a source are also subject to the criteria of the experts. However, there are 
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some guidelines in recent literature that could serve as a tool for the classification (see [99, 
100]). 
2.4.2.1 Classification by Sabath and Garbe (2009) 
Sabath and Garbe used the term mobility to characterize the transportability of a source in [96]. 
They have proposed the following categories for classifying the mobility of a source: 
(i) Stationary: if the source is part of a fixed installation. 
(ii) Transportable: if the source can be transported between various locations, but 
during operation it has to be stationary at one location. 
(iii) Mobile: if the source can be integrated into a mobile platform and can operate 
during the motion of the platform. 
(iv) Very mobile: if the source is mobile and has the ability to operate undiscovered in 
urban environments. 
(v) Highly mobile: if the source is mobile and has the ability to operate undiscovered 
within a building or transportation systems. 
2.4.2.2 ITU Classification (2009) 
The term used by ITU to characterize the transportability of the sources is the portability level. 
Four portability levels were defined according to the following considerations [89]: 
(i) Pocket size or body worn: applies to threat devices that can be hidden in the human 
body and/or in the clothing. 
(ii) Brief case or back-pack sized: applies to threat devices that are too large to be 
hidden in the human body and/or in the clothing, but is still small enough to be 
carried by a person (such as in a briefcase or a back-pack). 
(iii) Motor-vehicle size: applies to threat devices that are too large to be easily carried 
by a person, but large enough to be hidden in a typical consumer motor vehicle. 
(iv) Trailer-sized: applies to threat devices that are too large to be either easily carried 
by a person or hidden in a typical consumer motor vehicle. Such threat devices 
require transportation using a commercial/industrial transportation vehicle. 
2.4.2.3 Proposed scale 
From an analyst point of view, the above mentioned categories do not totally answer the 
question “how difficult is it to transport and operate a source close to the facility?”. Therefore, 
the transportability levels presented in Tab. 2.3 are suggested in this work. 
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Tab. 2.3 Suggested transportability level scale 
Transportability Level Description 
-1 Source easy to transport and operate 
0 Unknown 
1 Source difficult to transport and operate 
 
The choice of the level should take into account the access ways to the facility and its 
surroundings. Notice that non-transportable sources cannot be categorized since they should not 
be part of the analysis for obvious reasons. 
2.4.3 Source accessibility 
The accessibility to a facility describes the ability of entering or approaching the critical areas 
where the important equipment is placed, without being recognized or identified by surveillance 
and /or security devices. It is a measure of the degree of protection of the implemented access 
restriction policies of the facility. 
A similar concept was defined by Mansson et. al. in the so-called ASC (Accessibility, 
Susceptibility, Consequence) cube [29], in which, by using the facility EMT [49], an 
accessibility factor is assigned to each zone (the inner zones should be less accessible). Since 
typically the EMT zone boundaries are not directly related to the physical access to the facility, 
and considering the fact that many civilian infrastructures are not planned with an EMT 
approach, it is not straightforward to use these criteria for defining the accessibility. 
ITU has also proposed in [89] a definition of protection zones based on the distance between the 
source and the facility. The definition of the protection zones is very useful to understand how 
transportable the source should be in order to be placed inside a zone, but it does not give 
insight on the likelihood of detecting the source. 
2.4.3.1 Proposed scale 
The accessibility of the source can be classified according to the following proposed categories: 
(i) Easy: If the security restrictions may not be able to detect the presence of the 
source. 
(ii) Unknown: if no information about the security of the facility exists. 
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(iii) Difficult: if rigorous security devices are installed in order to survey and to detect 
the presence of malicious material or personnel; e.g. material inspection at the 
entrance, need of passcodes, existence of surveillance cameras, metal detectors, 
alarms, etc. 
The proposed accessibility levels are summarized in Tab. 2.4. Notice that the possibility of not 
being able to rate the accessibility of a source is also considered. 
 
Tab. 2.4 Suggested accessibility level scale 
Accessibility Level Description 
-1 Source easy to access 
0 Unknown 
1 Source difficult to access 
 
2.4.4 Calculation of the likelihood 
Once the availability, transportability, and accessibility levels have been defined, the EMC 
expert will have to judge the likelihood of the source. It is difficult to provide general rules for 
inferring the total likelihood of a source given that the presented criteria are based on 
propositions provided in the publications of different authors. However, the previous evaluation 
of the three parameters should provide with enough information to make an educated selection. 
The suggested scale to express the total likelihood of a given IEMI threat is presented in Tab. 
2.5. 
 
Tab. 2.5 Suggested likelihood level scale 
Likelihood Level Description 
-1 Source likely to happen 
0 Unknown 
1 Source unlikely to happen 
 
2 Service-Based Risk Assessment 
 
30 
 
Notice that the possibility of not being able to rate the probability of a threat is also considered. 
In order to calculate the total likelihood from the source accessibility, transportability, and 
availability, we suggest using the lookup table presented in Tab. 2.6: 
 
Tab. 2.6 Likelihood lookup table 
Case Availability Transportability Accessibility Likelihood 
1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
2 -1 -1 0 -1 
3 -1 -1 1 1 
4 -1 0 -1 0 
5 -1 0 0 0 
6 -1 0 1 1 
7 -1 1 -1 -1 
8 -1 1 0 0 
9 -1 1 1 1 
10 0 -1 -1 -1 
11 0 -1 0 0 
12 0 -1 1 1 
13 0 0 -1 0 
14 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 1 1 
16 0 1 -1 -1 
17 0 1 0 0 
18 0 1 1 1 
19 1 -1 -1 -1 
20 1 -1 0 0 
21 1 -1 1 1 
22 1 0 -1 0 
23 1 0 0 0 
24 1 0 1 1 
25 1 1 -1 1 
26 1 1 0 1 
27 1 1 1 1 
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Tab. 2.6 has been generated by assigning an important weight to the accessibility since it is 
related to the security measures, and the awareness of the facility staff. It was also assumed that 
the attacker will try to use sources that are not easily detected by the security network of the 
facility. Therefore, the detectable sources become less likely to be used. The transportability 
and availability of the sources have been assumed as constraints of the likelihood but not as 
determinant factors since the intention to attack the facility already exists. This means that if the 
source is accessible, and if the source is either difficult to obtain or to transport, the attacker will 
still tend to use it. On the other hand, if the source is difficult to obtain and to transport, 
therefore, an unlikely level is assigned.  
2.5 Assessing the hardness of a service 
Studying the possibility of perturbing the service provision inside a hostile IEME is perhaps the 
most complex task of a service-based risk assessment because it requires the competences of 
EMC and facility experts, but also, the use of EM computational tools or experiments. It also 
involves a very good knowledge of the IT equipment functional and physical connection 
diagrams, and if possible, their susceptibility levels. These latter are difficult to obtain because 
traditional off-the-shelf equipment are typically tested against only surges representative of 
lightning, ESD, or electromagnetic levels in the range of equipment operating in normal 
conditions. 
The two factors proposed to calculate the hardness of a service are its receptivity and its 
redundancy (see Fig. 2.4). Both terms have been introduced in [29] to describe the effect of the 
transmitted electromagnetic energy to the supporting equipment and to consider redundancy of 
equipment or trained personnel that could react during a failure situation so that the service is 
not interrupted. 
 
 
Fig. 2.4 Schematic diagram illustrating the contributing factors for the calculation of the 
hardness of a given service against IEMI. 
 
Receptivity Redundancy
Hardness
RISK
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In very complex infrastructures there might be several vulnerable electronic units that are vital 
for the provision of a service. Therefore, the receptivity of single equipment may not be enough 
to estimate the total hardness, and that explains the importance of knowing very well the 
functional connection diagrams by the facility experts. The receptivity assessment evaluates the 
possibility of inducing a malfunction of the equipment that supports the provision of a service 
given that a specific threat is acting against the infrastructure. 
2.5.1 Fault tree analysis  
Genender et. al. have proposed a systematic use of the FTA in [95] for identifying possible 
causes of a system failure and to study the breakdown of each of the separate units. The 
advantage of this strategy is that it is a top-down approach and therefore it helps to identify and 
focus only on the important equipment. In the FTA, the facility expert starts defining a top 
undesired event (service loss), from which the successive chain of bottom events that may have 
caused it are identified until the main primary causes are reached. The relations and 
dependencies between events are specified by using the logical AND and OR operators as 
schematically shown in Fig. 2.5. 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 Example illustrating the construction of an FTA. 
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According to the FTA of Fig. 2.5, in order to interrupt the service provision, event 1 has to 
occur and equipment 3 has to fail. Event 1 will happen if either equipment 1 fails permanently 
or equipment 2 fails temporarily. The primary causes of the equipment failure are shown with 
round symbols. In the case of an IEMI assessment, the primary causes are always the deliberate 
deployment of the source against the facility and that the induced fields, currents, or voltages at 
the equipment under study are higher than a failure threshold. Notice that both primary causes 
have to happen in order to induce a failure in equipment 1, 2, or 3. Further information about the 
method can be found in [36, 95]. 
An FTA has to be implemented for each of the services provided by the facility. The possibility 
of temporarily or permanently losing a service has to be analyzed separately. While doing the 
FTA, the experts would also notice if a service may be supplied by other redundant units or the 
staff. These considerations will increase the service redundancy and eventually reduce the total 
vulnerability of a service loss.  
If the probabilities of the primary causes are considered, the probability of an equipment failure 
is estimated as the product (AND operator) of the probability of the existence of a source and 
the probability of a failure as: 
 1 1( ) ( ) ( ),? ? T jp X p V V p T   (2.4) 
where X1 is the failure of equipment 1, and Tj is the existence of source j. 
Notice that this result is consistent with Equation (2.2) in which the probability of a 
consequence was estimated as the conditional probability of the consequence given a threat 
multiplied by the probability of the threat. 
If the entire FTA of Fig. 2.5 is solved starting from the primary causes up to the top event, the 
probability of the service loss yields: 
 2 3 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )],? ? ? ? ?j Tp SL p T p E E p V V p I I   (2.5) 
where SL is the event of experiencing a service loss. 
Notice that the terms in (2.5) depend on the choice of the events of the FTA and therefore a 
numerical evaluation of this expression does not guarantee that the total probability is 
calculated. Thus, due to time constraints and in order to simplify the analysis, if the experts 
consider only the main equipment, the FTA analysis provides only a reduced picture of the 
probability of a service loss. However, a qualitative analysis can be performed so that important 
equipment and important parameters causing the failure can be identified. For example, the 
results of (2.5) already show the importance of the magnitude of the electric field in the vicinity 
of equipment 3. Also, notice the importance of the likelihood of the source (p(Tj)). 
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2.5.2 Critical equipment list 
The use of the FTA allows the identification of the critical equipment that supports the 
provision of a service. Once the list of critical equipment is obtained, all the possible 
information about equipment functions must be searched and their location inside the critical 
facility has to be referenced in the building plans of the facility. The critical equipment list 
should include the units that are considered as fundamental for the provision of a service. The 
equipment that appear on the top layers of the FTA and that may not have any redundancy are 
more likely to be included in the critical equipment list. 
2.5.3 Failure thresholds of the critical equipment 
The failure thresholds of the critical equipment are generally specified as current, voltage, 
electromagnetic field or power limits above which the equipment will experience a failure or a 
permanent damage. These limits can be obtained either by direct experiments [73], or by 
analytical calculations (see e.g. [93, 101]). Alternatively, literature research can be useful to 
make an educated guess by comparing with similar equipment that has already been tested 
against waveforms representative of IEMI (see e.g. [6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 32, 72, 102-107]). 
It has been shown that failures do not always occur at the same exposure levels and therefore a 
probability distribution has to be defined (see e.g. [7, 93]. The use of a Weibull distribution in 
order to model the susceptibility threshold of equipment has been also discussed in [36, 91]. 
Depending on the budgetary and time constraints, multiple experiments with real equipment or 
computer simulations can be carried out in order to derive the failure probability distributions of 
the critical equipment.  
2.5.4 Transfer functions between critical equipment and possible source locations 
2.5.4.1 Electromagnetic topological diagram 
The EMT diagram of the facility is a very useful tool that can be used to assess the expected 
current, voltage, field, or power level at the critical equipment inputs. It is drawn by the EMC 
expert by considering the paths through which the electromagnetic energy could propagate 
inside the facility and the nature of the shielding surfaces that may appear during the wave 
travel from the source up to the target. If possible, all the cable paths, lengths and cross sections 
should be known so that a computer simulation could be used for analytical purposes. Acquiring 
such detailed information is a difficult challenge not only for the EMC expert but also for the 
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facility staff. Further illustration about the use of topological diagrams can be found elsewhere 
in the literature, e.g. in [53]. 
2.5.4.2 Critical coupling paths 
The expected IEMI sources and their locations around the facility have to be chosen according 
to their accessibility, transportability, and availability. Since the positions of the critical 
equipment have already been obtained, the most effective coupling paths can be identified by 
using the topological diagram. While choosing the coupling paths, special attention has to be 
given to conducted penetrations and large apertures, because they constitute the main points of 
entry of the back-door coupling process. It is important to mention that the equipment failure is 
typically due to either a direct field exposure or a field-to-cable coupling into the 
communication ports. If a front-door coupling is expected, the analysis should address antennas 
and the front ends of communication equipment. 
2.5.4.3 Analytical or numerical calculation of the transfer functions 
After identifying the critical coupling paths, their transfer function can be estimated with the use 
of heavy computer analysis or simple calculations that consider the attenuation provided by 
building walls, metal cabinets, shielded enclosures, and cable coupling. There are many 
available examples of the prediction of the transfer functions between two points of a 
topological diagram by using either numerical calculations (e.g. [53, 98, 108-110] [70]) or 
approximate analytical evaluations (e.g. [76, 89, 111]). The choice between one and another 
depends on the expected level of accuracy. However, the possibility of estimating the correct 
transfer functions from analytical or numerical methods without involving experimental results 
remains an open challenge provided the complexity of the facilities under test.  
As it happens with the failure thresholds, the transfer functions also exhibit a statistical 
distribution due to the uncertainty in the parameters of the coupling paths (impinging field 
amplitudes, wall materials, polarization angles, cable lengths, cable loading, etc.). Therefore, the 
transfer function calculations may include random parameters and the coupling probability 
distribution might be derived by using a Monte Carlo analysis [36, 64, 91]. Some examples 
illustrating the statistical analysis of topological diagrams can be found, e.g., in [64, 66, 67, 81, 
112, 113]. 
2.5.4.4 Experimental determination of transfer functions 
If EM tests are allowed inside the facility, the transfer functions are better characterized with 
experiments. Low power experiments will be useful to characterize the transfer function of 
systems where the presence of nonlinear components is not expected. High power tests will 
allow to discover any malfunctions induced due to the non-linear behavior of components [73]. 
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However, these kinds of tests are barely allowed for security reasons. Examples and guidelines 
for performing such kind of measurements are also available in the literature ( see [33, 73, 109, 
114]). An empirical method to address the shielding effectiveness of buildings without using the 
time consuming two-antenna method has also been suggested in [115]. 
2.5.5 Failure estimation 
Once the transfer functions and the failure thresholds of the critical equipment are known, the 
failure of the equipment can be predicted by convolution with the expected electromagnetic 
environment generated by the IEMI source. In general, if the induced current, voltage, field, or 
power is higher than the threshold, a temporal or permanent failure will appear in the equipment 
under test. If the thresholds or the transfer functions were obtained by considering stochastic 
conditions, an improved analysis can be performed to estimate the so-called breakdown failure 
probability [29, 91].  
Assuming that the CDF of the threshold and the PDF of the transfer function are known 
variables, the BFP of the equipment can be calculated according to [91]: 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
?
? ? ? ?? T cinc c T X XBFP E p X X CDF X PDF X dX   (2.6) 
where incE is the impinging field, XC is the coupled current, voltage, field, or power, and XT is 
the threshold.  
Once the BFP has been calculated, the failure probability for a given field amplitude will be 
obtained.  
2.5.6 Service receptivity evaluation 
Once the failure probabilities of all the equipment supporting the provision of a service have 
been calculated, the service receptivity can be estimated according to the possibility of 
interrupting or disabling the service. If the failure probabilities of the equipment have been 
estimated with a yes/no criteria, then the bottom-up calculation of the FTA provides the 
receptivity evaluation. If the service loss is feasible, there is a high receptivity to the 
interferences. On the other hand, if the FTA evaluation shows that there is no compromise of 
the service provision, the receptivity is low.  
For the cases where a stochastic variation of the thresholds and the transfer functions has been 
considered, the probability of losing a service can be calculated by assuming a probability of 
occurrence of the source equals to 1, and use a similar equation to (2.5) to infer the total BFP. 
Of course, this is a rather complex procedure and the possibility of estimating all these functions 
highly depend on the available time and computational resources. The service receptivity is 
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judged by defining a probability threshold above which the receptivity can be assumed as high 
or low. As an example, a BFP of 50% (or other) could be used to define the difference between 
high or low receptivity. 
The suggested scale to estimate the service receptivity is presented in Tab. 2.7: 
 
Tab. 2.7 Suggested receptivity level scale 
Receptivity Level Description 
-1 High service receptivity 
0 Unknown 
1 Low service receptivity 
 
2.5.7 Service redundancy evaluation 
The service redundancy evaluates the possibility of providing the service with alternative 
equipment or personnel that won’t be interrupted by the presence of the given IEMI source. The 
scale presented in Tab. 2.8 is proposed to evaluate the service redundancy. 
 
Tab. 2.8 Suggested redundancy level scale 
Redundancy Level Description 
-1 Not redundant service provision 
0 Unknown 
1 Redundant service provision 
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2.5.8 Service hardness evaluation  
When the receptivity and redundancy of the service have been determined, the total hardness of 
the service can be evaluated according to the following categories: 
(i) Weak: for systems for which no redundancy and high receptivity is expected. 
(ii) Unknown: for systems for which little information about the receptivity and 
redundancy exist.  
(iii) Strong: for systems exhibiting a low receptivity and/or redundancy. 
The suggested hardness levels are summarized in Tab. 2.9. 
 
Tab. 2.9 Suggested hardness level scale 
Hardness Level Description 
-1 Weak service 
0 Unknown 
1 Strong service 
 
In order to calculate the total hardness according to the receptivity and redundancy levels, we 
suggest using Tab. 2.10. 
 
Tab. 2.10 Hardness lookup table 
Case Receptivity Redundancy Hardness 
1 -1 -1 -1 
2 -1 0 -1 
3 -1 1 1 
4 0 -1 0 
5 0 0 0 
6 0 1 1 
7 1 -1 1 
8 1 0 1 
9 1 1 1 
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Notice that Tab. 2.10 has been generated by assuming that a low service receptivity or the 
existence of redundancy will make the service provision strong. This could constitute an 
optimistic perception of the hardness to the eyes of another EMC expert, and therefore the 
proposed level combinations can be accordingly modified.  
2.6 Assessing the service risk 
The final estimation of the service risk will use the consequence¸ likelihood, and hardness levels 
as inputs and according to the criteria of the EMC expert, a final qualitative evaluation is made. 
The risk examination is the conclusion of a thorough study in which several concepts that have 
been introduced in this chapter are put together in a single indicator as it was schematically 
illustrated in Fig. 2.1. 
The final conclusion itself is perhaps less important than all the information gained in the 
evaluation process, namely, the identification of important services provided by the facility, the 
critical equipment, possible coupling paths, important physical variables, and accessibility 
flaws. However, in order to provide with a single evaluation of the risk of losing the provision 
of a service, the following categories can be used: 
(i) High risk: when the service can be easily compromised with the use of IEMI and 
the consequences for the facility are important. These services are those to which 
special attention has to be paid in the business continuity management policies for 
allocating the resources for the required EM hardening measures. 
(ii) Moderate risk: when the service does not exhibit the correct hardness and in the 
event of an attack with a given source, the service provision is likely to be 
compromised. However, the likelihood of the studied source or the consequences 
might not be considered as a priority in the business continuity management 
program. 
(iii) Unknown risk: when the provided information is not enough to provide a risk 
evaluation. 
(iv) No risk: when the service exhibits the correct hardness; or in the case of a weak 
hardness level, when the likelihood of the source is low and/or the consequences are 
insignificant. 
A summary of the risk levels is presented in Tab. 2.11.  
 
 
 
 
2 Service-Based Risk Assessment 
 
40 
 
Tab. 2.11 Suggested risk level scale 
Vulnerability Level Description 
-2 High risk 
-1 Moderate risk 
0 Unknown 
1 No risk 
 
In order to calculate the risk according to the consequence, likelihood, and hardness levels, we 
suggest using Tab. 2.12. 
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Tab. 2.12 Risk lookup table 
Case Consequence Likelihood Hardness Risk 
1 -1 -1 -1 -2 
2 -1 -1 0 0 
3 -1 -1 1 1 
4 -1 0 -1 -2 
5 -1 0 0 0 
6 -1 0 1 1 
7 -1 1 -1 -1 
8 -1 1 0 0 
9 -1 1 1 1 
10 0 -1 -1 -2 
11 0 -1 0 0 
12 0 -1 1 1 
13 0 0 -1 -1 
14 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 1 1 
16 0 1 -1 -1 
17 0 1 0 1 
18 0 1 1 1 
19 1 -1 -1 -1 
20 1 -1 0 0 
21 1 -1 1 1 
22 1 0 -1 -1 
23 1 0 0 0 
24 1 0 1 1 
25 1 1 -1 1 
26 1 1 0 1 
27 1 1 1 1 
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2.7 Assessment workflow 
Given the high amount of information to be retrieved and processed during the service based 
qualitative risk assessment methodology, it is highly convenient to perform the audit in a 
systematic procedure. A schematic diagram of the required steps and the necessary information 
for doing the assessment is presented in the flow diagram of Fig. 2.6. The highlighted icons 
represent the information and processes that require the presence of the EMC and facility 
experts, whereas for the rest, only an EMC expert is required. The arrows represent the flow of 
information between inputs and outputs and they provide the step-by-step procedure for 
performing the audit. 
 
 
Fig. 2.6 Flow diagram of the service based qualitative assessment 
 
According to the flow diagram Fig. 2.6, the audit starts by obtaining the services list and the 
building plans from the facility experts, and by deciding a plausible IEMI source list to be 
analyzed. For each of the services in the list and each of the sources under study, the following 
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EMT Diagram
Service List
Coupling paths
Accesibility
analysis
Availability
analysis
Transportability
analysis
Transfer functions
RISK
Susceptibility 
levels
IEMI source list
EM
analysis
Fault tree analysis
Consequence
Likelihood
Hardness
Impact
analysis
Critical equipment
Breakdown 
probabilities
Source EM
environment
Building plans
2 Service-Based Risk Assessment 
 
43 
 
(i) With the help of the building plans and a visual inspection of the facility, the EMT 
diagram can be drawn and the source accessibility level can be defined. 
(ii) The source availability and transportability levels are estimated, and the source 
likelihood is calculated. 
(iii) The facility experts perform the impact analysis to decide the consequence level of 
a service loss.  
(iv) An FTA is drawn by the facility experts in order to identify the critical equipment 
list and their locations inside the facility, and the possible redundancies in the 
service provision. 
(v) The susceptibility levels of the critical equipment will be measured or obtained 
from the available literature. 
(vi) From the EMT diagram and the critical equipment locations, an electromagnetic 
analysis is performed to obtain the coupling paths. Notice that this analysis has to 
be performed for each different position of the source (keeping in mind that the 
source accessibility is not modified). 
(vii) The transfer functions of the coupling paths are measured, or estimated with 
analytical tools. 
(viii) The IEME generated by the source is estimated. 
(ix) The breakdown probability is estimated with the susceptibility levels, the transfer 
functions, and the source IEME. 
(x) The service receptivity is estimated by considering the obtained breakdown 
probabilities. 
(xi) The redundancy level is obtained from the FTA. 
(xii) The service hardness level is estimated from the receptivity and redundancy. 
(xiii) Finally, the service risk is estimated from the source likelihood, the service loss 
consequence and the service hardness. 
2.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a methodology for assessing the risk of perturbing or stopping the provision of 
important services by critical facilities due to IEMI was presented. The method merges some of 
the strategies proposed in the literature and focus on the qualitative evaluation of the risk of 
losing a service rather than the EMC issues of the facility itself. The need of a qualitative 
method for IEMI assessment has been pointed out due to the fact that numerical evaluation of 
the risk would require prohibitive time and resources.  
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Not only a qualitative assessment can be performed in shorter time periods but also it can be 
better understood by non-EMC experts. Thus, the method enables the intervention of the facility 
staff, who are the main assets of the critical infrastructures, and who should be aware of the 
IEMI threat.  
The service-based risk assessment has been applied to study the vulnerability of a power control 
center in Switzerland and it was found that if the interruption of the service provision is 
considered, the panorama of the risk assessment evaluation may become more optimistic since 
there are still many processes inside critical facilities that can be run by ‘non-IT’ equipment or 
manually. According to past experiences, this panorama is more realistic and the suggested 
protection measures will be easier to implement in complex infrastructures that were not 
designed considering EMC requirements. From a business continuity point of view, the final 
output of a service-based risk assessment may be less important than all the information about 
the organizational and IT equipment weaknesses that is gained during the evaluation process. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Prior to any analysis of the receptivity of a facility to an IEMI attack, a good knowledge of the 
expected IEME is required in order to decide the scope of the considered methodology. To do 
this, several questions need to be addressed, e.g. : 
? What is the expected voltage waveform in the cables of the facility under study?  
? What is the maximum field level expected in the vicinity of the facility under study? 
? What are the frequency contents of the field spectrum that will be illuminating the 
facility walls? 
One would expect that, given the size of hand-made electronic equipment and general purpose 
facilities, the majority of the sources should be built between some hundreds of MHz and some 
GHz (about 1 GHz according to the Baum’s law [116]). There are several good surveys in the 
literature addressing some of these questions by making reference to the development of so-
called non-lethal weapons in the US [20, 117]. In addition, useful analytical predictions of the 
expected field levels of sources can be found in [1, 2]. However, many advances have been 
made in the past few years and the survey on available sources can be revisited by including 
recently reported sources of different types and, in particular, mesoband sources of the past 
decade [118-122]. 
Revisiting the survey is also justified since, although general classification methods of sources 
according to their transportability and availability properties have been proposed [2, 89, 96], 
these methods have not been used in a systematic way to address available sources. 
3 3 Study and Classification of Potential 
IEMI Sources 
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This chapter draws heavily from the Sensor and Simulation Note 41 by Mora et al. [100], in 
which the capabilities of publicly reported HV pulsers and HPEM radiators that could be 
regarded as potential IEMI sources have been assessed. This work characterized the signals 
generated by published IEMI sources for which relevant information and/or waveforms were 
made available in the documents. The studied sources were classified in terms of their 
transportability, technological development, and cost level in order to reveal the trends that are 
followed by both, conducted and radiated sources. As a product of this work, two databases 
including the waveforms and spectral parameters of about 39 sources, and the classification of 
21 conducted sources and 55 radiated sources were presented. 
This chapter is organized as follows. An overview of the previously proposed classifications of 
IEMI sources according to their waveform and spectral parameters, availability, and 
transportability is presented in Section 3.2. The analysis of the survey results is presented in 
Section 3.3. The expected limits for the generation of more intense or faster EM fields with 
hyperband, mesoband, and hypoband sources are explained in Section 3.4. Finally, some 
conclusions are presented in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Classification of IEMI sources 
3.2.1 Waveform parameters 
Radiated and conducted signals can be classified by using their time-domain characteristics or 
their frequency spectrum. The time and frequency characterization of the sources is essential for 
the evaluation of the receptivity level. 
3.2.1.1 Time domain parameters 
The time domain parameters of interest are usually specified for signals following an impulse-
like, damped oscillatory or CW behavior [100]. The usually-addressed parameters of impulsive, 
damped oscillatory, and CW waveforms are summarized respectively in Tab. 3.1,  
Tab. 3.2, and Tab. 3.3. The first two columns of the tables contain the parameter name and the 
suggested denomination. The third column presents a brief description of the parameter. 
Further explanation about the calculation method and the nature of the time-domain parameters  
can be found in Chapter 2 of [100]. 
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Tab. 3.1 Single pulse waveform attributes [100] 
Name Denomination Description 
Peak amplitude maxR  Maximum value of the signal 
Time to peak maxt?  Time to achieve the peak amplitude 
Peak derivative 
max
dR
dt
? ?? ?? ?  
Maximum derivative of the 
waveform before the peak 
10-90% risetime 10 90t ??   Time to increase from 10% to 90% of the peak amplitude during the rise 
Maximum rate of 
rise 
max
max
R
dR
dt
? ?? ?? ?
 The ratio between the peak amplitude 
and the peak derivative 
Full-width-at-half 
-maximum 50 50t ??  
Time between the instants when the 
waveform reaches 50% the peak 
amplitude 
Pulse repetition 
frequency PRF 
Frequency between two successive 
impulses 
 
Tab. 3.2 Damped sinusoid waveform attributes [100] 
Name Denomination Description 
Peak amplitude maxR  Maximum value of the signal 
Fall time ft?  e-folding time of the signal envelope 
Average period T   
Average time between two zero 
crossings 
Average frequency avg0
1f
T
?   Inverse of the average period 
Average quality factor avg0
ftQ
T
? ??  Measures the ability of delivering energy at a tuned frequency  
Pulse repetition frequency PRF Frequency of the successive pulses 
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Tab. 3.3 CW waveform attributes [100] 
Name Denomination Description 
Peak amplitude maxR  Maximum value of the signal 
Average period T   
Average time between two zero 
crossings 
Average frequency avg0
1f
T
?   Inverse of the average period 
Pulse repetition 
frequency PRF 
Frequency between two successive 
bursts 
Duty cycle onD PRF T? ??  
Time frame during which the CW 
source output is active; expressed as 
a fraction of the burst period 
3.2.1.2 Frequency domain parameters 
Similarly, the frequency domain properties of the waveforms are obtained from the frequency 
spectrum of the signals. The frequency spectrum can be evaluated by calculating the Laplace 
transform along the imaginary j axis, or by directly calculating the Fourier transform of the time 
domain waveform. A summary of the usually-evaluated frequency domain parameters is 
presented in Tab. 3.4. 
Tab. 3.4 Spectral attributes [100] 
Name Denomination Description 
Peak spectral 
amplitude max(f)
R  Maximum amplitude of the 
frequency spectrum of the waveform 
Center frequency 0f   
Frequency at which max(f)R is 
evaluated 
Quality factor 0
3dB
fQ
BW?
?  Ratio between the central frequency 
and the -3 dB bandwidth 
Bandratio H
L
fbr
f
?  Ratio between the 90% energy 
bandwidth limits.  
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The bandratio is a fraction that was introduced used to classify the nature of the output of a 
HPEM generator [2, 20, 86]. Consider the illustration of the frequency spectrum of a damped 
sinusoid waveform in Fig. 3.1. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Illustration of the frequency spectrum of a damped sinusoid waveform. 
 
The bandratio is defined as [2, 20, 86]: 
 ,? H
L
fbr
f
  (3.1) 
where the low- and high- frequency limits,  and L Hf f  are defined as the smallest interval in 
which 90% of the energy is contained [2, 86]: 
 
? ?? ?0.9
1
22
0,9 1
22
0
inf ( ) : ,  in 
( )
0.9.
( )
?
?
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ?
?
?
H
L
H L H L
f
f
f f f f A
R f df
A
R f df
  (3.2) 
For spectra with large DC content, the lowest frequency limit is nominally defined as 1 Hz. The 
interval between  and L Hf f is sometimes addressed as the 90% energy bandwidth 90BW : 
 90 .? ?H LBW f f   (3.3) 
Frequency
|R
(f)
|
fL fH
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3.2.2  Spectral classification 
During the past decade or so, the study of IEMI has led to different classification attempts for 
the fields generated by HPEM sources, also addressed as IEME. The first attempt to classify 
HPEM generators was developed by Giri in [123]. The proposed classification was made 
according to the spectrum of the generated IEME by using both, the percent bandwidth and the 
bandratio of the generated signals.  
As it has been discussed in [2, 20], the use of the percent bandwidth to classify IEME may be 
inadequate in the context of UWB signals because it comes from a “communications point of 
view”. On the other hand, the bandratio concept was derived from a physical insight into the 
generated fields by the already existing HPEM sources at that time. The proposed classification 
was later standardized by IEC in 2005 [1]. The classification of the IEME according to the 
bandratio is presented in Tab. 3.5 [2, 20]. 
 
Tab. 3.5 Classification of IEME according to the bandratio 
Band type Bandratio (br) 
Hypoband ≤ 1.01 
Mesoband 1.010< br ≤3 
Sub-hyperband 3< br ≤ 10 
Hyperband br≥10 
 
3.2.3 E-field strength classification 
Another approach for the classification of IEME generated by HPEM sources is to examine the 
generated E-field at a given distance from the source [2]. The main interest is to predict the 
possible threat imposed to electronic equipment in proximity of the IEME due to a given HPEM 
source. There are several publications dealing with the susceptibility of electronic IT equipment 
(see e.g. [6, 7, 11, 72, 104, 106, 124]). A general study summarizing different susceptibility 
investigations up to 2004 can be found in [32]. 
Regarding the possible effects induced by strong radiators on electronic equipment, Giri has 
proposed a 4-level consequence classification according to the order of magnitude of the 
generated E-field and the coupling mechanism [104]. The proposed classification is presented in 
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Tab. 3.6. Notice that the front-door/back-door coupling mechanism has also an impact on the 
required amplitudes to produce a certain consequence. 
 
Tab. 3.6 Classification of electromagnetic effects according to E-field strength [104] 
Effect Consequence Type of coupling  
Magnitude 
(V/m) 
Noise Harmless Front door 100 
False information Can be critical Front door 101 
Transient upset System may recover Backdoor 102 
Permanent damage Can be critical Backdoor 103 
 
Sabbath has also proposed a classification of the E-fields according to the so-called threat level 
as reported in Tab. 3.7 [125]. However, there is little information available in the literature 
about the rationale behind the choice of the amplitudes. 
 
Tab. 3.7 Classification of the E-field strength according to the threat level [125] 
Threat level Description Amplitude 
XL Extreme low < 0.1 kV/m 
L Low 0.1-1kV/m 
M Intermediate 1-10kV/m 
H High 10-100kV/m 
XH Extreme high >100kV/m 
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3.2.4 E-field range classification 
Unlike HEMP environments, the IEME produced by HPEM radiators is range dependent and 
the amplitude of the expected fields at a given distance will depend on the technology of the 
source and the antenna. The radiated fields generated by any antenna in the far field region are 
inversely proportional to the distance and, therefore, a constant range-normalized E-field is 
expected. The range-normalized radiated E-field of a source is defined as its “far voltage” Vfar 
[2]: 
 ,?far fV rE   (3.4) 
where r is the range and Ef is the far-field generated by the source. 
Although this parameter is commonly addressed in the literature, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, no source classification has been proposed according to their far voltages. Three of 
the highest reported far voltages are presented in Tab. 3.8: 
 
Tab. 3.8 Highest far voltage of reported HPEM generators 
Far Voltage 
(MV) 
Generator 
Name 
Reference 
5.3 JOLT [126, 127] 
1.4 GIMLI [128] 
1.28 Prototype IRA [129] 
 
The generation of HPEM fields typically requires the excitation of a given antenna with a high-
voltage pulser. Another parameter of HPEM sources that has been used in the literature to 
compare their performance is the ratio of the far-voltage to the pulser peak-voltage Vfar/V0. It 
describes the efficiency of the source in transforming an initial pulse into a desired far field. 
Notice that this ratio depends on both, the antenna, and the characteristics of the pulser 
(including the switching speed). For impulse radiating antennas, the far voltage amplitude is 
related to the derivative of the input pulse and, therefore, the risetime plays a significant role in 
obtaining high Vfar/V0 ratios. Three of the highest reported Vfar/V0 ratios in the literature are 
presented in Tab. 3.9. 
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3.2.5 Availability and transportability classification 
The sources can also be classified according to the availability and transportability scales that 
were previously presented in Chapter 2. In what follows, the IEMI sources were classified 
according to the technological sophistication criteria proposed by Giri and Tesche in [2] and 
reviewed in Section 2.4.1.1, and according to their cost as proposed by Sabath and Garbe in [96] 
and reviewed Section 2.4.1.4 of this work. Also, the transportability of the IEMI sources was 
classified according to the scale proposed by the ITU in [89] and reviewed in Section 2.4.2.2 of 
this work. 
 
Tab. 3.9 Highest Vfar/V0 ratios of reported HPEM generators 
Vfar/V0 Generator 
Name 
Generator  
Description 
Reference 
10.68 Prototype 
IRA 
Vfar=1281 kV obtained with 
a ±60kV/100ps pulser 
[129] 
5.3 JOLT Vfar=5.3 MV obtained with 
a 1MV/180ps pulser 
[126, 
127] 
4.60 IRA II Vfar=690kV obtained with a 
±75 kV/85ps pulser 
[20] 
 
3.3 Analysis of the potential IEMI sources characteristics 
3.3.1 Survey of potential IEMI sources 
In order to assess the characteristic of potential IEMI sources and their generated IEME, the 
relevant literature (including peer-reviewed journals, conference papers, standards, conference 
presentations, online catalogs and brochures, and books) containing conducted and radiated 
sources were analyzed. The characteristics of all the sources were extracted into a database of 
waveforms and sources that were used to identify some trends. The choice of the considered 
publications was made so that at least some basic characteristics of the sources were mentioned 
and measured. Only HV sources and HPEM radiators that, due to their transportability and ease 
of operation, would most easily be deployed against urban or rural facilities were considered as 
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IEMI sources. The information that could be collected about each source varied from one 
publication to another; therefore, not all the parameters of the sources could be retrieved.  
In general, conducted sources offering pulsed outputs in the range of some hundreds of kV with 
moderate durations (hundreds of ns) are available on the market, and their transportability is 
only marginally constrained by their size and weight. High-energy sources require the use of 
bigger capacitors and inductors for storage, which will result in an increase of the weight of the 
source. The sources that are included in the survey are mainly test sources that are commonly 
found in EMC laboratories for ESD/lightning/NEMP testing. Low voltage sources could also be 
considered as potential conducted sources, and some examples have been included in the 
survey. 
On the other hand, the choice of HPEM radiated sources was more complex since both, the HV 
pulser and the antenna, had to be considered. The output antennas of typical hyperband radiators 
are likely to have big sizes due to the lower frequency range radiation requirement (below about 
200 MHz). Also, highly sophisticated radiators with increased gains due to the use of reflectors 
require some stability to ensure the correct focusing of the beams and, therefore, they are less 
likely to be operated while in movement. The radiated sources that were included in the survey 
were mainly obtained from peer-reviewed journal papers, conference papers, and standards. 
This reveals that many of the available sources are still in development phase and their 
commercial fabrication is not very common. HPM radiators [130] (typically present in radars 
and testing facilities) were not considered in the survey since they require heavy primary power 
for cooling and feeding the CW outputs. 
The collected information has been organized into two separate databases. The first database 
contains the reported waveform of the source output, its frequency spectrum, and a list of 
various time-domain and spectral attributes. The database is available in Appendix A of [100] in 
the form of a collection of wavecards containing the waveform’s parameters. The adopted 
procedure to digitize the source waveforms extracted from publications, and the processing 
steps to obtain the relevant parameters associated with each source are also presented in 
8.2Appendix A of this work. 
The second database generated with the survey is a spreadsheet containing a collection of all the 
identified potential conducted and radiated sources and their relevant characteristics. It is 
available in Appendix B of [100].  
The information gathered in the databases has been analyzed to identify possible trends or 
common factors that could lead to a better understanding of the expected characteristics of IEMI 
sources. In what follows, the results are presented in the form of pie charts and bar plots from 
which general trends can be identified, providing insight into the likelihood of IEMI sources. 
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3.3.2 Characteristics of conducted sources 
In general, the technologies required to produce portable HV sources have seen significant 
progress in the last 50 years or so, and it is quite difficult to identify trends since there are little 
constraints for their customized fabrication. However, the cost of test sources remains moderate, 
perhaps because they are still used only for research and development purposes. 
3.3.2.1 Portability level 
A percentage pie chart illustrating the portability level of the 21 conducted sources in the 
database is presented in Fig. 3.2. As it can be appreciated, almost all the sources can be 
transported in a briefcase, which implies that they can be operated undiscovered. 
 
Fig. 3.2 Portability level of the conducted sources (21 sources). 
 
3.3.2.2 Technology level 
A percentage pie chart illustrating the technology level of the 21 conducted sources in the 
database is presented in Fig. 3.3. About half of the reported sources require high technology 
development for their fabrication, suggesting that half of the devices are used for very specific 
research and development purposes and, therefore, their availability is limited. The other 
sources belonging to the medium-tech and low-tech categories are more likely to be purchased 
from a commercial producer. 
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Fig. 3.3 Technology level of the conducted sources (21 sources). 
 
3.3.2.3 Cost level 
A percentage pie chart illustrating the cost level of the 21 conducted sources in the database is 
presented in Fig. 3.4. As expected from the previous analyses, the majority (81%) of the sources 
can be purchased or fabricated at a moderate cost. This could be understood as a consequence of 
the maturity of the required technologies and availability of the primary components. 
 
 
Fig. 3.4 Cost level of the conducted sources (21 sources). 
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3.3.2.4 Portability level vs. technology level 
The portability level of the 21 sources is plotted against their technology level in the bar plot of 
Fig. 3.5. It can be seen that the technological level does not restrict the portability of the 
sources. About half of the sources that fit inside a briefcase are high-tech sources, and the other 
half are mainly moderate-tech and only one is low tech. Only one of the studied sources fits 
inside a pocket and uses low-tech technology. 
 
 
Fig. 3.5 Portability level vs. technology level of the conducted sources (21 sources). 
 
3.3.2.5 Portability level vs. cost level 
The portability level of the 21 sources is plotted against their cost level in the bar plot of Fig. 
3.6. Surprisingly, the most portable sources are those exhibiting a low or moderate cost. This 
can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that the cost is related to the required energy 
storage capacity of the source, which in turn is related to its transportability level. This implies 
that conducted sources could be very available for a malefactor. 
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Fig. 3.6 Portability level vs. cost level of the conducted sources (21 sources). 
3.3.2.6 Portability level vs. peak voltage 
The portability level of the 21 sources is plotted against their peak voltage in the bar plot of Fig. 
3.7. For an IEMI scenario, conducted voltage levels exceeding some kV are not likely to 
propagate efficiently due to insulation breakdown inside the cables. This is why a single voltage 
level was used to classify the sources above 10 kV. According to the bar plot, it can be 
concluded that sources producing peak voltages below 10 kV (the sources labeled “more than 
10 kV” are of course included since they can be operated at voltages lower than their maximum 
rating) are available at any portability level. The main factor leading to less portability is 
perhaps the increase of the energy storage requirement of the source. Interestingly, the 
percentage of pocket-sized sources with peak voltage level lower than 1 kV is negligible in the 
studied dataset. 
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Fig. 3.7 Portability level vs. peak voltage of the conducted sources (21 sources). 
 
3.3.3 Characteristics of radiated sources 
The radiated sources that were studied were mainly published in scientific journals, and there 
are a few sources that can be purchased from a commercial provider. This implies that these 
sources still have a limited availability, perhaps due to the technological effort and test 
equipment required to produce them. However, due to the possibility of producing high-
magntiude fields with such sources, they constitute a major threat, particularly since many of 
them can be easily transported. More insight about the source characteristics can be found in 
what follows. 
3.3.3.1 Portability level 
A percentage pie chart illustrating the portability level of 54 of the 55 radiated sources in the 
database is presented in Fig. 3.8. There is one source for which the portability level could not be 
inferred from the available information. According to the chart, the majority of the reported 
sources require a vehicle or a trailer to be transported. This is due certainly to the size of the 
antenna and to the weight of the primary pulser. Notice that the classification of the 
transportability does not consider the possibility of operating the source inside the vehicle. 
Thus, the question of operating it undiscovered remains open. Only a few (18%) can be 
transported in a briefcase, and there are no pocket sized sources reported in the literature. 
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Fig. 3.8 Portability level of the radiated sources (54 sources). 
 
3.3.3.2 Technology level 
A percentage pie chart illustrating the technology level of the 55 radiated sources in the 
database is presented in Fig. 3.9. This figure illustrates the fact that the radiated sources are still 
under development and, therefore, the required technical effort is high and the availability of the 
required components is limited. 
 
 
Fig. 3.9 Technology level of the radiated sources (55 sources). 
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3.3.3.3 Cost level 
A percentage pie chart illustrating the cost level of the 55 radiated sources in the database is 
presented in Fig. 3.10. The majority of the sources are classified as having medium and high 
cost. As expected, the cost level reflects the high sophistication of some of the devices and the 
limited availability of the components. However, 24% of the sources can be obtained at a 
moderate cost, which implies that there are some already mature technologies that are available 
on the market. 
 
 
Fig. 3.10 Cost level of the radiated sources (55 sources). 
 
3.3.3.4 Far voltage 
A percentage pie chart illustrating the far voltage of 35 of the 55 radiated sources in the 
database is presented in Fig. 3.11. There are 20 sources for which the far voltage could not be 
obtained from the available information. The far voltage categories were chosen by following 
the considerations of the threat levels proposed in Tab. 3.6 and Tab. 3.7. According to the 
classification, the large majority (about 83%) of the sources produce far voltages between 10 
and 1000 kV, which at a distance of 10 m would produce fields in the range of 1-100 kV/m. 
These levels are high enough to induce false information or transient upset in some systems and, 
in some cases, permanent damage. Sources producing lower levels may not imply a risk against 
electronics, but they remain useful for laboratory testing. A very reduced number of sources (3 
sources) produce more than 1 MV of far voltage. These sources can be regarded as the most 
dangerous among the sources for which their far voltage is available in the literature. 
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Fig. 3.11 Far voltage of the radiated sources (35 sources). 
 
3.3.3.5 Vfar/Vp ratio 
A percentage pie chart illustrating the ratio of the far voltage to the peak pulser voltage Vfar/Vp 
for 35 of the 55 radiated sources in the database is presented in Fig. 3.12. There are 20 sources 
for which the far voltage could not be obtained from the available information. The majority of 
the sources exhibit a ratio between 0.1 and 2, which gives an idea of the average conversion 
efficiencies available. Very few have a ratio above 5 which appears to be the conversion limit 
with the present technologies. 
 
 
Fig. 3.12 Far voltage/ peak pulser voltage ratio of the radiated sources (35 sources). 
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3.3.3.6 Portability level vs. technology level 
The portability level of 54 of the 55 sources is plotted against their technology level in the bar 
plot of Fig. 3.13. There is one source for which the portability level could not be inferred from 
the available information. The main conclusions that can be drawn from the plot can be 
summarized as follows: 1) Regardless of their technology level, none of the sources in the 
database can be classified into the pocket transportability level. 2) There exist low and high-tech 
sources that can be transported in a briefcase, motor vehicle or a trailer. 3) Only sources 
considered as ‘Medium Tech’ require at least a motor vehicle to be transported. Interestingly, 
high-tech sources are present at all portability levels (except in the pocket availability level). 
 
 
Fig. 3.13 Portability level vs. technology level of the radiated sources (54 sources). 
3.3.3.7 Portability level vs. cost level 
The portability level of 54 of the 55 sources is plotted against their cost level in the bar plot of 
Fig. 3.14. The portability level of one of the sources could not be inferred from the available 
information. It can be seen from this figure that the cost of the source is likely to be in the 
medium cost category at any transportability level. However, notice that while only about 10% 
of the moderate cost sources fall in the briefcase transportability bin, this percentage climbs to 
almost 50% for the motor vehicle sized sources. This implies that, from an availability point of 
view, sources are more likely to be transported in vehicles since they may exhibit a lower cost. 
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Fig. 3.14 Portability level vs. cost level of the radiated sources (54 sources). 
 
3.3.3.8 Portability level vs. far voltage 
The portability level of 35 of the 55 sources is plotted against their far voltage in the bar plot of 
Fig. 3.15. There are 20 sources for which the far voltage could not be obtained from the 
available information. From the bar plot, it can be observed that considerable far voltage levels 
(up to 1000 kV) can already be generated with sources fitting into suitcases. This implies a high 
threat level for malefactors with the available resources to acquire such a source. In general, all 
the far voltage levels are also available at motor vehicle sized and trailer sized sources. 
 
Fig. 3.15 Portability level vs. far voltage of the radiated sources (35 sources). 
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3.3.3.9 Band-type 
The band-type of the sources was assessed in order to identify possible trends in their 
fabrication. A percentage pie chart illustrating the band-type of 52 of the 55 radiated sources in 
the database is presented in Fig. 3.16. There are 3 sources for which the band-type could not be 
inferred from the available information. According to the chart, similar numbers were found for 
mesoband, sub-hyperband and hyperband sources. Thus, it appears that from a band-type point 
of view, there is not a preferential kind of source.  
As expected, there are a few CW sources since many of the HPM sources were not included due 
to the transportability and operability issues explained in Section 4. Many of the consulted 
references that included the use of LPM or HPM tubes were related to fixed installations and, 
therefore, they were not considered in the database. 
 
 
Fig. 3.16 Band-type of the radiated sources (52 sources). 
3.3.3.10 Year 
In order to get an insight into the research and development activities performed in this area, the 
number of sources vs. the publication year was assessed. A bar plot illustrating the publication 
year of the 55 radiated sources in the database is presented in Fig. 3.17. It can be observed that 
there were only a handful of publications about this subject before 1995, and a few in the period 
ranging from 1995 to 2000. An increased activity occurred in 2000-2010, with about the same 
number of publications in the first 5 years of this period as in the second 5-year period. In the 
three-year period from 2010-2013, there is about the same number of publications than that 
corresponding to 2005-2010, suggesting an increase of the research and development interest. 
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Fig. 3.17 Publication year of the radiated sources (55 sources). 
 
3.3.3.11 Year vs. band-type 
Finally, the band-type vs. the publication year was also assessed to see if there is an increased 
interest through time for a specific kind of source. The publication year of 52 of the 55 sources 
is plotted against their band-type in the bar plot of Fig. 3.18. There are 3 sources for which the 
band-type could not be inferred from the available information. The bar plot shows a trend to 
produce hyperband radiators before 2000. Mesoband sources appear in 2000 and, since 2010, 
the majority of the reported sources belong to this category. From the waveform analysis of 
[100], it was found that some of the oscillating sources exhibited a very low bandratio between 
3 and 4. Thus, part of the sub-hyperband sources between 2005 -2010 could be added to the 
mesoband sources due to their similar behaviors. Finally, as it was mentioned before, there has 
been considerable development on hypoband sources during the last decade or so; however, due 
to their increased power and low transportability, very few were considered in the database and 
they have not appeared in the literature since 2010. 
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Fig. 3.18 Publication year vs. band-type of the radiated sources (52 sources). 
3.4 Overview of the expected limits of potential IEMI sources and 
their current technologies 
After studying the trends based on the collected information on sources, the types of threats that 
can be achievable with today’s technologies and markets was also studied. These trends would 
certainly be modified as soon as the transportability of the sources increases or the costs are 
reduced due to technological improvement or market growth. The interest in generating intense 
fields in the range between some hundreds of MHz and some GHz can been explained by to the 
expected sizes of handmade electronic equipment and the so-called Baum’s law [116]. 
However, radiated IEMI could also be generated at higher frequencies (perhaps with less impact 
on electronics) or at higher field levels.  
The generation of HPEM fields is fundamentally limited by some physical constraints (proper to 
the current technologies) that are briefly overviewed in this section. When thinking about the 
feasibility of potential IEMI sources, the most important constraint is perhaps the physical 
limitation rather than the current technological limitation. However, it is quite difficult to think 
about the first one without the other one. 
There are many schemes for generating HPEM fields. A block diagram describing a simple 
HPEM generation scheme is presented in Fig. 3.19 [130]. 
 
Fig. 3.19 HPEM fields generation scheme. Image adapted from [130]. 
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One of the most common setups starts from a primary DC source that charges a capacitor bank, 
which in turn feeds a Marx or an inductive generator constituting the so-called primary source. 
The output of the primary source is injected into subsequent pulse-forming stages in which the 
risetime is reduced and the desired pulsed power waveform is obtained. At this point, depending 
on the application, the pulsed power stage can feed a microwave cavity, a HPM tube, or some 
form of peaking switch whose output is mode-converted and connected to an output antenna. 
For a conducted source, the output is directly connected to the target, or to a suitable inductive 
or capacitive probe that will couple to the target. 
3.4.1 Technological limits  
The electric field flowing in each of the stages of the HPEM generation chain is limited by the 
so-called gas breakdown limit for short pulses (roughly less than 1μs). For longer pulses, the 
key issue is the wall heating (see, e.g., page 124 of [130]). The amplitude of the electric field 
inside the generation chain will depend on the waveguide geometry and the primary excitation 
signal. When the total field propagating along a gas-filled medium is raised beyond the 
breakdown limit, a plasma channel is created that is able to sustain a high current value and a 
conduction current in the gas will short down the original field. In general, a spark develops 
when the accelerated electrons (due to the high intensity electric field) are capable of producing 
large electron avalanches. If this wave is intensive enough, the current in the intensified channel 
increases, becoming unstable until the total breakdown occurs [131]. 
The breakdown field of air and other types of gases have been extensively studied for switching 
applications [132-135] and for HPM generation [136]. For air at STP conditions immersed in a 
uniform field configuration (e.g. DC field in a parallel plate arrangement), the breakdown field 
is roughly 3MV/m. The study of breakdown under slowly changing non-uniform field 
conditions is much more complex and its analysis has to be worked out separately for each gas 
pressure and field configuration. There are some analytical formulas in the literature that 
provide the breakdown field between canonical sets of electrodes (e.g. spheres, cylinders, 
cylinder-plates, etc.) for different gases with a fair agreement with experiments [133, 137].  
Breakdown data for various gases show higher breakdown fields for shorter duration pulses. For 
instance, the breakdown of air at one atmosphere pressure is a factor of 2.3 higher for a 10-ns 
pulse than for DC [133]. In general, the 3MV/m breakdown threshold for uniform field 
configurations is typically used in HPEM antenna design with a safety margin of 3 (i.e. 1MV/m 
at the antenna output) to account for possible enhancement points that may lead to gas 
breakdown [138]. If higher field values are needed, antennas are usually insulated in SF6 [122, 
127] which breaks down at about 9MV/m and exhibits a similar propagation constant as air. 
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3.4.2 Hyperband radiators 
The far electric field of hyperband HPEM radiators having aperture antennas as an output (e.g. a 
HIRA [20]) is governed by the slew rate of the driving voltage and the size of the aperture. The 
difficulty in building high voltage transient pulsers generating hundreds of kV with risetimes in 
the order of hundreds of picoseconds constitutes a technological limitation for the generation of 
such signals. High performance peaking gaps tolerate pressures up to about 100 atm and 
withstand E fields in the range of MV/cm. It is believed that the maximum derivative that could 
be expected from a gas switch is in the order of the 1015 V/s [20, 139]. Assuming a maximum 
derivative of 10x1015 V/s, a rough estimation of the strongest/fastest achievable pulser for 
hyperband radiators can be obtained. For instance, the fastest 100-kV pulser would switch at no 
less than 10 ps and the fastest 1-MV pulser should close at no less than 100 ps.  
As already mentioned in Section 3.2, among the most powerful transient generators available in 
the literature is the JOLT [127]. This system is capable of delivering a radiated far field with a 
risetime of about 80ps, a FWHM of the order of 100ps, and a far voltage of 5.3 MV. To achieve 
these results, the JOLT is driven by a 1-MV pulser switching in about 200 ps (dV/dt of about 5 x 
1015 V/s). In the near field, this system could generate up to 800 kV/m [138]. 
3.4.3 Mesoband radiators 
Mesoband generators can be built from quarter-wave switched oscillators charged with a DC 
voltage [120]. These systems will also be limited by the above-mentioned switching constraints. 
Furthermore, given the expected size of these devices, high voltage management becomes an 
issue. Also, if the desired oscillating frequencies of the quarter-wave oscillators exceed the GHz 
range, the design of the devices becomes complicated since the mechanical precision 
requirements for constructing metal profiles at such small dimensions are expensive and not 
always feasible.  
One of the most powerful reported mesoband systems based on a switching oscillator is the so-
called MATRIX system [117]. This system could be charged up to 150 kV and it oscillated 
between 180 MHz and 600MHz. The estimated far-voltage of the original MATRIX system was 
about 90 kV. Newer versions of the MATRIX systems include oscillators working at higher 
frequencies (1 and 2 GHz) but charged at lower DC voltages (50-65 kV) [140, 141] due to the 
above-mentioned breakdown constraints.  
Another way to obtain mesoband HPEM radiated waveforms is by connecting a wire antenna to 
a HV impulse generator. Among the most powerful reported systems, the DIEHL suitcase 
generators [142] are capable of producing about 225 kV/m at 1m, oscillating at a center 
frequency of 350 MHz. These systems use a tunable coil antenna that is pulsed with a 600 kV 
Marx generator. The main technological challenge of such systems is the compaction of the 
Marx generator into such a small volume (100x55x82 cm3 according to [142]). 
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A larger, but still transportable mesoband radiation system based on the excitation of wire 
antennas with a powerful Marx generator was presented in [122]. The system was capable of 
generating a 2 MV/300ps pulse to drive a set of helical antennas with 9 different central 
frequencies ranging from 200 MHz to 6 GHz. Due to breakdown issues at the generator/antenna 
interface, the helical antennas had to be insulated in an SF6 radome.  
3.4.4 Hypoband radiators 
Among the IEMI radiators, the so-called LPM sources and HPM radiators are the most 
dangerous since they are very energetic and may induce permanent effects due to heating of 
semiconductors. HPM devices are defined as those that exceed 100 MW in peak power and 
span the range of frequencies between 1 and 300 GHz [20, 130]. Conventional tubes may work 
in a continuous wave regime up to some MW of output power. If higher output power is 
required, HPM radiators can be tailored to emit continuous wave bursts of short duration in the 
hundreds of nanoseconds to some microseconds range (10-6 duty factors), and reach output 
power of some GW. Given the size and the weight of the required supply source and the cooling 
mechanisms of such generators, LPM and HPM sources are very difficult to transport and they 
are typically installed in military vehicles or big infrastructures such as airports or military 
bases.  
In order to understand the positioning of LPM and HPM tubes, a comparison of the peak vs. 
average power for conventional and HPM tubes is presented in Fig. 3.21 [130]. The peak power 
of a device is plotted against its average power. It can be appreciated that conventional tubes 
span a big range in the plot while HPM tubes have not been developed to produce substantial 
average power levels. The straight lines are traced to identify the limits between 1, 10-2, 10-4, 
and 10-6 duty factors. 
 
Fig. 3.20 Peak vs. average power for LPM and HPM sources. Figure adapted from [130]. 
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Naturally, the expected peak E field of an HPM radiator is lower than that of a hyperband or 
mesoband radiator. It was believed in the late 90s that HPM devices were fundamentally limited 
above a peak power of approximately 10GW and pulse energy of 1 kJ [130, 143]. However, it is 
believed that with the aid of phase locking, multiple sources can conceivably increase the single 
device levels. For example, the output levels of a feasible multiple pulse weapon considered by 
Taylor and Giri in [143] was 10 GW of peak power, 100 ns pulse width, and 1 kJ of energy per 
pulse at a repetition rate of 1 kHz. The ultimate limits on HPM source peak power are not well 
known. They are set by a trade-offs between breakdown (multipactor), mode competition, and 
intense beam-field interactions. 
Fig. 3.21 presents a plot of the peak power generated by a representative sample of high power 
sources adapted from [130]. It appears that the peak power of many sources falls off as Pf2 at 
high frequency. 
 
 
Fig. 3.21 Peak powers of HPM sources. Figure adapted from [130]. 
 
Among the most powerful and simple to build HPM sources is the virtual cathode oscillator or 
Vircator. The Vircator is a very attractive source for IEMI given the fact that it is a tunable CW 
generator in the 1-10GHz range, it does not require an applied magnetic field and it is a low 
impedance device (permits high power operation at low voltage). However, it is a very 
inefficient source (about 1-15%) and it is traditionally operated with explosives like single shot 
electrical generators at the input in order to reduce space. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have presented a study and classification of potential IEMI sources that were 
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collection of wavecards with the waveforms and spectral parameters of about 39 sources, and a 
spreadsheet containing the classification of 21 conducted sources and 55 radiated sources 
according to the proposed criteria for assessing the strength, availability and transportability 
were presented. Both databases can be found in Appendices A and B of [100]. 
The information in the spreadsheets was used to generate pie charts and bar plots that illustrate 
some tendencies and characteristics of the analyzed conducted and radiated sources. It was 
found that potential IEMI conducted sources are more available than radiated sources. Due to 
the maturity of the market, and the lower frequency requirements, these sources are 
commercially available from various EMC test vendors. Voltage levels in the range of several 
kV can be achieved with sources exhibiting all of the defined portability levels (including 
pocket-size), and their acquisition prices remain moderate for the majority of the conducted 
sources. Thus, they can be regarded as likely to be deployed by an IEMI malefactor. 
On the other hand, radiated sources are still in a development phase and are only available for 
purchase as test-sources. They require at least a vehicle to be transported and, according to the 
classification (made to the best of the authors’ knowledge), the typical costs of such sources 
remain high due to the required high technology in the implementation and testing. However, 
there are already some prototypes that can be transported in a briefcase and whose field level 
outputs are capable of theoretically producing malfunctions and damages –if located close 
enough- to electronics. A trend to produce hyperband radiators was identified in the early 
2000s. In more recent years, the survey reveals a growing activity in the development of 
mesoband sources.  
In the last part of this chapter, the physical limitations that constrain the development of current 
technologies in the generation of faster and stronger HPEM sources have been reviewed in order 
to set up an overview of the expected worst case scenario. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Hardening of infrastructures against IEMI requires a prior knowledge of the receptivity level 
and the nature of the expected perturbations arriving to the protected equipment. Among the 
typical parameters of interest are the amplitude and frequency content of the induced current or 
voltage at the equipment inputs. The expected amplitudes and frequency contents of IEMI 
sources have been previously studied in Chapter 3.  
Recent studies have shown the possibility of interrupting the normal functioning of IT networks 
using HPEM interferences through the LVP [11, 106] and the LAN cables [11, 106, 144]. In 
[11, 106], mesoband sources [2] of about 60 kV/m were used to temporarily interrupt an 
Ethernet switch after illuminating its LVP cable in an AC. Similar tests with hyperband fields of 
44 kV/m inside a GTEM Cell [11, 106], and 6.6 kV/m in a TEM Cell [144] have been shown to 
slow down or permanently break the data transfer of the switch, depending on the pulse 
repetition frequency of the source. 
Predictions of the coupled voltage and current levels at the cable terminals (input of the 
equipment) can be obtained with the use of the TL theory (e.g., [88] [46, 145, 146]), assuming 
that the cable parameters are known. The use of TL-based approximation techniques for 
modeling the propagation of IEMI transients in LVP networks has been studied in [81, 82] 
where it was shown that uncertainties in the input geometrical and electrical parameters of the 
exposed line may significantly impact the accuracy of simulated results. The stochastic nature of 
the impinging field and the wire positions can be included in the predictions (e.g., [91, 112, 147-
149]). In particular, TL models of straight wire lines excited by a superposition of random plane 
4 4 Experimental Characterization of 
the Response of Commercial Cablings 
to IEMI 
 
Equation Chapter 4 Section 1 
4 Experimental Characterization of the Response of Commercial Cablings to IEMI 
 
74 
 
waves have shown to provide results which are in good agreement with experimental data 
obtained using RC in [112, 147]. The relation between field-to-wire coupling test results 
obtained in a RC and AC is discussed in [150]. 
Electromagnetic field coupling to unshielded TWP has also been a subject of recent studies 
(e.g., [145, 148, 151-154]]. It has been shown that accurate predictions for the induced CM and 
DM voltages can be achieved as long as the considered configurations are relatively simple. On 
the other hand, DM voltage estimation is very sensitive to less controlled parameters like the 
twist pitch or a non-integer number of twists, which might lead to inaccurate predictions in 
realistic scenarios [11, 155]. Further insight about the challenges and modeling issues of 
realistic cablings at frequencies representative of IEMI interferences will be dealt in Chapters 6 
and 7. 
In general, the presence of non-ideal connectors, load imbalance [145, 156], line non-uniformity 
[157], and improper line terminations [158, 159] substantially contribute to inaccuracies in 
numerical/analytical predictions. Therefore, experimental results are needed to obtain correct 
estimates of induced DM signals in TWP cables. Similar issues occur in the prediction of field 
coupling to shielded cables where the overall response can be significantly affected by the 
presence of pigtails, or bad contact resistances between the shields and connectors (see e.g. 
[84]). Experimental results for shielded cables illuminated inside a RC in [160] have shown that 
modifications in the range of tens of dBs are obtained in the voltage response of a shielded cable 
due to a change of the connector type. 
This Chapter is heavily drawn from [79]. It presents the results of two experimental campaigns 
that were carried out to study the levels of induced DM voltage and CM current in typical 
configurations of LVP, TEL and LAN installations inside an office, due to an external 
electromagnetic field illumination representative of IEMI. The first test consists of the 
illumination of a commercial raceway with a HPEM field inside a GTEM cell. In the second 
test, the same raceway was illuminated with a CW signal in a RC. 
The idea of testing with these two separate methods was two-fold: (i) to estimate the expected 
conducted disturbances at the input of equipment connected to the cables due to a HPEM 
illumination, without having to model the complete setup in a full wave or transmission line 
environment; (ii) to be able to generalize the obtained results for the case of multiple angles of 
incidence and non-uniform illumination, with statistically plausible data. The first method is 
useful for understanding the induced levels in the time domain, whereas the second is useful to 
assess the general behavior of the assemblies in the frequency domain. The experiments have 
been performed with the intention of providing a general idea of the coupling levels and this is 
why representative cables and structures have been used. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the device under test, namely a typical 
electrical and communications raceway including several types of cables that are found in 
commercial buildings. Section 4.3 presents the transient HPEM illumination setup inside a 
GTEM cell. Section 4.4 presents the low power test setup inside a RC. The obtained results with 
relevant discussion are presented in Sections 4.5 to 4.7. Finally, conclusions are presented in 
Section 4.8. 
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4.2 Device under test 
This section describes the electrical and communication raceway under test and the 
measurement interface cards that were specifically designed to access the induced signals in 
individual conductors. 
4.2.1 Raceway description 
The device under test is a 200-cm long raceway containing several LVP, LAN, and TEL cables, 
typical of a civilian office environment. A schematic diagram representing the cablings inside 
the raceway is shown in Fig. 4.1. 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Schematic diagram of the cablings inside the test raceway. Distances are in cm and not 
to scale. 
4.2.1.1 Low voltage power cabling 
The LVP cabling is composed of 4 TT 3 x 1.5 mm2 cables terminated with triple-power sockets 
of SEV 1011 type. The LVP cables contain three coated wires corresponding to the phase, 
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neutral, and ground conductors of the distribution network and are supposed to withstand a DM 
peak voltage of 1 kV before dielectric breakdown. The four power sockets were labeled from 
left to right as AC1, AC2, AC3, and AC4, respectively.  
The power cables were connected in a star configuration with one end connected to the sockets 
and the other end to a junction box. The junction box can be also used to connect the test 
raceway to external 220V/ 50Hz power lines. Since the study did not require the test of the 
equipment in a powered state, the power cables were left isolated from the external power 
network. 
4.2.1.2 Ethernet network cabling 
The Ethernet network cabling is composed of 3 LAN cables terminated at both ends with RJ-45 
sockets. Each LAN cable contains 4 TWPs. Each TWP is made of 2 coated copper wires that 
may contain a shielding screen to avoid interference with the other pairs of the bundle. The 4 
TWPs are grouped into a single bundle that may be also shielded to avoid interference with the 
environment.  
Three different LAN cable categories were used as follows: 
? C7: Category 7 S/FTP cable 
? C6-S: Category 6 SF/UTP cable 
? C6-U: Category 6 U/UTP cable 
A summary of the properties of the used LAN cables, according the manufacturer datasheets, is 
shown in Tab. 4.1. The RJ-45 connectors were labeled according to the LAN cable category. 
 
Tab. 4.1 LAN cable specification 
Label Cat. Class Bundle shield TWP shield Max. Freq. (MHz) 
C7 7 F Braid Foil 600 
C6-S 6 E Braid-foil None 450 
C6-U 6 E None None 300 
 
4.2.1.3 Telephone cabling 
The TEL cables were three U72 cables terminated at both ends with RJ-45 sockets. U72 are 
unshielded cables containing 4 twisted coated wires. According to the manufacturer’s datasheet, 
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the maximum usable frequency for this kind of cables is 5 MHz. Notice that in practice, only 2 
wires of the U72 cable are required for the telephone connections. The termination sockets of 
the TEL cable were labeled as T1, T2, and T3, respectively. 
4.2.2 Measurement interface cards description 
The current and voltage measurements performed in this work used two measurement interface 
cards that were specifically designed to make a transition between the different cable outputs 
and the 50 Ω input of a measuring oscilloscope or VNA. Additionally, the interface cards could 
also be used as 50 Ω or 100 Ω terminations for unused or floating wires in the cables under test.  
A schematic diagram describing the measurement interface cards is shown in Fig. 4.2. 
 
Fig. 4.2 Schematic diagram of the measurement interface cards. 
 
The measurement card has 3 inputs, namely, the LVP input (phase, neutral, and ground wires), 
the TEL input (2 wires of the TEL cable connected to pins 4 and 5 of the TEL RJ 45 jack), and 
the LAN input (8 wires of the LAN cable connected to the LAN RJ-45 jack). The measured 
signals are transmitted through 50Ω coplanar lines of identical electrical length to seven SMA 
connectors located at the other end of the card. These connectors serve to connect the 
measurement channel or to terminate the lines with a 50 Ω load. The DM termination 
impedance between any pair of SMA connectors is 100 Ω. 
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Out of the 8 available wires from the LAN cable, only two (pins 3 and 6) were used for 
measurement. These correspond to the Rx+ and Rx- wires in classical Ethernet networks. Also 
pins 1 and 2 are connected to the card reference plane. These correspond to the Tx+ and Tx- 
wires in classical Ethernet networks. 
The measurement cards were installed inside a metallic enclosure that provides better shielding 
than a typical COTS product. Representative RJ 45 connectors were used for the TEL and LAN 
inputs with additional shielding provided by a seal made up with copper tape. The effect of the 
additional shielding on the RJ-45s will be shown later in Fig. 4.19. A picture of one of the 
measurement cards (without the copper tape seal over the RJ 45s) is shown in Fig. 4.3. There 
are two additional SMA connectors on the top part of the picture that are connected to a through 
PCB line that was made for calibrating the delay between the lines due to the FR4 effective 
permittivity. 
 
Fig. 4.3 Top view of the measurement cards without the shielding enclosure. Notice that the 
shield of the RJ-45 jacks is not continuous. 
4.3 Transient HPEM illumination setup 
In this section, the experimental setups for the high power illumination tests inside the GTEM 
cell are presented. 
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4.3.1 GTEM cell description 
The illumination tests were performed in the GTEM cell of Armasuisse (Swiss Defence 
Procurement Agency) located in the RUAG Defense Labs in Bern. The cell reference is GTEM 
3750 fabricated by EMC Baden. A schematic diagram illustrating the dimensions of the cell is 
presented in Fig. 4.4. The working volume was 2.5m x 2.5m x 2m. 
 
 
Fig. 4.4 Front and side view of the GTEM 3750 Cell of Armasuisse. 
 
The input of the GTEM cell was connected to a bipolar 200ps/50kV peak-to-peak amplitude 
pulser provided by ISL [128]. The pulser was remotely operated using a computer and a FO 
communication link. The output of the pulser was connected to the GTEM cell input through an 
impedance adapter [161].  
The electromagnetic field generated in the working volume was characterized using B-dot and 
D-dot sensors. The voltage output of the sensors was transmitted through a FO link to a digital 
oscilloscope. The FO transmitter was located inside the cell, and the FO receiver was installed 
in a shielded cabin outside the cell. 
A summary of the specifications of the used equipment is given in Tab. 4.2. 
Several field samples were taken at different positions inside the working volume. The 
measurements correspond to the average of 6 subsequent shots of the pulser. The generated field 
was found to be a uniform TEM wave. A plot of a typical measured vertical E-field and 
horizontal H-field, and their frequency spectra is presented in Fig. 4.5. In order to check the 
TEM validity, we have multiplied the magnetic field curve by the free space impedance 
120? ?? . We have also checked that the field components in the other directions were 
significantly lower. 
The generated E-field is a bipolar hyperband pulse of about 40kV/m peak-to-peak amplitude. 
Given that the risetime of the D-dot sensor is slower than the driving source risetime (about 
230ps), the risetime of the generated field is approximated to the risetime of the pulser, namely 
200ps. 
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Tab. 4.2 GTEM cell experimental setup configuration for field mapping 
Parameter Description 
D-dot max. frequency/ max. field 1.2 GHz / 1MV/m 
B-dot max. frequency / max. field 1.3 GHz / 2.65kA/m 
FO link max. frequency 3.2GHz 
Oscilloscope sampling rate/ max. frequency 20Gs/s / 6GHz 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 Waveform and spectrum of the generated vertical E-field and horizontal H-field in the 
working volume of the GTEM cell. The DC component of the derivative sensors was removed 
before integration to avoid the offset-induced spurious integration ramp. 
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4.3.2 CM current test 
A schematic diagram of the CM current measurement setup is presented in Fig. 4.6. The 
raceway was either vertically or horizontally positioned inside the working volume of the 
GTEM cell in order to test the effect of a normal and grazing incidence of the field. The induced 
CM current in the cable under test was measured with a current transformer (CT) connected to a 
digital oscilloscope through a FO transceiver. The output of the CT was attenuated in order to 
meet the input requirements of the FO transmitter. The oscilloscope was configured to take the 
average of 6 subsequent triggers. 
The LVP, LAN or TEL lines were connected to the interface cards’ inputs, and the CM current 
flowing from the output socket of the raceway was measured with the CT. All the SMA ports of 
the cards were terminated with 50Ω loads during this test. The connection between the cards’ 
input and the raceway sockets was made through patch cords of the same type as the cables 
under test. For example, during the C7 LAN cable test, the RJ-45 jack of the interface card was 
connected to the raceway by using a patch cord of category 7 S/FTP. 
 
 
Fig. 4.6 Schematic diagram of the CM current test. 
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4.3.3 DM voltage test 
A schematic diagram of the DM voltage measurement setup is presented in Fig. 4.7. The 
raceway was either vertically or horizontally positioned inside the working volume of the 
GTEM cell. The induced voltages in two selected wires of the cable under test were measured 
by connecting the interface cards’ outputs to the FO transceiver. The DM voltage between the 
two wires was determined by calculating the difference between the signals in the two wires. 
The outputs of the measuring interface card were attenuated in order to meet the input 
requirements of the FO transmitter. As in the CM current test, the oscilloscope was configured 
to take the average of 6 subsequent triggers. 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 Schematic diagram of the DM voltage test. The diagram illustrates the measurement of 
one of the DM lines. 
 
The LVP, LAN or TEL lines were connected to the interface cards’ inputs, and the outputs of 
two SMA ports were connected to the oscilloscope through the FO transceiver. The other SMA 
ports were terminated with 50Ω loads. 
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A summary of the equipment configuration for both tests is presented in Tab. 4.3. 
 
Tab. 4.3 Experimental setup configuration for the GTEM illumination tests 
Parameter Description 
CT frequency range 1 MHz-1GHz 
CT max. pulse current 100A 
Fiber optic link max. freq. 3.2GHz 
Oscilloscope sampling rate 20Gs/s 
Oscilloscope max. freq. 6GHz 
 
4.4 Reverberation chamber setup 
4.4.1 Reverberation chamber description 
The RC illumination tests were performed in the chamber located in the Department of 
Electronics, University of York UK. The 4.70 m x 3.00 m x 2.37 m chamber has a lowest usable 
frequency of about 100 MHz. It is tuned using a mechanical paddle driven by a stepper motor in 
the chamber roof that is controlled by a PC using a serial interface. The working volume of the 
chamber at 1 GHz is approximately 2.3 m × 2.7 m × 2.0 m. 
The measurements were conducted using a VNA controlled via a GPIB interface from a PC. 
The setup for the calibration and coupling measurements is shown in Fig. 4.8. The PC 
controlled the paddle rotation and an RF switch module located inside the chamber was used to 
alternate between the two signal wires being measured during each coupling experiment. The 
switch module has an isolation of more than 70 dB (typically 90 dB) up to 8 GHz. 
All the RC measurements reported here were carried out over the frequency band 200 MHz to 6 
GHz, collecting 1601 frequency samples at 100 equally spaced positions of the paddle over a 
full rotation. A full two-port calibration of the VNA, cables and RF switch up to the input ports 
of the antennas was carried out. The small amplitude and phase imbalance of the two cables 
from the RF switch unit to the measurement card was calibrated out by de-embedding (in post-
processing) an S-parameter error block determined from a separate VNA measurement of the 
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two cables. Hybrid “blade” antennas covering the range 200 MHz to 26 GHz were used to allow 
the required frequency range to be measured without switching antennas [162]. 
4.4.2 RC uniformity and calibration 
Where appropriate the test methodology followed the IEC61000-4-21 standard [163]. The 
electromagnetic field generated inside of the working volume of the chamber was characterized 
with the raceway and any other equipment in place and the external switch shown in Fig. 4.8 set 
to the “power calibration” position. The transmission between the pair of blade antennas was 
measured and the average power density and hence the mean-square electric field, inc 2| E |  , 
within the working volume determined from 
 
inc 2 2
2 1
212
0 2 0
| E | | V |1 8 | S | .TS Z
?
? ? ?
?
? ?   (4.1) 
Here 1V
?  is the forward voltage of the VNA, 0?  the intrinsic impedance of free-space, 0Z  the 
VNA port impedance and 2
T?  is the total efficiency of the receiving antenna, given by 
 rad 2 22 2 22 22(1 |S | ) (1 | S | ),
T FS? ?? ? ? ?   (4.2) 
where rad2?  is the radiation efficiency of the antenna (due to ohmic and dielectric losses) and 22SFS  
is its free-space reflection coefficient. The statistical error in the fields was about ±0.5 dB [164]. 
A summary of the required equipment for this test and the specifications are reported in Tab. 
4.4. 
 
Tab. 4.4 Equipment for power density calibration of RC measurements 
Equipment Description 
VNA Rhode & Schwarz ZVB 20 
PC3.5 SOLT cal. kit Rhode & Schwarz ZV-Z235 
Rx/Tx antenna UoY hybrid “Blade” antenna 
RF switch Mini-circuits MSP2TA-18, DC-18 GHz 
Microwave cables Reynolds Industries 269-0195 
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Fig. 4.8 RC Measurement setup. The dotted lines show the calibration planes of the VNA. 
4.4.3 DM coupling tests 
The configuration for coupling measurements was the same as in Fig. 4.8, with the external 
switch (after the DC block) in the “raceway” position. It was essential that the equipment was 
not disturbed between the power density calibration and raceway measurements in order to 
obtain accurate results. The RF switch unit was used to allow the measurement of the received 
voltage into 50 ohms on each wire in a signal pair of a cable, 1V
?  and 2V
? , at each paddle angle. 
The mean-square DM voltage at each paddle position was calculated from 
 2 2DM 1 2| V | | V V | .? ?? ?   (4.3) 
Statistical distribution functions for DM| V |  over the different paddle positions can be also 
obtained. These are expected to have Rayleigh distributions [112, 147, 153, 165]. 
4 Experimental Characterization of the Response of Commercial Cablings to IEMI 
 
86 
 
4.5 Transient HPEM illumination results 
4.5.1 CM current results 
CM current measurements were performed in each of the 9 cables (3 LVP, 3 TEL, and 3 LAN) 
while the raceway was either in the vertical or horizontal position inside the GTEM cell. Notice 
that in the LVP measurements, the near end measurement card was connected to AC1, AC2, or 
AC3, while the far end card was always connected to AC4. Depending on the cable under test, 
different profiles of induced current waveforms were obtained.  
4.5.1.1 Typical result  
An example of the CM current from a measurement performed in the C7 cable (see Fig. 4.1) is 
presented in the top panel of Fig. 4.9. The plot corresponds to a measurement performed while 
the raceway was in the vertical position. The oscillatory waveform has a peak amplitude of 6 A. 
The computed frequency spectrum is shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 4.9. It features several 
resonant frequencies with a peak at about 50 MHz, an expected behavior for line lengths of the 
order of meters. Similar curves exhibiting an oscillatory behavior with several resonant 
frequencies were obtained for the other cables. 
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Fig. 4.9 Example of a current measurement performed in the C7 cable with the raceway in a 
vertical position. The incident E-field is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
4.5.1.2 Peak amplitudes 
A bar plot summarizing the peak amplitudes of the 18 measurements is presented in Fig. 4.10. 
The results obtained with the raceway in vertical and horizontal positions are plotted with red 
and blue bars, respectively. Amplitudes between 1 and 10 A were observed with higher values 
corresponding to the normal incidence of the field (raceway in the vertical position). Similar 
current levels and resonant frequencies have been reported for 44kV/m hyperband illuminations 
[11, 106] and 10-50 kV/m NEMP illuminations [166] of LAN cables. 
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Fig. 4.10 Bar plot of the peak amplitude of the CM current measurements. The incident E-field 
is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
4.5.2 DM voltage results 
DM voltage tests were performed in each of the 9 cables while the raceway was either in the 
vertical or horizontal position. Three DM voltages were measured for each of the three LVP 
lines, namely, the Phase-Neutral voltage (PN), the Phase-Ground voltage (PG), and the Neutral-
Ground voltage (NG). In the case of the TEL and LAN cables, the DM voltage was measured 
between the pins indicated in Fig. 4.2. 
4.5.2.1 Typical result  
Two of the DM voltages obtained in the AC3 cable while the raceway was in the vertical 
position are presented in Fig. 4.11. The peak amplitudes of the PN (in black) and PG (in light 
were 160 V and 460 V, respectively. Similar curves exhibiting an oscillatory behavior with 
several resonant frequencies were obtained for the other cables. 
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Fig. 4.11 Example of a DM voltage measurement of the AC3 cable with the raceway in a 
vertical position. The incident fields are shown in Fig. 4.5. 
 
4.5.2.2 Peak amplitudes 
A bar plot summarizing the peak amplitudes of the DM voltage measurements of all the cables 
is presented in Fig. 4.12. The three white and gray bars that are plotted in the AC categories 
correspond to the PN, PG, and NG voltage amplitudes respectively. 
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Fig. 4.12 Bar plot of the peak amplitude of the DM voltage measurements. The incident E-field 
is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
It was found that almost all the induced voltages in the LVP cables remained in the range of 
120-250V. Notice that there are two cases in AC3 with induced voltages of more than 450V that 
significantly differ from the others. Peak voltages between 40-300V were obtained for the TEL 
cables and between 10-100 V for the LAN cables. Similar levels were obtained for hyperband 
testing (at 44kV/m) of an unshielded CAT5 cable in [11].  
The highest amplitudes were obtained with the raceway in the vertical position. The influence of 
the shielding scheme of the LAN cables can be also observed: reduced peak voltages are 
obtained for the shielded cables (C6S and C7). 
4.6 DM voltage transfer functions 
In order to address the overall shielding effectiveness of the assembly of cables, patch cords and 
measurement cards, the electric field to DM voltage transfer functions were calculated. Unless 
specified, all the transfer functions contain the overall coupling contribution from the raceway, 
the patch cords, and the measurement cards. The measurement cards play the role of typically 
found connector terminals through which EM energy can be also coupled. The obtained transfer 
functions give an idea of the required protection for limiting the induced voltage at the 
equipment terminals. 
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4.6.1 Transfer function definitions 
4.6.1.1 Low frequency band (40MHz -200MHz) 
The transfer functions between 40MHz and 200MHz were calculated by using the Fourier 
decomposition of the DM voltage and the illuminating field measured during the HPEM tests. 
The magnitude of the DM transfer functions | |
dV
H  were obtained from: 
 | ,
d
DM
V inc
VH
E
?   (4.4) 
in which DMV  is the Fourier spectrum of the measured DM voltage between two wires of the 
tested cables (see Fig. 4.2) while the raceway was in the vertical position, and incE  is the 
Fourier spectrum of the generated field inside the GTEM cell working volume. The reason for 
not using the horizontal measurements for the transfer function calculation is that the incident 
field along the raceway cannot be described with a single reference measurement (as done for 
the vertical case), due to the 1/r dependence of the amplitude in the longitudinal dimension of 
the GTEM cell. Notice that for the LVP cables, the DM voltage was measured between the 
phase and neutral wires. The lower frequency limit of the measurement was given by the 
number of samples in the time window and the sampling rate of the oscilloscope used. 
4.6.1.2 High frequency band (200 MHz-6GHz) 
The transfer functions between 200 MHz and 6 GHz were calculated by using the results 
obtained in the RC. The following definition of the transfer function was used: 
 
2
2
| |
| ,
| |d
DM
V inc
V
H
E
?   (4.5) 
where 2DM| V | and
inc 2| E | have been already defined in (4.1) and (4.3). 
4.6.2 Transfer function results 
Given that the nature of the transfer functions definitions is different, a priori, a consistent 
average transfer function value among both methods is not expected. However, according to the 
results of [150] the average transfer function of a plane wave illumination test should be, within 
a few decibels, equal to the transfer function in a reverberation chamber. As it is shown later, 
there is a broad consistency in the average coupling level between the low and high frequency 
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band transfer functions. However, regarding the transition at 200 MHz, differences between 6 to 
20dBs have been found. 
The obtained transfer functions feature a strong variation as a function of frequency and they do 
not follow a common pattern. However, depending on the cable nature (untwisted, twisted, or 
shielded), it has been found that the transfer functions have similar behaviors as will be 
presented in what follows. 
The magnitudes of the transfer functions of two LVP cables (AC1 and AC3), two TEL cables 
(T1 and T3), and two LAN cables (C7 and C6U), are plotted in Fig. 4.13, Fig. 4.14, and Fig. 
4.15, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 4.13 Magnitude of the DM voltage transfer function of the AC1 and AC3 LVP cables. 
 
The LVP cables exhibit the strongest response with the magnitude of the transfer functions 
reaching about -20 dB at the resonant frequencies (Fig. 4.13). Twisted cables with no 
overshield, like the TEL cables or the C6U cable, have an improved behavior with respect to the 
untwisted, with a magnitude of about -30 dB at the resonant frequencies (Fig. 4.14 and Fig. 
4.15). The lowest response is obtained with the C7 cable (twisted and shielded) with nearly -40 
dB at the resonant frequencies.  
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Fig. 4.14 Magnitude of the DM voltage transfer function of the T1 and T3 TEL cables. 
 
 
Fig. 4.15 Magnitude of the DM voltage transfer function of the C7 and C6U LAN cables. 
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A summary of the maximum, minimum and mean transfer functions for all the tested cables 
considering the whole frequency range is presented in Fig. 4.16. In this plot, the improved 
response of the twisted and shielded cables can be easily appreciated. 
 
 
Fig. 4.16 Maximum, minimum, and mean amplitudes of the DM voltage transfer functions 
measured in all the cable types of the raceway 
 
Theoretical models leading to the correct prediction of the DM mode coupling require very 
detailed information about the geometry and imperfections in the line terminations (see e.g. 
[148, 155]). Given the many uncontrolled parameters of our assembly, we have chosen to 
compare our results with comparable experiments reported in the literature.  
Similar measurements were performed with home-made unshielded TWP of arbitrary wire 
separation distance by using a CW illumination in an AC in [151, 152, 155] and a RC in [154]. 
Contrary to our case, in these experiments a very careful termination of the wires has been 
made; e.g. the experiments in [154] and [155] used baluns for terminating the wires, thus 
reducing the CM to DM conversion.  
We have tried to obtain the equivalent DM voltage transfer functions from the information 
provided in the cited papers. The AC results in [151, 152] and [155] exhibit levels of about -90 
to -50 dB, and -80 to -40 dB, respectively. In these two examples, the TWP separation distances 
were around 1-2 mm and they were illuminated from particular angles of incidence. Therefore, 
the statistical significance of the measurements was low.  
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On the other hand, the RC results in [154] show transfer functions between -60 and -20 dB. In 
this case, the TWP separation distances were 16mm and 33.7mm, and this explains the higher 
coupling levels with respect to the AC examples. Also, the multiple angles of incidence imply 
an increased probability of exciting the TWP with illumination conditions that will be difficult 
to obtain with an AC test.  
4.7 Governing factors in the transfer functions 
In this section we present some additional measurement results that are useful for explaining the 
governing factors in the transfer functions. The results presented in Fig. 4.16 show that the type 
of cable has, in general, an appreciable effect on the obtained transfer functions; the unshielded-
untwisted cables being the most susceptible, and the shielded-twisted cables the least 
susceptible wires (as expected). However, the difference between the transfer functions of the 
TEL and LAN cables becomes less significant at higher frequencies. Given that the observed 
transfer functions contain the joint effect of the measurement cards, the patch cords used to 
access the raceway, and the raceway cables, it is expected that at higher frequencies the majority 
of the energy penetrates through imperfections in the cable terminations or couples directly to 
the measurement cards. Thus, similar responses are obtained at higher frequencies. 
We have performed further measurements in the RC in order to identify the governing effects in 
the total system response. We measured the transfer functions of the measurement cards by 
themselves, and with just patch cords between them (without the raceway). An example of the 
obtained results is presented in Fig. 4.17 which compares the magnitude of the transfer function 
of one measurement card alone (MC), two measurement cards with just a C7 shielded patch 
cord in between them (C7-PC), and the full measurement system connected to the C7 cable of 
the raceway (C7+C7-PC). 
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Fig. 4.17 Magnitude of the DM voltage transfer function measured in the C7 cable, the C7 patch 
cord, and the measurement card alone. 
 
According to Fig. 4.17, below a frequency of about 1 GHz, the cable coupling is dominant. 
Beyond a frequency of about 2 GHz, direct coupling to the measurement cards become 
predominant. A similar behavior was observed for the other cables.  
In order to separate the effect of the measurement cards and that of the connected cables, the 
maximum, minimum, and mean transfer functions were calculated in two separate frequency 
bands; namely, 0.2 to 2 GHz, and 2-6 GHz. A summary of the results is presented in Fig. 4.18, 
in which the transfer functions of a measurement card alone (MC) and, two measurement cards 
connected through patch cords (CX-PC) have been added. Notice that the statistical moments of 
the second band feature less variation as a function of the considered configuration compared to 
the first band, meaning that the coupling is independent of the cable type and is essentially 
governed by the measurement cards (± 5 dBs). 
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Fig. 4.18 Maximum, minimum, and mean amplitudes of the DM voltage transfer functions 
according to the analyzed frequency band  
4.7.1 Effect of shield discontinuities 
In order to assess the effect of inserting discontinuities in the shields, two tests were performed. 
In the first test, the transfer function of the measurement card alone without the copper seal in 
the RJ-45 jack was determined. A plot comparing the obtained results with the results of the 
former card with a continuous shield is presented in Fig. 4.19. The results with the unshielded 
connector card are plotted in red (MC-NS), and those with the shielded connector card are 
shown in black (MC). The transfer functions feature resonances which are presumably related to 
the PCB size and trace lengths. The observed resonance frequencies are specific to the particular 
MCs but it is expected that similar effects would occur in real equipment. A difference of about 
15 dB is observed between the two curves.  
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Fig. 4.19 Magnitude of the DM voltage transfer function measured in the measurement card 
alone with and without over shielding of the RJ-45 jack. 
 
The second test consisted of testing the shielded cables of the raceway while connecting the 
measurement cards with and without shielded patch cords. The insertion of an unshielded patch 
cord introduced a discontinuity that degraded the performance of the entire system.  
A plot comparing the response of the C7 cable of the raceway connected through shielded patch 
cords (C7+C7-PC), through unshielded patch cords (C7+C6U-PC), and the response of the C6U 
cable of the raceway connected through C6 unshielded patch cords (C6U+C6U-PC) is presented 
in Fig. 4.20. Notice that the presence of an unshielded patch cord degrades the response of the 
C7 cable so that it becomes similar to the response of an unshielded cable.  
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Fig. 4.20 Magnitude of the DM voltage transfer function measured in the C7 cable, the C7 cable 
with an unshielded patch cord, and the C6U cable. 
 
4.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a typical electrical and communications raceway including several types of 
cables found in commercial buildings was built and tested against HPEM transients inside a 
GTEM cell and low power fields inside a RC. In the first test, the raceway was illuminated with 
a fast transient bipolar E-field pulse of ± 20kV/m and 100 ps risetime, and the amplitude and 
frequency characteristics of the induced CM currents and DM voltages between the cable 
terminations were assessed.  
The HPEM tests revealed that the LVP cables are the most susceptible under a hyperband 
illumination, compared to TEL and LAN cables.  
Tab. 4.5 shows the range of the measured peak values in both tests (raceway in vertical and 
horizontal positions) and for each type of cabling. 
In general, the amplitude of the induced CM current signals is related to the illuminated portion 
of the cables. On the other hand, the DM voltages are related to the illuminated portion, the 
presence or not of a shield, the load balance, and proper terminations of the cables. As expected, 
the best performance was obtained with the use of shielded twisted pairs. 
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Tab. 4.5 Measured range for the induced CM current and DM voltage peaks. The incident E-
field is a hyperband source with a peaka-to-peak value of 20 kV/m and a risetime of 100 ps. 
Cable Current range (A) Voltage range (V) 
LVP 2.1-8.5 122-474 
TEL 1.7-9.8 40-298 
LAN C6U (no shield) 2.2-5.6 91-107 
LAN C6S (shielded) 4.4-6.8 10-49 
LAN C7 (shielded) 4-6.8 13-34 
 
In the second test, the response of the raceway to low power swept CW stimulation was 
measured in a RC to determine statistical transfer functions from random incident field 
configurations into DM voltage in cable loads. The obtained electric field to DM voltage 
transfer functions were summarized in Fig. 4.18. The responses were found to be governed by 
the raceway under test in the lower frequencies (below 1 GHz). Between 0.2-1 GHz, the 
raceway gives about 10 dB higher coupling than a short patch cable. The difference is even 
greater at lower frequencies and for shielded cables. In the frequency band 1-3 GHz, little 
differences were observed between a short patch cable and full raceway, but both are still 
significantly higher than direct coupling to the measurement card. Beyond 3 GHz, the coupling 
is clearly dominated by the measurement cards.  
The experiments performed in this work provide a better understanding of the expected induced 
voltages and currents in commercial cable systems when exposed to IEMI-like signals. For the 
first time in the literature, three types of cabling (plus 3 subtypes of Ethernet) were investigated 
using an identical experimental technique in a very broad frequency range, namely from 40 
MHz to 6 GHz. The considered cabling configuration was in a representative installed 
environment (raceway) rather than just individual cables. The GTEM and RC test results in the 
cross-over region were found to be broadly consistent. The transfer functions derived in this 
work are therefore directly useful in IEMI risk analyses for many types of CIs, bearing in mind, 
of course, that they are derived from particular experiments. 
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5.1 Introduction 
It has been previously mentioned in Chapter 4 that very accurate modeling of a CI is not always 
possible due to the complexity of the problem. However, it is important to highlight that 
educated decisions can still be taken with the use of approximate EM models where 
experiments are not allowed or difficult.  
The estimation of the receptivity level of critical equipment due to an IEMI attack requires an 
accurate evaluation of voltages and currents at their terminals [24, 167]. IEMI stresses on a 
system can be applied either through conductive coupling or radiated electromagnetic coupling. 
In both cases, interferences will reach the sensitive devices through connected cables. 
Therefore, the evaluation of wave propagation/electromagnetic coupling along cables is 
customarily made using the TL theory [88] which applies to uniform transmission lines with 
electrically small cross-sectional dimensions, where the dominant mode of propagation is TEM. 
The applicability of the TL theory to disturbance sources with higher frequency content (HPM, 
UWB, etc.) is a topic that has received increased attention during the past decade or so [57]. The 
accuracy of the TL theory in the evaluation of common-mode induced signals has already been 
addressed in the literature (e.g., [168, 169]). 
The first part of this chapter is heavily based on [42]. It studies the DM coupling due to a plane 
wave illumination of a transmission line composed of two wires above a ground plane - a topic 
that has not been specifically addressed in the literature, to the best of the author’s knowledge. 
The differential-mode propagation existing between the two wires is evaluated by assuming that 
the wires are floating (i.e. no galvanic connection to ground) at a height above the ground plane 
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which is not necessarily electrically small. The results obtained using the classical TL theory are 
compared with full-wave solutions obtained using the Numerical electromagnetics Code NEC-4 
[170]. Provided that the above-ground height of the wires is not electrically small, the 
applicability of the TL theory becomes questionable (see e.g. Section 1.5 of [88]). However, the 
question arises whether the TL solutions for the DM coupling are still valid if the distance 
separating the two wires is electrically small. 
The interest of studying the DM coupling with such a configuration is twofold: (i) the 
susceptibility thresholds of electronic equipment are typically achieved with differential mode 
signals (e.g. differential signal pairs inside a PVC conduit inside a building, or twisted pairs 
inside a cable raceway), and (ii) the influence of the wires’ height above the ground plane in the 
accuracy of the TL solutions can be better understood.  
The second part of the chapter is based on [80]. We study how the propagation of IEMI signals 
along power and communication lines will be affected by conductive and dielectric losses. The 
distorted transmission will result in the attenuation of the amplitudes and in the increase of the 
risetimes of the IEMI signals. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, a theoretical analysis is presented on the 
characteristic impedance of a two-wire transmission line above a ground plane, and the same 
two-wire line in free space. In Section 5.3, we present simulation results for the previously 
considered line configurations illuminated by a plane wave. Section 5.4 presents the simplified 
TL model for the parametric attenuation and dispersion studies and their results. Finally, the 
conclusions are presented in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Comparison of the DM propagation along a two-wire line in free 
space and above a ground plane 
Consider the cross sections of a two-wire lossless semi-infinite line in free space and a two-wire 
lossless semi-infinite line above a ground plane as shown, respectively, in the left and right 
panels in Fig. 5.1. 
Assuming that a source is located at one end of the line (as shown in Fig. 5.1), and that one of 
the two wires is the reference conductor, the solutions for the current and voltage for the line in 
the free space case can be expressed as: 
 0(z) I ,
V( ) (z),
??
?
jkz
c
I e
z Z I
  (5.1) 
where the current 0I  is calculated according to the boundary conditions and cZ  is the 
characteristic impedance of the transmission line which, for the case where iD r??  is given by 
[46]: 
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in which 0?  is the free space wave impedance. 
 
 
Fig. 5.1 Left: Cross section and schematic of a two-wire line in free space. Right: Cross section 
and schematic of a two-wire line above a ground plane. 
 
On the other hand, if the ground plane is chosen as the reference conductor, the voltages and 
currents for the wires above a ground plane can be expressed as: 
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  (5.3) 
where 0I  is calculated according to the boundary conditions and cZ  is the characteristic 
impedance matrix of the multi-conductor transmission line given by [46]: 
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5.2.1 DM propagation of a two-wire line above a ground plane 
The DM propagation between the two conductors assumes a current 1 2 dI I I? ? ?  that will 
produce a DM voltage dV  between the lines calculated as: 
 1 2 1,1 2,2 2,1(Z 2Z )I ,?? ? ? ? ? ?d c c c d c d dV V V Z Z I   (5.5) 
where the fact that 1,2 2,1c cZ Z?  has been used.  
The DM propagation will be thus governed by the DM characteristic impedance c dZ ?  that can be 
obtained from (5.4) as: 
 0 2 2
4 (h )ln .
2 (2h )
?
??
? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?c d c
h hZ Z
h s
  (5.6) 
Notice that the DM characteristic impedance will tend to the characteristic impedance of the 
wires in free space as the argument in the natural logarithm in (5.6) approaches unity. If a fixed 
distance between the wires is considered, neither h?  nor s can be modified without modifying 
the global geometry of the lines in free space and, therefore, the only parameter governing the 
above-mentioned approximation becomes the height h of the wires above the ground plane. 
From (5.6), it becomes obvious that for lines satisfying the condition h D??  which, in turn, 
implies that ,h h s?? ? , the characteristic impedance can be evaluated disregarding the presence 
of the ground plane, namely c d cZ Z? ? . 
5.2.2 Application example 
Consider the propagation along a two-wire line characterized by the geometrical parameters in 
Tab. 5.1 (see Fig. 5.2): 
 
 
Fig. 5.2 Application example two-wire line above a ground plane cross section. 
 
 
h
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Tab. 5.1 Parameters of the application example 
Parameter variable Value 
Wires radii r1,r2 1 mm 
Wires horizontal separation s = 5r 5 mm 
Wires vertical separation h?  0 
 
Fig. 5.3 presents the plot of the absolute percentage error of the approximation c d cZ Z? ?  as a 
function of the normalized height h/s. 
 
Fig. 5.3 Estimation error in the calculation of the differential-mode characteristic impedance for 
the case r1 = r2 = r = 1 mm, s = 5r, and 0h? ? . 
 
For this particular configuration, it can be seen that the error is less than 2% when the height 
above ground of the wires exceeds twice their separation distance. 
5.3 Plane wave illumination of a two-wire line above a ground plane 
The results of the previous section imply that the differential-mode propagation becomes 
independent of the presence of the ground plane for lossless lines with wire heights exceeding 
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about twice their separation distance. In this section, the accuracy of the TL theory in the 
prediction of the induced currents in the case of a plane wave illumination of the line when the 
conductors’ heights are not electrically small (h )??  is assessed. We have used as reference 
full-wave solutions obtained using the Numerical Electromagnetics Code (NEC-4) [170].  
5.3.1 Problem under study 
The geometry of the problem is illustrated in Fig. 5.4. Two PEC wires of circular cross-section 
with a diameter 2a and length L are located at heights h and h+d above a perfectly conducting 
ground plane. The two wires are terminated with impedances Z1 and Z2 that are equal to the 
characteristic impedance of the two-wire transmission line in free space. 
 
Fig. 5.4 Schematic representation of a two-wire line above a ground plane illuminated by an 
incident plane wave. 
 
The wires are illuminated by a plane wave described with the polarization angles illustrated in 
Fig. 5.5. 
 
Fig. 5.5 Plane wave polarization angles adopted from chapter 7 in [46]. 
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The induced current I1 flowing through the impedance Z1 is calculated using: (i) NEC-4, (ii) 
classical TL theory, and (iii) a simplified TL model that will be explained as follows. Given that 
the wires are floating above the ground plane, the current I1 is alternatively calculated by 
considering that the two-wire line is located in free space (i.e. without the ground plane) and 
illuminated by the superposition of the impinging plane wave and its image (see Fig. 5.6). 
Note that in this case, the ground plane is considered when calculating the exciting 
electromagnetic fields, which is the sum of the incident field and the ground-reflected field, both 
in absence of the two wires. On the other hand, the presence of the ground plane is disregarded 
when evaluating the induced signals and their propagation along the two-wire line. 
 
 
Fig. 5.6 Schematic representation of a two-wire line in free space illuminated by an incident 
plane wave, including the ground-reflected fields. 
 
5.3.2 Considered line parameters 
Two line configurations were tested with the above-mentioned setups. In what follows, the 
wavelength used for calculating the line dimensions of the configurations was evaluated in free 
space at a frequency of 1GHz ( 30 cm? ? ). 
The first configuration comprises a line with h=10λ and d= λ /10. This case is useful to assess 
the accuracy of the TL theory in the prediction of the DM current when the lines are far from 
the ground, but the distance between the lines is electrically small.  
The second configuration comprises a line with h=10λ and d=λ. This example is used to 
illustrate the errors obtained with the TL theory when the distance between the two conductors 
is no longer electrically small.  
A summary of the parameters used for both configurations is presented in Tab. 5.2: 
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Tab. 5.2 Summary of the considered line parameters 
Parameter Variable Value Units 
Length L 100 cm 
Radius a 0.7 mm 
Height h 300 cm 
Distance d 3 and 30 cm 
Impedance Z1, Z2 450 and 727 Ω 
Elevation angle ?  60 deg 
Azimuth angle ?  0 deg 
Polarization angle ?  0 deg 
5.3.3 Frequency domain results 
A comparison of the magnitude of the transfer functions I1/Einc for the first configuration, 
obtained with NEC-4 (black), TL theory in presence of ground plane (red), and TL theory 
disregarding the ground plane (blue) are shown in Fig. 5.7. 
It can be seen that the three curves are in excellent agreement, even at frequencies exceeding 
1GHz, suggesting that for the calculation of the DM coupling, the governing factor is the 
electrical distance between the conductors under consideration and not the overall cross section 
of the line. As long as the DM of the floating wires is concerned, this latter example illustrates 
the possibility of using the TL theory when the electrical distance between conductors remains 
short, regardless of their heights above the ground plane. 
A comparison of the results obtained for the second case (d= 30 cm) is presented in Fig. 5.8. 
The results obtained using the TL theory are in very good agreement with the full-wave 
simulations, for frequencies up to about 350 MHz, which corresponds to a distance 1/ 3d ?? . 
Beyond that frequency, as expected, the results obtained using the TL theory start to deviate 
with respect to full-wave simulations because the separation distance of the two-wire line is no 
longer electrically small. On the other hand, the TL results for the two line configurations (two-
wire line in free space and two-wire line above a ground plane) are in excellent agreement in the 
whole frequency range. This confirms again that the differential-mode induced signal in floating 
wires is not significantly affected by the presence of the ground plane. 
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Fig. 5.7 DM current transfer function of a two-wire line above a ground plane for the case h = 
300 cm, and d = 3cm. 
 
 
Fig. 5.8 DM current transfer function of a two-wire line above a ground plane for the case h = 
300 cm and d = 30cm. 
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5.3.4 Time domain results 
The accuracy of the time domain reconstruction of the induced current has been also tested by 
illuminating the lines with a set of three IEMI waveforms [100] exhibiting different bandratio. 
For calculating the time domain response, the transfer functions in Fig. 5.7 and Fig. 5.8 were 
multiplied by the incident field spectra and a classical IFFT was used to recover the current 
waveforms. A description of the used IEMI waveforms is presented in Tab. 5.3. 
 
Tab. 5.3 Parameters of the IEMI waveforms used to test the time domain reconstruction 
accuracy 
Description Classification Bandratio Reference 
Far field of the IRA II 
system 
Hyperband 1.9E9 [20] 
Field generated by the 
EPFL SWO 
Mesoband 2.43 [119] 
Numerically 
generated CW chirp 
Hypoband <1 N/A 
 
5.3.4.1 Hyperband signal illumination  
A plot of the far electric field of the IRA II system [20] is presented in Fig. 5.9. It corresponds 
to a fast impulse of about 60kV/m, a rise time of about 70 ps, and a FWHM of about 110 ps. 
The frequency spectrum of the field extends up to a significant frequency of about 5 GHz, 
corresponding to a minimum wavelength of 6 cm. The simulated current waveforms obtained 
with NEC-4 (black), TL theory in presence of ground plane (red), and TL theory disregarding 
the ground plane (blue) are plotted for the first configuration (d=3 cm) in Fig. 5.10 and for the 
second configuration (d=30 cm) in Fig. 5.11. 
There is an excellent agreement of the waveforms obtained for the first configuration, which 
implies, as already mentioned, that the governing factor is the electrical distance between the 
conductors under consideration and not the overall cross section of the line. On the other hand, 
for the second configuration where the distance between the two wires is no longer electrically-
small at high frequencies, a very small disagreement can be observed. Since the illuminating 
signal has a wide bandratio, the inverse FFT includes an important part of the low frequency 
spectrum in which the transfer function is correctly calculated, thus the average reconstruction 
exhibits amplitudes and delays that are similar to the full wave solution. 
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Fig. 5.9 Hyperband incident electric field: far electric field of the IRA II system [20]. 
 
 
Fig. 5.10 DM current due to the hyperband illumination for the case h = 300 cm and d = 3cm. 
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Fig. 5.11 DM current due to the hyperband illumination for the case h = 300 cm and d = 30cm. 
 
5.3.4.2 Illumination of the line with a mesoband signal 
A plot of the electric field generated by the EPFL SWO [119] is presented in Fig. 5.12. The 
amplitude of the signal is 6.6 kV/m, the center frequency is about 310 MHz and the quality 
factor is about 20. The recovered current waveforms obtained with NEC-4 (black), TL theory in 
presence of ground plane (red), and TL theory disregarding the ground plane (blue) are plotted 
for the first configuration (d=3 cm) in Fig. 5.13 and for the second configuration (d=30 cm) in 
Fig. 5.14. 
Similar conclusions to those obtained for the hyperband illumination can be derived for the 
mesoband signal. There is an excellent agreement in the solutions obtained for the first 
configuration. For the second, the TL simulations are still in very good agreement with the full-
wave solutions. This good agreement is consistent with the frequency domain comparison 
presented in Fig. 5.8, in which there is good agreement between TL and NEC results at 
frequencies of about 310 MHz. If the center frequency of the mesoband source is outside the 
validity region of the predictions for the second configuration, an over/under estimation of the 
amplitudes could be observed as it will be explained in what follows. 
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Fig. 5.12 Mesoband incident electric field: electric field generated by the EPFL SWO [119]. 
 
 
Fig. 5.13 DM current due to the mesoband illumination for the case h = 300 cm and d = 3cm. 
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Fig. 5.14 DM current due to the mesoband illumination for the case h = 300 cm and d = 30cm. 
 
5.3.4.3 Illumination of the line with a hypoband signal 
Finally, the illumination of the lines with a CW signal of 900MHz has been considered. Fig. 
5.15 plots the incident electric field that was used to excite the lines. The frequency of the signal 
was chosen so that the distance between the conductors satisfies the TL conditions in the first 
configuration, but does not in the second configuration. The simulated current waveforms 
obtained with NEC-4 (black), TL theory in presence of ground plane (red), and TL theory 
disregarding the ground plane (blue) are plotted for the first configuration (d=3 cm) in Fig. 5.16 
and for the second configuration (d=30 cm) in Fig. 5.17. 
The results of the first configuration are in perfect agreement whereas the amplitude of the 
induced current is overestimated by a factor of about 2 with the TL solutions in the second 
configuration. 
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Fig. 5.15 Hypoband incident electric field: numerically generated CW chirp oscillating at 900 
MHz. 
 
 
Fig. 5.16 DM current due to the hypoband illumination for the case h = 300 cm and d = 3cm. 
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Fig. 5.17 DM current due to the hypoband illumination for the case h = 300 cm and d = 30cm. 
 
5.3.4.4 Results analysis 
The results presented in this section have illustrated the efficiency and accuracy of TL theory in 
the prediction of the time domain DM disturbances when dealing with sources that are outside 
the frequency validity limits. According to the survey of Chapter 3, a good portion of the IEMI 
signals exhibit a mesoband or hyperband bandratio. Therefore, a good reproduction of the time 
domain waveform is expected since much of the source energy remains low frequencies, where 
the TL solutions are correct.  
The particular example used to illustrate the prediction of hypoband interferences has shown 
that the response may be over / underestimated by a few dBs which is acceptable for the 
purposes of this work. If further accuracy is required, alternative formulations of the TL 
equations that account for higher frequency effects like radiation in the extremities of the line 
due to the discontinuities can be used [62]. 
  
Time (ns)
5 10 15 20 25 30
I 1
 (A
)
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
TL
TL free space
NEC
5 Application of Transmission Line Theory in Evaluating Differential-Mode Signals in IEMI scenarios 
 
117 
 
5.4 Study of the influence of conductive and dielectric losses in the 
propagation of IEMI signals along power and communication lines 
The propagation of IEMI signals along power and communication lines will be affected by (i) 
conductive losses and dielectric losses, and (ii) radiation losses. In this section, the attenuation 
and distortion of selected cables is studied with a simplified TL model [3] of a two conductor 
line with conductive and dielectric losses. The radiation losses and reflection due to non-
uniformities are not considered. 
5.4.1 Modeling considerations 
Consider the DM coupling of an electromagnetic disturbance onto a lossy uniform transmission 
line of finite length L. The electromagnetic disturbance is represented as an equivalent lumped 
source at a given position along the line. In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the 
line is matched at both ends and an equivalent voltage source is used to excite the line at one 
end, as schematically shown in Fig. 5.18. 
The transmission line is characterized by its characteristic impedance 0Z  and its complex 
propagation constant? . The propagation transfer function H relating the voltages at both ends 
of the line can be expressed as: 
 - - -( ) ,
(0)
L L j LV LH e e e
V
? ? ?? ? ?   (5.7) 
where the complex propagation constant ?  has been decomposed into the attenuation constant 
?  and the phase constant ? . 
 
 
Fig. 5.18 Schematic diagram of a uniform two-wire transmission line excited by an equivalent 
voltage source representing the DM field-to-wire coupling from an external source. 
 
The complex propagation constant of a transmission line can be calculated from its p.u.l. 
parameters as [88]: 
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 2
' ' ' '(1 ) ( ),
' '
? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
R G R Gj LC j
LC L C
  (5.8) 
in which R’, L’, G’ and C’ are respectively the line P.U.L. resistance, inductance, conductance 
and capacitance. 
5.4.1.1 DM propagation cross sections 
The transfer function and the complex propagation constant of typical power and 
communication lines found in civilian installations, namely, (i) LVP lines, (ii) TWPs, and (iii) 
RFC lines were studied. 
The cross sections of the LVP and TWP lines are presented in Fig. 5.19. Two wires of radii wr  
and conductivity ?  are coated with a dielectric insulator with a relative permittivity r?  and a 
tangent loss tan? . The outer radius of the coating is mr . 
 
 
Fig. 5.19 Schematic diagram of the geometry and the constitutive materials of a lossy two-
coated-wire line. 
 
The cross section definition of the RFC line is shown in Fig. 5.20. In this figure, ?  is the 
conductivity of the inner and outer conductors, r?  and tan? are the relative permittivity and 
tangent loss of the dielectric insulator, T is the outer conductor thickness, and wr  and sr are 
respectively the radii of the inner conductor and the dielectric insulator. 
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Fig. 5.20 Schematic diagram of the geometry and constitutive materials of a lossy RF coaxial 
line. 
 
The P.U.L. parameters of the lines were calculated with classical analytical formulas or fast 
numerical procedures [88] and were used to run the parametric analyses. A summary of the 
formulas used to estimate the P.U.L. parameters can be found in 8.2Appendix B. The p.u.l. 
resistance and conductance of the lines are approximated with analytical formulas for running 
faster parametric analyses. 
5.4.1.2 Effective complex permittivity 
The constitutive parameters of the dielectrics were approximated with constant relative 
permittivity and tangent loss. Neglecting the conduction currents inside the dielectric, the 
tangent loss can be expressed as: 
 '' ''tan ,
' '
d? ?? ?? ?? ?
?? ?   (5.9) 
where '  and ''? ?  account respectively for the polarizability of the medium, and the loss (heat) 
due to the damping of the vibrating dipole moments [171].  
Finally, the complex permittivity of the dielectric materials was calculated using: 
 0 0ˆ ( ' '') (1 tan ).? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?rj j   (5.10) 
5.4.1.3 Parameters of selected lines 
The dimensions and the constitutive materials of several LVP, TWP, and RFC lines were used 
for calculating their P.U.L. parameters. The conductors of the considered lines were made of 
copper with conductivity 58 MS/m? ? . The dielectric insulators of the lines varied between PE, 
PTFE (Teflon), or PVC. The used relative permittivity and tangent loss of the dielectric 
insulators at a frequency of 100MHz are given in Tab. 5.4. 
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Tab. 5.4 Dielectric properties of constitutive materials 
Dielectric r?  tan?  
PVC 2.3 0.02 
PE 2.1 0.8 x 10-3 
PTFE 3 0.4 x 10-3 
 
A summary of the parameters of each line is presented in Tab. 5.5. The first column of the table 
contains the usual denomination of the lines. The second and third columns present the line type 
and the used dielectric insulator. The approximated dimensions are contained in the third to 
sixth column. The approximated characteristic impedance Z0 of the lines is given in the seventh 
column. The P.U.L. resistance R’ and conductance G’ (calculated at a frequency of 1GHz) are 
shown, respectively, in the eighth and ninth columns. Finally the calculated attenuation factor 
(in dB/100m) of the lines is shown in the last column. 
In order to estimate the attenuation factor, the attenuation constant of the lines was 
approximated using [171]: 
 0
0
1 R'( G'Z ).
2
? ? ?
Z
  (5.11) 
Notice that the LVP lines do not necessarily have a fixed separation distance unless they are 
grouped inside an insulating jacket. For evaluating the parameters presented in Tab. 5.5, the 
separation distance was approximated to twice the radius of the dielectric. This is used only as 
an indication of the expected propagation characteristics. 
According to Tab. 5.5, the conductive and dielectric losses of the studied lines have a 
considerable magnitude at 1GHz and should be included in the calculation of the propagation of 
a disturbance at these frequencies. The LVP lines exhibit the highest dielectric losses due to the 
PVC insulation. On the other hand, TWPs have the highest conductive losses due to the small 
cross section of the lines. 
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Tab. 5.5 Parameters of selected lines 
Name Type Diel. 
rw 
[mm] 
rm/ rs 
[mm] 
s 
[mm] 
Z0 
[Ω] 
R’ 
[Ω/m] 
G’ 
[mS/m] 
Att. 
[dB/100m] 
2X1.mm2 LVP PVC 0.7 1.200 2.4 90 3.6 2.56 117 
2/0 AWG LVP PVC 6.3 8.300 16.6 70 0.42 1.94 62 
Cat. 5e TWP PE 0.29 0.470 0.99 92 9.1 0.11 47 
Cat.6 TWP PE 0.26 0.550 1.12 105 10.1 0.15 49 
Cat.7 TWP PE 0.29 0.700 1.40 103 9.1 0.23 49 
RG58 RFC PE 0.47 1.475 N/A 50 3.7 0.56 44 
RG174 RFC PE 0.24 0.740 N/A 50 7.2 0.57 75 
RG316 RFC PTFE 0.27 0.775 N/A 50 6.6 0.28 63 
RG214 RFC PE 1.13 3.620 N/A 50 1.5 0.55 25 
 
5.4.2 Parametric analyses and results 
5.4.2.1 Numerical simulations setup 
The propagation transfer function H was calculated with Equation (5.7) for the following lines 
whose parameters were previously reported in Tab. 5.5: (i) 2 x1.5mm2 (LVP), (ii) Cat 5e 
(TWP), and (iii) RG58 cable (RFC). 
In order to compare the contribution of the conductive and dielectric losses, the transfer 
functions were calculated by using the parametric configurations presented in Tab. 5.6. 
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Tab. 5.6 Parametric loss configurations 
Loss configuration 
Conductivity 
(? ) 
Tangent loss 
( tan? ) 
None ∞ 0 
Only conductive 58 MS/m  0 
Only dielectric ∞ 
According to 
Tab. 5.4 
both 58 MS/m According to 
Tab. 5.4 
 
A hyperband signal was used as a voltage source to excite the lines at one end (see Fig. 5.18) 
and the transmitted voltage at the other end was calculated by convoluting the waveform with 
the inverse Fourier transform of the transfer function. In what follows, the transmitted voltage 
and the amplitude of the transfer function are presented for each of the studied lines. The total 
length of the lines was set to L=10 m. No approximations were made in the calculation of the 
complex propagation constant. Fig. 5.21 shows the injected signal, which is representative of a 
hyperband IEMI waveform with a risetime of 229 ps [34, 78]. 
 
Fig. 5.21 Injected voltage representative of a hyperband IEMI (adapted from [34]). 
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5.4.2.2 Results 
The results for the 10-m LVP line are presented in Fig. 5.22 and Fig. 5.23. They present, 
respectively, the propagated signals at the far end of the line, and the magnitude of the transfer 
function. The black-dashed curve corresponds to the calculated signal when no losses are 
included. If the conductive losses are included (red curve) there is an attenuation of about 12% 
for the peak amplitude, and an increase in the signal risetime. The attenuation in this case is less 
than 3dB at the highest frequency. 
On the other hand, if only the dielectric losses are considered (blue curve), the peak attenuation 
is about 40% and a more significant increase is observed for the risetime. The attenuation is 
more than 30 dB in the GHz range. Finally, the solid black curve shows the results obtained 
when both losses are included. In this case, the overall peak attenuation is about 50% and the 
obtained risetime and attenuation are comparable to the values obtained if only dielectric losses 
are included. 
 
 
Fig. 5.22 Propagation along a 10-m long LVP line: transmitted signal. 
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Fig. 5.23 Propagation along a 10-m long LVP line: transfer function. 
 
The simulation results for the 10-m TWP line are shown in Fig. 5.24 and Fig. 5.25. Unlike the 
case of the LVP line, for which the dielectric losses were predominant, in this case, the 
conductive losses prevail. This is essentially due to (i) smaller cross section of the wires and (ii) 
thinner dielectric coating with lower tangent loss for the twisted wires in the network cable in 
comparison with the power cable. Notice that there is a marginal increase of the risetime, and 
the attenuation in the GHz range is less than 10 dB. 
Finally, the results for the 10-m RFC line are shown in Fig. 5.26 and Fig. 5.27. The performance 
of this line is similar to the TWP case, with predominant conductive losses due to the small 
cross section of the inner wire. The effect of the homogeneous padding with dielectric insulator 
inside the coaxial line can be observed in that the signal arrives 7 to 9 ns later than in the 
previous cases. Also notice that the dielectric losses are slightly more significant in the GHz 
range than in the TWP line. 
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Fig. 5.24 Propagation along a 10-m long TWP line: transmitted signal. 
 
 
Fig. 5.25 Propagation along a 10-m long TWP line: transfer function. 
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Fig. 5.26 Propagation along a 10-m long RFC line: transmitted signal. 
 
Fig. 5.27 Propagation along a 10-m long RFC line: transfer function. 
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5.4.3 Discussion 
According to the results of the previous section, the differential mode propagation of fast 
transients can be significantly attenuated by the presence of losses in the transmission lines. One 
of the effects of thick dielectrics coatings is the increase of the risetime with respect to the 
original waveform. 
Traditional surge protection devices (SPDs) are used to protect from disturbances originated by 
signals that could be slower than the expected IEMI signals (e.g., those originated from ESD, 
NEMP, or lightning). Therefore, it is useful to assess the propagation distance at which lossy 
transmission lines will disperse an IEMI-originated disturbance so that classical SPDs could be 
used. It is also useful to evaluate the required propagation distance to reduce the disturbance 
amplitude so that less strong SPDs could be installed (see [80] for further details).  
5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the applicability of the TL theory in evaluating DM signals in canonical 
setups of two-wire lines floating above a ground plane was discussed through analysis and 
simulation. Special attention was given to the possibility of predicting the response of the lines 
when subjected to waveforms representative of IEMI.  
According to the results presented in Section 5.2, two main conclusions can be drawn: 
(1) the presence of the ground plane can be disregarded in the calculation of the 
characteristic impedance of the lines, provided that the height of the wires is larger than 
about twice the separation distance between them.  
(2) The validity of the TL theory for DM induced disturbances is conditioned upon an 
electrically short distance between the wires, regardless of the distances above the 
ground plane.  
The effects of including conductive and dielectric losses in the analysis of the DM propagation 
in selected transmission lines was also studied from an analytical point of view. The parameters 
of several power and communication lines were extracted in order to assess the significance of 
the conductive and dielectric losses at the expected frequencies of IEMI perturbations. The 
results show that both dielectric and conductive losses have to be taken into account in order to 
obtain the total attenuation. However, it has been evidenced that in lines with very small 
conductor cross-section, it is more likely that the conductive losses will dominate the total 
attenuation due to the skin effect.  
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6.1 Introduction 
The applicability of TL theory for calculating the propagation of IEMI disturbances in cables 
representative of real scenarios was previously studied in Chapter 5. This chapter deals with the 
TL modeling of the propagation of IEMI along LVP networks. Previous studies have 
experimentally shown the possibility of injecting malicious disturbances in the LVP network 
[17, 33]. As previously mentioned, in order to estimate the expected voltages and currents at the 
equipment power plug inputs, EM simulation means have to be used when experiments are not 
possible. Typical input impedances of commercial equipment obtained by measurement [172, 
173] can be included to simulate their connection to the power lines. After calculating the 
disturbance, the compromise level of the equipment can be estimated after comparing the 
voltage and current levels to the upset and permanent damage thresholds [7, 11, 174]. 
In this chapter, the TL modeling of the propagation of high frequency disturbances along the 
LVP network of the commercial raceway that was already introduced in Chapter 5 is presented. 
The TL models were implemented using CST Cable Studio [175]. This tool has been previously 
applied to similar studies and shown to provide accurate results in the analysis of the crosstalk 
between cables (see e.g., [176]). In order to validate the models, the numerical results were 
compared against measurements obtained with frequency and time domain techniques. 
According to the results of Chapter 5, the DM propagation along LVP cables is efficient up to 
some hundreds of MHz. Therefore, the measurements and the TL models were limited up to a 
frequency of 200MHz. It is worth noting that, to the best of the Author’s knowledge, the highest 
frequencies at which propagation effects along power lines have been considered do not exceed 
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a few tens of MHz for Power Line Communication systems (e.g., [177-179]), or 100 MHz for 
Nuclear Electromagnetic coupling studies (e.g., [180, 181]) 
The results presented in this chapter are heavily drawn from a previous report by the author and 
Dr. Kasmi from the Wireless security Lab of the ANSSI [81], and two publications presented at 
international conferences [81, 82]. In the first part, the experimental setup that was used to 
measure the propagation along the raceway in the frequency and time domains is introduced. 
Secondly, the TL modeling procedure and the validation of the simulation tool with a canonical 
example is presented. Finally, the validation of the raceway models with the experiments is 
presented and discussed. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The experimental setup that was used to measure the 
transfer functions and the impulse response between the raceway sockets is presented in Section 
6.2. The TL model of the LVP cabling of the raceway is presented in Section 6.3. The 
comparisons between the experimental and simulation results are discussed in Section 6.4. 
Finally, conclusions are given in 6.5. 
6.2 Experimental setup 
The experiments were performed along the LVP network of the experimental raceway that was 
introduced in Chapter 4. For the sake of clarity, some information will be repeated in this 
section, and further details about the cable connectors will be provided. 
Both time-domain and frequency-domain tests were carried out in order to address the 
propagation along the raceway. The frequency domain tests were carried out by using a VNA. 
The time domain tests were carried out by using a voltage impulse generator and an 
oscilloscope. 
6.2.1 Test raceway 
A schematic diagram representing the test raceway and the LVP circuits is presented in Fig. 4.1. 
The raceway is composed of 4 triple-power sockets of the SEV 1011 type. The SEV 1011 
sockets are the standardized power outlets in Switzerland (see picture in Fig. 6.2). The four 
power sockets were labeled from left to right as AC1, AC2, AC3, and AC4 respectively. 
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Fig. 6.1 Schematic diagram of the LVP cabling inside the test raceway. Distances are in cm and 
not to scale. 
 
 
Fig. 6.2 Example of a triple SEV 1011 power socket. 
 
Each of the power sockets are connected to a NEXANS TT 3 x 1.5 mm2 cable. This type of 
cable is typically installed in Swiss raceways. The cable has three coated wires that are used for 
the connection to the Phase, Neutral, and Ground wires of the distribution network, and are 
tested to withstand a maximum voltage of 1 kV before the dielectric breakdown [182]. 
The cables are connected in a star configuration; starting at each of the power sockets and 
ending at a junction box that is schematically shown with a red line in Fig. 4.1. In order to 
connect to the socket inputs, a vertical extension of 6.2 cm length (not shown in Fig. 4.1) was 
added to each of the four cables. A picture of the junction box where the arrival and inter-
connection of the four power cables can be appreciated is presented in Fig. 6.3. Notice that the 
cables are bent several times in order to make them fit inside. Thus, an additional 18 cm cable 
length has to be considered at the junction box. 
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Power socket
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Fig. 6.3 Picture of the junction box containing the four power cables. The phase, neutral and 
ground conductors of each power cable are interconnected in the box. 
 
The junction box can be alternatively connected to the power grid. Since the study does not 
require the test of equipment in their on-line state, the cables were left isolated from the power 
mains.  
The tests were carried out at the EMC Lab of EPFL. The raceway was placed inside the semi-
anechoic chamber above the metallic ground plane of the room. A picture showing the raceway 
laying over the ground plane before starting the tests is shown in Fig. 6.4. The plastic walls of 
the raceway were removed in order to have an easy access to some of the cables during the tests. 
 
 
Fig. 6.4 Picture of the raceway laying over the ground plane of the semi-anechoic chamber 
before starting the tests. 
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6.2.2 Injection adapters 
Two types of adapters enabling the transition from SEV 1011 sockets to BNC connectors were 
built for injecting and measuring the DM signals in the raceway. A picture showing both types 
of adapters is presented in Fig. 6.5. The adapters were built by using commercial SEV 1011 
connectors, short-length NEXANS cable, and BNC chassis mount connectors. The Phase wire 
was soldered to the central pin of the BNC connector and the Ground and Neutral wires were 
soldered together to the BNC chassis. On the other side of the NEXANS cable, each wire was 
connected to the three pins of the SEV 1011 connector. The ground and neutral pins were short-
circuited with pieces of coated 1.5mm2 copper wires. 
 
 
Fig. 6.5 Picture of the SEV 1011 to BNC adapters. 
6.2.3 Frequency-domain tests 
The magnitudes of the transfer functions between socket AC1 and the other three sockets were 
measured by using an ANRITSU MS4630B VNA. The schematic diagram of the measurement 
setup is presented in Fig. 6.6.  
 
 
Fig. 6.6 Schematic diagram of the experimental setup for measuring the transfer function among 
the raceway sockets with a VNA. 
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The ANRITSU MS4630B VNA provides two identical outputs containing the signal of the local 
oscillator. One of the outputs was connected to the reference channel R, and the other was 
injected to AC1 by means of a 50 Ω cable that was connected through an injection adapter. The 
output of the raceway was connected to the TA/R channel of the VNA by means of another 50 
Ω cable connected to the respective adapter. The ratio between the TA/R and R channels was 
internally calculated by the VNA. 
For each of the tests, an average of 50 measurements was recorded. A summary of the 
configuration of the VNA is reported in Tab. 6.1. 
 
Tab. 6.1 Configuration of the ANRITSU MS4630B for the transfer function measurements 
Parameter Description 
Output power level 0 dBm 
Number of frequency points 500 
Start frequency 1 MHz 
Stop Frequency 200 MHz 
Resolution Bandwidth (RBW) 20 kHz 
Sweep Time 100 ms 
 
6.2.3.1 Reference measurement 
In order to correct the calculated transfer function to account for the presence of the 
measurement cables and adapters, a reference measurement was performed before starting the 
tests. The schematic diagram of the reference measurement is presented in Fig. 6.7.  
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Fig. 6.7 Schematic diagram of the reference measurement setup with the VNA. 
 
Assuming a good match between the adapters and the raceway, the correction of the transfer 
function can be performed by dividing the original measurement (Fig. 6.6) by the reference 
measurement (Fig. 6.7). As the frequency starts to increase, the mismatch due to non-
uniformities at the adapter-socket transition would require a full two-port calibration of the 
VNA at the raceway input and output plane. Such calibration was not possible because the 
calibration kit requires standards connectors. 
6.2.4 Time-domain tests 
The impulse response between socket AC1 and the other three sockets of the raceway was 
measured with the aid of a MONTENA PG-45 rectangular voltage generator, a SCHAFFNER 
DCP 0100 directional coupler, and a Lecroy LC574AL oscilloscope. A schematic diagram of 
the measurement setup is presented in Fig. 6.8. 
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Fig. 6.8 Schematic diagram of the setup for measuring the impulse response among the raceway 
sockets. 
 
The generator output Vinc was injected to the input of the directional coupler. The transmitted 
signal of the directional coupler was connected to AC1 by using a 50 Ω cable. The output signal 
from the raceway Vout was connected to the oscilloscope through a 50 Ω cable and a 20dB 
attenuator. On the other hand, in order to trigger the oscilloscope and to obtain a replica of the 
incident voltage, the forward signal of the directional coupler Vref was connected to a second 
channel of the oscilloscope through a 50 Ω cable. Notice that the forward signal of the 
directional coupler is attenuated by about 40dB. 
A summary of the configuration of the generator and the oscilloscope is reported in Tab. 6.2. 
 
Tab. 6.2 Configuration of the voltage generator and the oscilloscope for the impulse response 
measurements 
Parameter Description 
Voltage impulse amplitude 33.5 V 
Voltage impulse risetime/duration 750ps/30ns 
Oscilloscope samples /Sampling rate 1kS/(1GSamples/s) 
Oscilloscope Bandwidth 1GHz 
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6.3 Electromagnetic modeling 
6.3.1 Numerical tool: CST Cable Studio 
The information provided in this subsection draws heavily from [183]. 
The TL model of the raceway has been implemented in CST Cable Studio, an EM tool designed 
for the simulation of cable harnesses. It is based on the TL decomposition of the cable cross-
sections into a cascade of circuits that are solved with an enhanced circuit solver that can be 
optionally coupled with a 3D full wave solver to include the effect of impinging or scattered 
electromagnetic fields during the simulation. The simulation procedure with CST is as follows. 
In a first step, a complex cable harness is divided into a finite number of straight segments. For 
each segment the program checks for any metallic structure surrounding the cables. The cables’ 
cross sections in combination with additional metallic structures define the segments’ cross 
sections. Secondly, the p.u.l. inductance and capacitance of the segments are calculated with the 
aid of a static 2D field solver and simplified formulas are used for obtaining the p.u.l. resistance 
and conductance. Each segment is transformed into an equivalent circuit and finally all circuits 
are connected together into a single circuit model representing the whole cable harness.  
The generated equivalent circuits are valid within a frequency range from DC to a maximum 
frequency that is defined by the highest frequency at which the cross sections of the harness are 
electrically small. Additional effects caused by discontinuities like bends or deviations are not 
considered. 
Finally, the electrical model of the cable harness is transferred into the circuit simulation 
environment in the form of an N-port network. The user is able to define the network loadings 
(passive/active, linear/non-linear) and calculate its behavior either in time or in frequency 
domain. The circuit simulation can be optionally coupled with a 3D full wave solver for the 
calculation of the EM environment around the cable harness and obtain the distributed field 
sources for considering the field-to-cable coupling. This latter feature is not used in this work 
since only the propagation effects along the raceway were modeled. 
6.3.2 Validation of the numerical tool 
Before starting the EM modeling of the complex cablings inside the raceway, the results 
obtained with the EM simulation tool were validated with measurements performed considering 
a simpler canonical configuration of a coated wire above a ground plane. In what follows, an 
explanation of the experimental setup and the modeling procedures for the validation of the 
numerical tool is presented. 
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The validation experiment was carried out in the laboratories of the ANSSI. A schematic 
diagram of the test setup is shown in Fig. 6.9. A coated wire of length L was laid above a 
metallic ground plane at a height h. A sinusoidal signal generator was applied to one end of the 
wire under test through an N-type chassis connector. The screen of the chassis connector was 
screwed to a vertical extension of the ground plane, and its center pin was soldered to the copper 
wire. The other end of the wire under test was connected to the receptor of a spectrum analyzer 
in a similar way as it was done for the signal generator. The used wire was a coated copper wire 
of circular 1.5mm2 nominal cross section with a 0.5 mm thickness PVC coating. 
 
 
Fig. 6.9 Schematic diagram of the measurement setup of the validation example. 
 
The tests were carried out by injecting a signal to one end of the wire with the signal generator, 
and simultaneously measuring the amplitude of the signal at the other end with the SA. The 
voltage transfer function was obtained from 1 to 200 MHz. 
A schematic diagram of the simulation setup in CST is presented in Fig. 6.10. The numerical 
simulations were performed by implementing a transmission line fed by a 1 V /50 Ω generator, 
and terminated at the other end with a 50 Ω resistance. The output voltage was evaluated across 
the 50 Ω termination. The transmission line parameters are summarized in Tab. 6.3. 
 
 
Fig. 6.10 Schematic diagram of the simulation setup of the validation example. 
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Tab. 6.3 Simulation parameters of the validation example 
Parameter Variable Value 
Line length L 1 m 
Line height h 35 mm 
Wire diameter d 1.4 mm 
Copper conductivity ?  58 MS/m 
PVC coating thickness T 0.5 mm 
PVC relative permittivity ? r  3 
 
A comparison of the magnitude of the voltage transfer function obtained with CST and 
measurements is plotted in Fig. 6.11. There is an excellent agreement between both results. This 
implies that the transmission line parameters were accurately calculated by the simulation tool. 
It is worth noting that the agreement between simulation results using a transmission line 
approach and measurements was expected since in the considered frequency range (up to 200 
MHz), the height of the wire remains electrically small. 
 
 
Fig. 6.11 Validation of the simulation tool with a canonical case. 
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6.3.3 Topological decomposition of the LVP cabling 
The topological diagram [56] of the LVP cabling inside the raceway is illustrated in Fig. 6.12 . 
It is composed of 11 junctions and 10 tubes. The number of junctions and tubes was chosen so 
that every significant change in the cable cross-sections inside each tube was separately 
considered. The length of each tube is shown with black arrows. An indication of the number of 
NEXANS cables running inside each of the tubes is given with gray letters. The junctions 
labeled as AC1 to AC4 correspond to the power sockets and represent the arrival of the four 
NEXANS cables. The intermediate tubes connecting junctions N1 to N5 contain the cables that 
are laying over the bottom of the raceway. The junction box was divided in two separate 
junctions since 2 tubes were required to model the cable bundles inside the junction box: (i) a 
tube containing 4 NEXANS cables coming from N4, and (ii) a tube containing the 12 coated 
cables coming from the 4 NEXANS cables at the Junction Box. 
 
 
Fig. 6.12 Topology of the test raceway. Distances are in cm and not to scale. 
 
6.3.4 NEXANS cable cross-section 
Fig. 6.13 shows the cross section of the NEXANS TT 3 x 1.5 mm2 cable. According to the 
manufacturer’s datasheet, the wires are made up of copper, the insulation polymer is PVC, and 
the inner and outer coatings are also made in PVC. The cable diameter is 7.2 mm. Each bare 
copper wire has a diameter of 1.4 mm and a 0.5 mm PVC coating. 
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Fig. 6.13 NEXANS cable cross-section. 
6.3.5 Raceway simulation model 
The fact that the layout of the cables is not uniform inside real buildings (see e.g. Fig. 6.3) 
requires an approximate representation of the harness cross-sections in the MTL model. The 
exact reproduction of the real cabling scenario with the numerical tool would require prohibitive 
efforts since the relative position of each wire among the bundles, and the accurate dielectric 
parameters of the PVC are unknown.  
In a first attempt, the raceway was modeled by using uniform TLs with segments having a fixed 
cross section along the cable path. The following assumptions were made in the creation of the 
simulation models with fixed cross sections:  
? Since the bottom cable bundles were not running exactly above the ground plane, the 
effective height of all the cable bundles was set to 35mm with allowed variations in the 
mm range. The distances were obtained from measurements made to the cables arriving 
to nodes N1 to N5. 
? All the vertical cables were modeled as horizontal straight cables at the same height as 
the other cables (35 mm). 
? The cables inside the junction box were modeled as two tubes containing 4 horizontal 
NEXANS cables and 12 horizontal coated wires positioned at the same height as the 
other cables (35 mm) 
? The bare wires conductivity was set to copper’s conductivity (σ = 5.8 x 107 S/m)  
? After running several tests, the relative dielectric permittivity of the PVC was set to 6 
with a loss angle tangent of 0.02. 
For filling up the tubes of the topology, five different fixed cross sections were created as 
schematically shown in Fig. 6.14. The separation distances among the NEXANS cables were 
also chosen based on measurements made inside the raceway. 
7.2 mm
1.4 mm
0.5 mm
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coating
PVC 
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Fig. 6.14 Schematic diagram of the cross-sections. Distances are in mm and not to scale. 
 
In order to better model the propagation along the cables, a second model containing random 
cross-sections was generated so that the unknown position of all wires was taken into account. It 
has been shown that by introducing random cross-sections along the cabling, the propagation 
losses due to the multiple mismatch in the cable paths could be effectively reproduced [109]. 
The random cross-sections in CST were created by laying the NEXANS cables around a central 
axis located at the average height of 35mm. Only the same fixed cross-section was used in the 
tube containing the 12 coated wires. 
In order to reproduce the measurements, the simulation setup was chosen as schematically 
described in Fig. 6.15. A voltage source Vin in series with a 50 Ω resistor was connected 
between the Phase and Neutral wires of the power socket AC1. The Ground wire of AC1 was 
also connected to the Neutral through a 20nH inductor representing the piece of wire connecting 
the Ground and Neutral pins of the adapters (see Fig. 6.5). A similar configuration of wires was 
used to terminate the Phase and Neutral wires at the output socket (AC4 in the case of Fig. 6.15) 
with a 50Ω resistor. 
 
 
Fig. 6.15 Schematic diagram of the simulation setup of the raceway transfer functions. 
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The voltage transfer functions were calculated by taking the ratio of the incident voltage in AC1 
and the received voltage in the socket under test: 
 2 ,?? ?out outv
in in
V VH
V V
 (6.1) 
where inV
?  is the incident voltage, Vin is the source voltage, and Vout is the output voltage 
measured over the 50Ω resistor (see Fig. 6.15). 
For calculating the time-domain response, the above calculated transfer functions were 
multiplied by the FFT spectrum of the incident voltage that was previously measured by directly 
connecting the voltage pulse generator to the oscilloscope. Afterwards, a classical IFFT 
procedure was used to obtain the output waveforms of the sockets. 
6.4 Simulation results and experimental validation 
6.4.1 Frequency-domain results 
In what follows, the transfer functions obtained with the fixed and random cross-section models 
of the raceway are compared to the measurements obtained with the VNA. The measurement 
results are plotted with a dashed-black line. The results obtained with the fixed cross sections 
model are plotted with red lines and those obtained with the random cross section model are 
plotted with blue lines. 
The transfer functions between AC1 and AC2, AC3 and AC4 are plotted in Fig. 6.16, Fig. 6.17, 
and Fig. 6.18, respectively. Simulations are in fair agreement with the experimental data and 
reproduce the overall characteristics of the measured transfer functions. There is a better 
agreement between the curves at low frequencies, even though the predicted resonance 
frequencies do not always match with the observed ones. This is presumably due to the 
uncertainty of the cable lengths and dielectric parameters, or the presence of parasitic 
capacitances at the level of the junction box. Also, the presence of a highly nonuniform cabling 
in the junction box of the raceway makes it difficult to perform a correct modeling with 
approximate cross sections. 
It can also be noticed that the use of random cross sections in the model provides responses that, 
in general, are not radically different from those obtained with fixed cross sections. This is 
certainly due to the fact that the dielectric parameters and the average height above the ground 
plane were not significantly modified from one simulation to another. In order to better address 
the sensitivity of the results to each of the model parameters, more elaborate statistical analysis 
is required, which is beyond the scope of this work. It has been recently suggested [66, 67] that 
the statistical analysis of the TL predictions can be significantly improved using the extreme 
value theory, especially when security and safety are under concern. 
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It has been shown in Chapter 5 that the accuracy of the model in calculating the actual 
waveform of the disturbance depends on the bandratio of the injected signal. The responses to 
impulse signals having a large bandratio are generally well reproduced provided the general 
good accuracy of the TL theory at low frequencies. On the other hand, the TL-predicted 
response to signals exhibiting a low bandratio is generally less accurate. The accuracy of the 
method in the prediction of the time domain response of the raceway due to a hyperband 
injection will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 
Fig. 6.16 Comparison of the simulation and measurement results for the transfer function 
between AC1 and AC2. 
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Fig. 6.17 Comparison of the simulation and measurement results for the transfer function 
between AC1 and AC3. 
 
 
Fig. 6.18 Comparison of the simulation and measurement results for the transfer function 
between AC1 and AC4. 
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6.4.2 Time-domain results 
In what follows, the impulse responses obtained by convoluting the injected waveform spectra 
with the transfer functions obtained with the random cross section model are compared with 
measurement results. The injected signals in AC1 are plotted with a dashed-black line. The 
outputs of the power socket under study are plotted with red lines. The simulation results are 
plotted with blue lines. 
The impulse response between AC1 and AC2, AC3 and AC4 are plotted in Fig. 6.19, Fig. 6.20, 
and Fig. 6.21, respectively. In general, it can be seen that simulation results are in very good 
agreement with the measured results. In particular, the correct delay between the input and the 
output waveforms shows that the permittivity of the insulators was correctly chosen. Also, the 
late time response of the model is in good agreement with the measurement results. The small 
discrepancies found in the early times of the response of Fig. 6.20 and Fig. 6.21 might be 
attributed to the presence of a highly non-uniform cabling in the junction box of the raceway 
that are modeled with approximate cross-sections in both models.  
 
 
Fig. 6.19 Comparison of the simulation and measurement results for the impulse response 
between AC1 and AC2. 
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Fig. 6.20 Comparison of the simulation and measurement results for the impulse response 
between AC1 and AC3. 
 
 
Fig. 6.21 Comparison of the simulation and measurement results for the impulse response 
between AC1 and AC4. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we presented a comparison of experimental and simulation results obtained with 
TL theory on the propagation of high frequency disturbances along the LVP cabling of a 
commercial raceway. The frequency spectrum of the considered disturbances was representative 
of IEMI sources. An accurate modeling of the propagation along real cabling scenarios requires 
a very high degree of knowledge of the simulated topology. Frequently, several input 
parameters of the models are not precisely known and the related uncertainties may impact the 
accuracy of results. 
It was shown that simulation results are in good agreement with the experimental data and 
reproduce the overall characteristics of the measured transfer functions. The predicted resonance 
frequencies of the transfer functions did not always match the experimental observations. This 
was presumably due to the uncertainty of the cable lengths and dielectric parameters of the 
PVC. Also, the presence of a highly non-uniform cabling in the junction box of the raceway was 
difficult to model with approximate cross-sections. However, from the comparison with time 
domain waveforms, it was concluded that the high frequency discrepancies did not result in 
significant errors in the evaluation of the impulse responses. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The application of TL for calculating the propagation of high frequency fields along unshielded 
cables like those of the LVP lines was previously presented in Chapter 6. This chapter is 
devoted to the study of the application and validation of TL theory for the case of shielded 
harnesses. This Chapter is heavily drawn from [83, 84]. Notice that the experiments performed 
in [84] were performed with spacecraft cables. However, the conclusions of this work are also 
applicable to the case of commercial cables in CIs given that the cable cross sections are not 
very different and that the frequency ranges under study are also within those of IEMI. 
The TL theory has been successfully applied to analyze internal and external coupling in 
shielded cables. Complex harnesses typically include a set of internal cable arrangements that 
are individually shielded using different technologies (e.g. braided shield or a served wire 
screens). Depending on the application, the cable harness may also come with overshields that 
are used to further protect the cables from interferences. The cable arrangements are terminated 
in multi-pin connectors covered with a backshell that requires the separation of the signal 
conductors from the shielding conductors, thus reducing the shielding performance if not 
properly implemented. 
The analysis methods of shielded cables with the aid of TL theory were firstly introduced by 
Vance in [8]. Significant advances were achieved in the subsequent years improving the existing 
knowledge about braided shields, pigtail cable terminations, and shield discontinuities [1, 2, 9]. 
Experimental results on the transfer impedance of selected connectors, backshell, and cable 
shielding mechanisms have enabled a better understanding and generation of guidelines in the 
selection of appropriate schemes for protecting the critical harnesses [10-13].  
7 7 Numerical Modeling of the Overall 
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In this chapter, we present a review of the use of TL theory to model the overall transfer 
impedance of shielded cable assemblies. The modeling procedures of cables, shields, and 
connectors are discussed, and solutions to some practical issues are proposed. The use of the 
modeling techniques is illustrated by considering a realistic cable assembly for which a 
comparison of measurement results and simulations are provided.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The modeling techniques for cables, shields and 
connectors are reviewed in Section 7.2. The studied cable assembly and its experimental 
characterization are presented in Section 7.3. The modeling procedure and the model parameters 
that were used to generate an equivalent TL structure are explained in Section 7.4. Comparisons 
between the results obtained with the TL model and measurements are presented in Section 7.5. 
Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.6. 
7.2 Modeling techniques 
In this section, we present an overview of the available techniques for modeling the different 
components present in a cable harness by using TL theory, taking into account internal 
conductors, shields, pigtails if necessary, and connectors. 
7.2.1 Modeling of the internal conductors 
The propagation of currents and voltages along cable bundles can be accurately predicted with 
the use of TL [46, 47]. Notice that the application of TL theory for the propagation analysis is 
limited by the validity of the transmission line (TL) theory assumptions (see e.g., [46]). A 
detailed overview of the methods for obtaining the p.u.l. parameters of multi-conductor 
geometries can be found in e.g. [88]. As the cable bundles become complex, the use of a 
numerical 2D tool for the evaluation of the p.u.l. parameters becomes necessary due in 
particular to inhomogeneities introduced by the presence of lossy dielectric coatings. 
7.2.2 Modeling of the shielding screens  
The so-called transfer impedance and transfer admittance of the shields [46, 59] are used to 
model the diffusion of electromagnetic fields through the cable screens and the coupling 
through its apertures. Many authors have contributed to the analytical calculation of the transfer 
impedance and transfer admittance of solid and braided shields (see a comprehensive summary 
in [45, 46]). Schelkunoff derived an analytical expression for the transfer impedance of a solid 
tubular shield in [184]. Vance [185], Demoulin [45], and Kley [186] presented analytical 
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expressions for the transfer impedance of braided shields that have shown to be accurate up to 
frequencies of some hundreds of MHz. 
Even though analytical expressions are usually preferred due to their simplicity and the 
possibility of doing parametric studies, the transfer impedance of cable screens can also be 
measured when little manufacturing information is available [187]. Notice that experimental 
studies above several hundreds of MHz are rarely available due to the constraints imposed by 
the propagation phenomena inside the cables that lead to the creation of standing wave patterns. 
Alternatively, 3D modeling techniques can be used to estimate the transfer impedance but an 
increased computational cost is required [188].  
7.2.3 Modeling of braided shields 
A schematic diagram illustrating a typical cable containing two braided-wire shields is shown in 
Fig. 7.1 [59]. 
 
Fig. 7.1 Braided shield wire. Adapted from [59]. 
 
The left diagram of Fig. 7.2 shows an unwrapped view of a braided shield of internal radius a, 
and the right diagram shows an enlargement of the weave pattern where additional details of the 
apertures and the weaving filaments of the shield can be seen.  
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Fig. 7.2 Left: Unwrapped view of a typical braided shield; image adapted from [46]. Right: 
Enlargement of the weave pattern. Adapted from [59]. 
 
The braided shields can be characterized in terms of the inner radius of the shield a, the number 
of carriers C, the number of filaments N, the filament diameter d, the conductivity of the shield 
σ, and the weave angle of the shield α. The fill factor F, the coverage factor K and the number of 
apertures per-unit-length n can be calculated as [46, 59, 189]: 
 2
2
,
4 cos( )
2 ,
tan( ) .
4
? ?
?
??
?
? ?
?
NdCF
a
K F F
Cn
  (7.1) 
The transfer impedance of the braid can be calculated, for example, with the optimized single 
braided shield model proposed by Kley in [186]. The results provided by this model have been 
found to be in very good agreement with the performed measurements in this work [83]. 
On the other hand, the calculation of transfer admittance requires the specification of the p.u.l. 
capacitance between the braid and the ground return path. Vance has discussed the calculation 
of the so-called transfer capacitance in [59, 185], but generally this parameter can only be 
evaluated once the cable harness position has been specified. Thus, this parameter is generally 
neglected in the simulations. This is the reason why this work focuses in the modeling of 
transfer impedance of braided shields. 
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7.2.4 Transfer impedance of single braided shields 
7.2.4.1 Vance’s model 
Vance proposed a model to calculate the transfer impedance of single braided shields that 
accounts for the effects of diffusion through the metallic shield and magnetic field penetration 
through its apertures [59]: 
 ' ' ' .t d aZ Z j L?? ?   (7.2) 
The diffusion term Z´d is calculated by assuming that the braided-wire shield behaves as a solid 
tube having a thickness equal to one filament diameter and a modified DC resistance Ro´ that 
accounts for the aperture density in the cross section. The diffusion term is given by: 
 02
4' ' ,
cos( ) sinh( ) sinh( )d
d dZ R
d NC d d
? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ?   (7.3) 
where ?  is the complex propagation constant through the sheath approximated by: 
 (1 ) .
2
j ???? ? ?   (7.4) 
The mutual inductance term L´a is based on the assumption that the braided shield behaves as a 
thin walled solid tube with elliptical holes of the same density and major and minor axes as the 
rhombic apertures in the braided-wire shield [59]. This term is given by: 
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  (7.5) 
The terms K(e) and E(e) in (7.5) denote respectively the complete elliptic integrals of the first 
and second kind. The eccentricity e of the ellipse is given by: 
 
2
2
1 tan ( )  if   45 ,
1 cot ( )   if  45 .
e
e
? ?
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? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
  (7.6) 
7.2.4.2 Kley’s model 
In order to account for the so-called porpoising mechanism (the induction phenomenon due to 
overlapping of the carriers of the shield), Tyni (see chapter 10 in [46]) and Démoulin (see 
chapter 6 in [45]) have derived alternative expressions for the transfer impedance. Note that the 
porpoising effect is more important when the optical coverage is high, because less penetration 
occurs [46]. 
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Kley proposed an improvement of the transfer impedance model of Tyni by tuning some of the 
quantities based on several measured cable data up to 200 MHz. In his model, he proposed to 
calculate the transfer impedance as [186]: 
 ' ' ' (1 ) ' .t d t sZ Z j L j L? ?? ? ? ?  (7.7) 
The diffusion term 'dZ  in Kley´s model is calculated as:  
 0' ' ,sinh( )
R
d
R
dZ R
d
?
??   (7.8) 
where 0.67 / cos( )Rd d ?? . 
The inductances '  and 't sL L are the penetration inductance and the eddy currents inductance, 
respectively. The penetration inductance 'tL is expressed as the sum of the aperture inductance 
'LM  and the porpoising inductance 'GM [186]: 
 ' ' ' ,t L GL M M? ?   (7.9) 
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and 
 0 1
0
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2G m
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D F
? ??? ?   (7.11) 
The fill factor in Kley’s model is defined by using an average shield radius am as follows: 
 , 1.25 .
4 cos( ) mm
NCdF a a d
a? ?? ? ?   (7.12) 
The magnetic field attenuation factor of the chimney effect in (7.10) is defined as: 
 
12
39.6 ( ) .
2H m
K dF
a
? ?   (7.13) 
The minimal filling factor in (7.11) is: 
 0 cos( ),??F F   (7.14) 
and 
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The 'sL?  term in (7.7)was introduced by Démoulin [46] in order to account for the eddy 
currents in the apertures’ walls due to the magnetic field that penetrates the shield. Kley 
introduced other eddy currents circulating between the inner and outer carriers of the braid that 
induce a quadrature component 'sj L? [46, 186]. If both terms are taken into account, the 
(1 ) 'sj L??  term in (7.7) is obtained [46]. 
The eddy currents inductive term can be calculated as: 
 1 1 1' ( ),s
s L G
L
D D???? ?   (7.16) 
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and 
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7.2.5 Transfer impedance of two-layer braided shields 
7.2.5.1 Vance’s model 
The analysis of two-layer braided shields was made by Vance in [185] by using the per-unit 
length decomposition shown in Fig. 7.3. He assumed that the external and internal braids are in 
electrical contact at electrically short spacing along the cable. 
The coupling of an external field source would induce the flow of current 1I  along the outer 
shield external surface that will couple to the outer shield internal surface through its transfer 
impedance 1'tZ  and will induce the flow of the internal current 2I . The current 2I circulates 
through a mesh composed of the per-unit length series impedance of the outer shield and 
internal shield 1 2'  and Z's sZ , respectively, and the per-unit length inductance of the coaxial 
transmission line formed by the outer shield inner surface and the inner shield outer surface 12'L . 
Finally, the flow of the internal current 2I will couple through the internal shield transfer 
impedance 2'tZ  and will induce the voltage drop 2E  in the inner shield surface. 
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Fig. 7.3 Per-unit length model for analyzing double braid shields. Adapted from [185]. 
 
The overall transfer impedance of the double braid line can be calculated from the previous 
analysis as: 
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Vance proposed to calculate the overall transfer impedance by using his model for single braids 
(see Section 7.2.4.1), resulting in: 
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where subscript 1 applies to the inner shield and 2 to the outer shield, sl is the spacing between 
shield-to-shield connections, and s?  is the complex propagation constant of the shield-to-shield 
transmission line. 
The per-unit-length inductance between the shields can be evaluated using 
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where 2a is the inner radius of the outer shield and 1b  is the outer radius of the inner shield. 
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7.2.5.2 Proposed model 
We propose [83] to use (7.19) for estimating the equivalent transfer impedance of a two-layer 
braided shield and using the optimized single-layer model proposed by Kley for calculating the 
transfer impedance of the inner and outer braided shields (see Section 7.2.4.2). This model can 
be referred to as the Vance-Kley model since it uses Vance’s approach to estimate the transfer 
impedance of a double-shield cable, but takes advantage of Kley’s model to predict the transfer 
impedance of each single braid. Putting both models together, the overall transfer impedance 
reads: 
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7.2.5.3 Experimental validation 
The proposed model was tested by comparing the numerical predictions with experimental 
results of the transfer impedance of two commercial samples made of silver plated aluminum 
monofilament wires.  
The measurements were performed between 10 kHz and 70 MHz with a triaxial setup (see Fig. 
7.4) [187]. Each braided shield was mounted on a calibrated mandrel containing a metallic inner 
conductor. The resulting coaxial assembly was inserted in a tubular solid tube to conform the 
triaxial structure where the braided shield and the solid tube conform the outer coaxial. The 
external and internal coaxial structures were terminated in their characteristic impedances in 
order to avoid standing wave patterns. An injection probe was used to generate a current flow 
along the braid and a measurement probe was used to measure the induced current. A spectrum 
analyzer was used to measure the induced voltage between the innermost conductor and the 
braid, and therefore, estimate the transfer impedance. 
 
 
Fig. 7.4 Triaxial setup for measuring transfer impedance of cables by using magnetic current 
injection with a current transformer. Image adapted from [187]. 
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Regarding the simulation setup, the number of filaments, number of carriers, the filament 
diameter, and the weave angle of the external and internal braids were included in the datasheets 
of the samples manufacturer. On the other hand, only the outer diameter of the external braid 
was available. One of the most difficult-to-measure parameters was the inner and outer 
diameters of the independent braids, and their separation distance. Also, the conductivity of 
metal alloys was not provided in the datasheets.  
In order to obtain the parameters of the tested braids, the following procedure was used: (i) the 
number of filaments, number of carriers, filament diameter, and weave angle were obtained 
from the datasheet nominal values. (ii) The initial conductivity was set to the approximated bulk 
conductivity of Al: σ = 35 MS/m. The conductivity was corrected to match the DC transfer 
impedance obtained by measurements. (iii) The external radius of the outer braid was assumed 
as the nominal ±2mm, and the average thickness of the braids was assumed to be 1.25 times the 
filament diameter as suggested in [186]. (iv) The separation distance between braids was varied 
between 50-200μm. (v) The separation distance and the external radius of the outer braid were 
swept in steps of 10 μm, until a good correspondence was obtained with the model at high 
frequencies. 
In what follows, the results of both models obtained with the parameters optimized for each of 
the models will be presented. The optimized parameters provide a minimum mean square error 
between the measurement and the model. 
The first sample (sample A), was made of two braids having the same parameters: N=11, C=40 
and d=0.2 mm. The weave angles of the inner braid and outer braid were α1=30°and α2=40°, 
respectively. The nominal external diameter of the two-layer braided shield was 22mm and the 
sample length was 1m.  
A summary of the optimized parameters of sample A according to each model is reported in 
Tab. 7.1. The percentage variations of the conductivity and the external radius with respect to 
the nominal values are indicated in the last column. 
Fig. 7.5 shows a comparison between the results obtained from (i) measurements, (ii) Vance 
model, and (iii) proposed Vance-Kley model, for sample A. The results of the Vance model are 
in good agreement with the measurements from about DC to 250 kHz, and beyond 10 MHz or 
so. On the other hand, the proposed Vance-Kley model shows excellent agreement with the 
measured data in the whole frequency range. 
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Tab. 7.1 Optimized Parameters of Sample A 
Parameter Variable Value Units D% 
Conductivity σ 35.2 [MS/m] 0.5 
Ext. diameter (Vance) 2am 20.7 [mm] -6.1 
Sep. distance (Vance)  180 [μm]  
Ext. diameter (Vance-Kley) 2am 19.9 [mm] -9.7 
Sep. distance (Vance-Kley)  160 [μm]  
 
 
Fig. 7.5 Transfer impedance of Sample A: measurement and simulation results. 
 
The second sample (sample B), was made of two braids having the same parameters: N=14, 
C=24, and d=0.12 mm. The weave angles of the inner braid and outer braid were α1=27.5°and 
α2=28.7°, respectively. The nominal external diameter of the two-layer braided shield was 
10mm and the sample length was 1m. 
A summary of the optimized parameters of sample B according to each model is reported in 
Tab. 7.2. 
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Fig. 7.6 shows a comparison between the results obtained from (i) measurements, (ii) Vance 
model, and (iii) Vance-Kley model, for sample B. The results of the Vance model are in good 
agreement with the measurements from about DC to 800 kHz, and beyond 25MHz, whereas the 
proposed Vance-Kley model shows excellent agreement in the whole frequency range, as it was 
observed for Sample A. 
 
Tab. 7.2 Optimized Parameters of Sample B 
Parameter Variable Value Units D% 
Conductivity σ 30.3 [MS/m] -13.5 
Ext. diameter (Vance) 2am 8.9 [mm] -11.2 
Sep. distance (Vance)  150 [μm]  
Ext. diameter (Vance-Kley) 2am 9.8 [mm] -1.8 
Sep. distance (Vance-Kley)  170 [μm]  
 
 
Fig. 7.6 Transfer impedance of Sample B: measurement and simulation results. 
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7.2.6 Modeling of served wire shields 
The term served wire shield refers to a collection of n strands that are helically wound around 
the protected wires. A schematic diagram illustrating the cross-section of a coated pair with a 
served wire shield is presented in Fig. 7.7. The multiple strands provide with a high optical 
coverage and also exhibit a low self-inductance, thus working up to relatively high frequencies 
(some MHz). The term “spiral shield” is also used to refer to the served wire shield. 
 
 
Fig. 7.7 Schematic diagram of the served wire shield. 
 
The served wire shields are specified according to the following parameters [190](See Fig. 7.7): 
inner radius of the screen a, number of strands n, diameter of the strands d, conductivity of the 
strands σ, and the weave angle α. 
The calculation of the transfer impedance of the served wire shield has been discussed in a few 
studies. Tsaliovich [190] derived an approximate formula by considering the decomposition of 
the total current in the shield in its axial (along the cable) and circular (around the cable) 
components. According to Tsaliovich, the transfer impedance tZ ?  of the served wire shield can 
be estimated as: 
 20 tan ( ),
4t th sh
Z Z Z j?
?? ??
? ?? ? ?? ?? ?   (7.23) 
where  and th shZ Z  are respectively the transfer and series impedance of a homogeneous tube 
having conductivity? , internal diameter a, and thickness d. These latter can be estimated with 
the model of Schelkunnof [184].  
αn individual strands
a
d
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7.2.7 Modeling of pigtails 
A correct layout of cables requires the connection of all the screens to the common current 
return path (e.g. the metallic backshell of the connectors). The grounding of the shielding 
screens is generally performed with the use of so-called pigtails that significantly modify the 
overall immunity responses due to the discontinuities. 
Paul presented in [191] a very simple low-frequency model for simulating the presence of 
pigtails. He used a lumped-parameter solution in which the crosstalk of a shielded cable with 
pigtail connections is calculated as the superposition of the coupling due to the presence of the 
shield, and the one due to the two pigtails. As frequency increases, the interaction of the 
shielded section with the pigtail needs to be considered in the solution. In this case, TL 
approach may give a more accurate solution since the physical presence of the pigtail wire is 
included in the MTL matrices. However, notice that a separate section of the unshielded wires 
has to be added at the ends of the cables. 
From a practical point of view, it is very difficult to define the geometry of a pigtail wire since 
they are generally randomly positioned in the bundles. This gives rise to uncertainties when 
calculating the MTL impedance and admittance matrices. Therefore, in this study, the pigtails 
are modeled as lumped inductances of about 1 nH/mm which is a commonly agreed value of the 
inductance of a piece of wire (see e.g. [139]). The lumped representation of the pigtail is 
conservative since the mutual inductance between the pigtail and the inner wires are neglected, 
thus, not providing with capacitive and inductive shielding.  
7.2.8 Modeling of the connectors 
Connector models should provide with a representation of the resistive and inductive behavior 
of the conductive backshell, as well as the diffusion of the fields through the connector body, 
and the penetration through any present aperture. 
7.2.8.1 Backshell model 
The connector backshells are made up of solid metals or composite materials with no apertures 
in the cross section (in principle). A good connector from the EMC point of view exhibits 100% 
optical coverage around the protected wires and it should make a continuous current path to 
ground when bonded with the cable shields. Thus, connector backshells can be integrated into 
the TL simulations in the form of a solid shield of a given thickness and an effective 
conductivity that surrounds the protected wires. The backshell transfer impedance has to be 
determined through analytical treatment, full wave simulations or experiments. 
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Typical connectors exhibit circular and rectangular cross-sections. The theoretical expression 
for the transfer impedance of a solid round tubular shield derived by Schelkunoff [184] can be 
used as an approximation of the behavior of a rectangular tubular shield with equivalent cross-
section.  
7.2.8.2 Bonding 
The overall shielding quality of the harness is related to the correct bonding of the cable screens 
to the connector backshell through a low resistance/inductance path and with a good optical 
coverage (i.e. without leaving any significant aperture). The degradation of the high frequency 
susceptibility of the harnesses is critically determined by the quality of the connection of the 
screens to the backshell, and the connection between the backshell to the chassis of the 
equipment.  
The bonding of the backshell to the general chassis of the equipment with screws is included in 
the simulations by using lumped resistors of some mΩ and inductors of some 10-100 pH. 
7.3 Cable assembly under study 
7.3.1 Assembly description 
The cable assembly under study was composed of a bundle containing 5 AWG26 shielded 
copper pairs of 950 mm length and terminated in both sides with 37-pins micro-D backshell 
connectors. Two of the pairs were provided with a braided shield (one for each pair), and 3 pairs 
were provided with a served wire shield (one for each pair). All the shields were connected to 
the connector backshell chimney using 20 to 30-mm long pigtails. A picture of the cable 
assembly is presented in Fig. 7.8. Notice the pigtail connections to the connector backshell with 
an aluminum wrap around the chimney. 
7.3.2 Overall transfer impedance of the cable assembly  
In order to evaluate the overall transfer impedance of the assembly, the setup presented in the 
picture shown in Fig. 7.9 was used. This setup was inspired by the line injection technique for 
measuring the transfer impedance of braided shields, see e.g. Section 2.4.1.2.2 of [48] or IEC 
62153-4-6 [192]. Note that other techniques are available in the literature for the evaluation of 
the transfer impedance of shielded connector assemblies, e.g. [193-195]. In the used setup, a 
copper tape was laid above the bundle path in order to create a pseudo micro-strip line that will 
induce a current flow along all the cable shields. The injection port of a vector network analyzer 
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(VNA) is connected to the near end of the micro-strip, and a 50 Ω resistor is connected to the far 
end. 
 
 
Fig. 7.8 Picture of the cable assembly under study. 
 
A particular wire from the bundle was terminated in 50 Ω at the far end and connected to the 
measurement port of a VNA at the near end, while the other wires were left floating. Assuming 
the connector and the shielded pair assembly as a single body, the induced voltage measured by 
the VNA due to the current injection in the micro-strip provides an indication of the overall 
transfer impedance of the assembly.  
 
 
Fig. 7.9 Mictrostrip injection test for measuring the overall shielding performance of the 
shielded pairs.  
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In order to assess the influence of the shield type, two different tests were performed. In the first 
test, the terminated wire was selected from one of the 3 pairs equipped with a served wire 
shield. In the second test, the terminated wire was selected from one of the 2 pairs with a 
braided shield. The measurements of the overall transfer impedance for both cases are plotted in 
Fig. 7.10. Notice that, as expected, a better performance is observed for the pair with the braided 
shield. 
 
 
Fig. 7.10 Overall transfer impedance of the cable assembly measured in the served wire shield 
pair and in the braided shield pair. 
7.4 Modeling procedure 
In this section, we present the implementation of the TL model of the cable assembly with the 
aid of the CST Cable Studio (CST-CS) numerical tool. The model attempts to reproduce as 
accurately as possible the measurement setup used to estimate the overall transfer impedance of 
the assembly as presented in Fig. 7.9. 
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7.4.1 General schematic diagram 
A schematic diagram showing the model of the measurement setup is presented in Fig. 7.11. 
The cables are located at a height h above a perfectly conducting ground plane. The pigtails are 
modeled as lumped inductances Lp, and the interconnection between the connector backshell 
and the ground return path is modeled with a lumped inductance Lbs. 
 
 
Fig. 7.11 Schematic diagram of the cable assembly model. 
 
7.4.2 Shielded pairs’ parameters 
The parameters of the cables and shields that were used for creating the cross-sections are given 
in Tab. 7.4 and Tab. 7.5.Since the exact positions of the cables in the bundle were unknown, a 
random distribution of the cross-sections was automatically generated around a reference height 
h = 5cm, that was chosen to approximate the actual position of the whole bundle in the 
measurement setup. 
The transfer impedance of the braided shields were calculated by using Key’s model [186] with 
the CST-CS integrated tool. The transfer impedance of the served-wire shields were calculated 
by using the approximate formula of Tsaliovich (Equation (7.23)) [190]. Note that the transfer 
admittance was not considered in this study since for the considered height above ground, its 
effect is negligible. 
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The presence of the copper tape above the cable bundle was included in the simulation by 
adding a rectangular copper cross section. Fig. 7.12 illustrates the randomly distributed cross-
sections of the five shielded pairs and the copper tape. The parameters of the copper tape are 
given in Tab. 7.3. 
 
 
Fig. 7.12 Illustration of the randomly distributed cross sections used for modeling the cable 
bundle below the copper tape. The dimensions are not to scale. 
 
Tab. 7.3 Summary of the Copper tape dimensions  
Parameter Value Units 
Copper width 5 mm 
Copper thickness 1 mm 
Copper conductivity 58 MS/m 
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Tab. 7.4 Parameters of the pairs with braided shield  
Parameter Value Units 
Cores (Inner conductors) 
Number of cores 2  
Core Conductivity (Silver Plated Copper) 13.73 MS/m 
Core diameter 0.5 mm 
Core insulator rel. permittivity (PTFE) 2.1  
Core insulator tangent loss (PTFE) 1e-6  
Core insulator thickness 0.2 mm 
Braided shield 
Number of carriers 16  
Filaments per carrier  6  
Filament diameter 0.071 mm 
Inner radius of the braid 0.95 mm 
Optical Coverage 86 % 
Weave angle 33 ° 
Conductivity (Silver Plated Copper) 13.73 MS/m 
Outer insulator 
Relative permittivity (Kapton) 3.4  
Thickness 0.12 mm 
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Tab. 7.5 Parameters of the pairs with served wire shield  
Parameter Value Units 
Cores (Inner conductors) 
Number of cores 2  
Core Conductivity (Silver Plated Copper) 13.73 MS/m 
Core diameter 0.57 mm 
Core insulator rel. permittivity (Kapton) 3.4  
Core insulator thickness 0.24 mm 
Served wire 
Number of filaments 56  
Filament diameter 0.079 mm 
Inner radius of the shield 0.79 mm 
Weave angle 33.5 ° 
Conductivity (Silver Plated Copper) 13.73 MS/m 
Outer insulator 
Relative permittivity (Kapton) 3.4  
Thickness  0.222 mm 
 
7.4.3 Pigtail model 
The connection of the cable shields to the backshell chimney were modeled as lumped 
inductances of different values between 20 to 30 nH depending on the pigtail lengths (20-30 
mm). 
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7.4.4 Backshell model parameters 
7.4.4.1 Connector backshell 
An isometric view and the side views of the micro-D connector backshell are shown in Fig. 
7.13. 
 
Fig. 7.13 Isometric and side views of the micro D backshell (units in mm). 
 
The volume of the backshell was modeled as the union of two 1-mm thick solid shields of 
rectangular cross sections located at a height h =5cm from the ground plane, that represent the 
chimney and the body of the backshell, respectively. The rectangular solid shield enclosed the 
cross-section of the wires of the 5 pairs without the shields. An example of one of the cross-
sections used to simulate the connector backshield is schematically shown in Fig. 7.14. The 
cross sectional parameters are given in Tab. 7.6. 
The transfer impedances of the solid shields were calculated using Schelkunoff’s formula [184] 
for the case of a rectangular cross-section [196]. Since the bulk material properties of the 
backshell were not available from the manufacturer, the conductivity of Aluminum was 
assumed as 37 MS/m. 
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Tab. 7.6 Micro-d connector parameters used to generate the rectangular shield cross-section 
Parameter Value Units 
Backshell chimney length 11.8 mm 
Backshell chimney cross section 16.56 x 9 mm2 
Backshell body length 13.6 mm 
Backshell body cross section 28.1 x 9 mm2 
Backshell thickness 1 mm 
Backshell conductivity (Al) 37 MS/m 
 
 .1.1.1 Grounding inductance estimation 
In order to estimate the value of the grounding inductance Lbs, a simplified experiment 
performed with a very short section of the bundles was performed. A schematic diagram 
showing the simplified experiment setup is shown in Fig. 7.15. 
 
 
Fig. 7.14 Schematic diagram illustrating the cross section of the connector backshield and the 
pairs’ wires with the shields removed. The dimensions are not to scale. 
 
The five copper pairs were overshielded with an additional braid. At one end, the pairs’ wires 
were connected to the 37-pin micro-D connector. At the other end, one wire of the pairs was 
short-circuited to the braided overshield, and the current was injected at this point with a signal 
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generator. The other copper wires and their shields were left floating. The overshield was 
wrapped to the connector backshield chimney using a 360° connection. The shields of the five 
pairs (2 braided and 3 served wires) were also connected to the chimney through 20 mm long 
pigtails. Finally, the backshell was connected to the general chassis of the setup by using its 
mating female micro-D connector (without using RFI gaskets) and was very well secured with 
the use of two screws. 
The injected current was measured with the use of a current transformer, and the induced 
voltage was measured in the selected wire at the connector level with a spectrum analyzer. 
An equivalent TL model of the measurement setup was generated. The pigtails were modeled as 
lumped inductances of Lp = 20 nH. The lumped inductance Lbs was left as an open parameter in 
the simulations.  
The parameters of the braided overshield that were used for creating the cross-sections are given 
in Tab. 7.7 
 
Tab. 7.7 Braided overshield parameters 
Parameter Value Units 
Length of the section 124.6 mm 
Number of carriers 48  
Filaments per carrier  9  
Filament diameter 0.16 mm 
Inner radius of the braid 9.15 mm 
Optical Coverage 88.8 % 
Weave angle 27.8 ° 
Conductivity (Silver Plated 
Copper) 
13.73 MS/m 
 
The connector’s transfer impedance was measured and calculated for frequencies ranging from 
30 kHz to 70 MHz. Three different values for the backshell inductance Lbs were chosen in the 
model, namely, 10, 50, and 100 pH. A plot of the connector transfer impedance obtained from 
measurements and simulation are presented in Fig. 7.16.  
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It can be observed that there is a very good agreement between measurement and simulations at 
low frequencies. This implies that the selected conductivity values and dimensions of the 
backshell and the braided overshield reproduce very well the DC resistance of the connector 
assembly in simulation. The transfer impedance shows an increasing trend as a function of 
frequency suggesting the presence of a dominant inductive behavior. 
 
 
Fig. 7.15 Schematic diagram of the experimental setup for determining the grounding 
inductance of the connector. 
 
After adding the backshell inductance, the simulation results exhibit a better agreement with the 
measured data. The curve with Lbs=100 pH reproduces well the behavior at the measured low 
and medium frequencies; the differences in the higher frequency range remain acceptable for 
engineering purposes.  
It is observed that the overall response at high frequencies is very sensitive to the grounding 
impedance between the connector’s surface and the equipment chassis. A very good galvanic 
contact between male and female connectors is required (for example through the use of RF 
gaskets)[194]. It is very likely that the inductive behavior of the backshell connection is due to 
an imperfect mating between the male and female backshells and that the return current is 
flowing through the securing screws. 
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Fig. 7.16 Measurement and simulation results of the connector transfer impedance considering 
different values for Lbs (0, 10, 50, and 100 pH). 
7.5 Simulation results for the cable assembly 
The overall transfer impedance of the cable assembly was simulated for frequencies ranging 
from 30 kHz to 500 MHz.  
In a first try, the simulation was performed by using a backshell grounding inductance Lbs=100 
pH. The measurement results and the simulation results obtained for the served wire shielded 
pair and the braided shield pair are plotted in Fig. 7.17 and Fig. 7.18, respectively. 
In both cases, the low frequency transfer impedance predicted by the numerical simulation is 
about half of the measurement result. Provided that the backshell simulations showed excellent 
agreement with measurement at low frequencies, the observed discrepancy was identified as due 
to the contact resistance associated with an imperfect bonding between the shields and the 
backshell, which was not considered in the model. Therefore, a second set of simulations were 
performed by adding a series resistance to ground Rbs=15mΩ (similar values were reported in 
[194]), and the low frequency results were improved as it can be seen in the green curves of Fig. 
7.17 and Fig. 7.18. The simulation results obtained after adding the backshell resistance are in 
reasonable agreement with the experimental data. 
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Fig. 7.17 Measurement and simulation of the cable assembly overall transfer impedance 
obtained in one of the served wire pairs.  
 
 
Fig. 7.18 Measurement and simulation of the cable assembly overall transfer impedance 
obtained in one of the braided shield pairs. 
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7.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, general considerations for the application of the TL theory for simulating 
shielded cable assemblies were presented. Some of the practical issues that occur in the 
modeling process of various components of cable assemblies, namely connectors, pigtails and 
backshell were discussed. 
An improved model for estimating the transfer impedance of a two-layer braided shield was 
proposed. The proposed model is a combination of the model proposed by Vance for the 
evaluation of the equivalent transfer impedance of a two-layer braided shield, and the improved 
Kley model for the transfer impedance of single-layer braided shields. The proposed model has 
shown to be very accurate in reproducing the measured transfer impedance of two different two-
layer braided shielded cables up to 70 MHz.  
The overall transfer impedance of the studied cable assembly was used as a figure of merit to 
evaluate the total shielding provided by the harness. The measurement setup was implemented 
in CST-CS which uses TL theory to generate a lumped circuit equivalent that is solved to obtain 
the currents and voltages at the terminations. Some of the parameters of the model were 
available from the manufacturers’ datasheets and others were determined either experimentally 
or empirically. The position of the cables along the cross section was randomly assigned by the 
simulation tool.  
In general, the obtained simulation results were found to be in reasonable agreement with the 
experimental data. It was found that the generally overlooked contact impedances between the 
cable shields and connectors play a significant role, especially at low frequencies. The 
simulation results also emphasized the importance of the inductance and resistance of the 
connector backshell interconnection to the equipment chassis. 
The presented models could be improved by including a more accurate representation of pigtails 
as additional wires in the cable cross sections, and the effects due to the transfer capacitance, 
which at large frequencies may play a significant role. 
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This thesis is a contribution to the assessment of the vulnerability of CIs against IEMI. The 
performed studies deal with the improvement of the existing methods for the general assessment 
of the IEMI risks undertaken by CIs, the classification of existing IEMI sources, and the 
experimental and numerical assessment of the response of commercial cables to IEMI. These 
studies are important to better understand the compromise of CIs when operating with ICT 
technologies and to take appropriate corrective and mitigation measures against this new threat 
that has raised a great deal of attention in the EMC community during the past years. 
8.1 General highlights 
In Chapter 2, we proposed a qualitative methodology for assessing the risk of CIs against IEMI. 
The need for a qualitative method for IEMI assessment has been pointed out because a 
quantitative evaluation of the risk is a very difficult task, given the complexity of CIs. 
Furthermore, we believe that a qualitative assessment can be better understood by non-EMC 
experts and allows the intervention of the facilities’ staff, who are the main assets of the CIs, 
and who should be aware of the IEMI threat. 
The proposed method is a service-based risk assessment tool that merges the strategies proposed 
in previous works to infer qualitatively the risk of stopping a service provision with EM means. 
The method is oriented to assess the business continuity of the utilities and therefore it 
concentrates only on the equipment involved in the provision of important services, and 
considers the threats imposed by IEMI sources that are likely to occur given the accessibility 
constraints of the facility and the availability and transportability of the sources. From a 
business continuity point of view, the final output of a service-based risk assessment may be 
less important than all the information about the organizational and IT equipment weaknesses 
that is gained during the evaluation process.  
In Chapter 3, we presented an updated survey and classification of potential IEMI sources that 
were collected from available literature. The tendencies and characteristics of several conducted 
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and radiated sources were discussed and illustrated in the form of pie charts and bar plots. It was 
found that potential IEMI conducted sources are more available than radiated sources and they 
can be regarded as likely to be deployed by malefactors. The radiated sources were found to be 
still in a development phase and not easily available for purchase. The majority of the radiated 
sources are transported with vehicles and their typical costs remain high due to the required high 
technology in their implementation and testing. The physical limitations that constrain the 
development of current technologies in the generation of faster and stronger HPEM sources 
have also been reviewed in order to set up an overview of the expected worst case scenario. 
In order to study the spectral characteristics of the IEMI sources, we have proposed to represent 
digitized signals as an expansion of complex exponentials from which their Fourier transform 
can be calculated analytically. This alternative method facilitates the calculation of the spectral 
parameters of the signals because the spectra can be calculated at arbitrary frequency points. We 
have also shown how to decrease the computation time of the bandratio of the signals by using 
the so-called Blumer index. A summary of the methodology can be found in 8.2Appendix A. 
In Chapter 4, a typical electrical and communications raceway including several types of cables 
found in commercial buildings was built and tested against HPEM transients inside a GTEM 
cell and low power fields inside a RC. The tests revealed that the LVP cables are the most 
susceptible compared to TEL or LAN cables. The responses were found to be governed by the 
configuration of the cable under test in the lower-intermediate frequencies (below 3 GHz). 
Beyond 3 GHz, the coupling is clearly dominated by the cable terminations (connector 
imperfections, pigtails, etc.). As expected, the best performance was obtained with the use of 
shielded twisted pairs. 
These experiments improve our understanding of the expected induced voltages and currents in 
commercial cable systems when exposed to IEMI-like signals. The obtained transfer functions 
can be used for bounding the disturbance levels in IEMI risk analyses for many types of CIs. 
Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the applicability of the TL theory in evaluating DM signals in 
canonical setups of two-wire lines floating above a ground plane. It was found that the presence 
of the ground plane can be disregarded in the calculation of the characteristic impedance of the 
lines, when the height of the wires is larger than about twice the separation distance between 
them. Also, the results showed that the validity of the TL theory is conditioned upon an 
electrically short distance between the DM wires, regardless of the distances above the ground 
plane. 
The effects of including conductive and dielectric losses in the analysis of the DM propagation 
along lines with cross sections representative of commercial cables were also discussed. The 
results show that both dielectric and conductive losses have to be considered for obtaining 
accurate attenuation levels. In lines with very small conductor cross-section, it is more likely 
that the conductive losses will dominate the total attenuation due to the skin effect. 
Chapter 6 presents the numerical modeling of the propagation of IEMI disturbances along LVP 
cables. Even though some of the input parameters of the models are not precisely known, it was 
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shown that simulation results are in good agreement with experimental data obtained in both 
frequency domain and time domain.  
Finally, Chapter 7 was dedicated to the modeling of the so-called overall transfer impedance of 
complex cable assemblies. The obtained simulation results were found to be in reasonable 
agreement with the experimental data. It was found that the generally overlooked contact 
impedances between the cable shields and connectors and the inductance and resistance of the 
connector backshell interconnection to the equipment chassis play a significant role in the 
evaluation of the overall transfer impedance. Furthermore, an improved model for estimating 
the transfer impedance of a two-layer braided shield was also proposed. The proposed model 
has shown to be very accurate in reproducing the measured transfer impedance of two different 
two-layer braided shielded cables.  
8.2 Future perspectives 
The results of this thesis can be readily used for performing IEMI risk analysis of CIs. The 
systematic application of the service-based risk analysis to existing critical facilities should 
reveal the technical and organizational shortcomings that should be hardened in order to 
decrease the risk evaluation of modern CIs. 
We have shown the existing limitations on the fabrication of stronger and faster HPEM 
weapons due to physical constraints. However, the evolution of energy storage technologies and 
semiconductors could dramatically increase the transportability and availability of IEMI 
radiated sources and as a consequence the risk evaluation of CIs. Thus, the technical capabilities 
in the generation of HPEM sources should be continuously monitored. 
The majority of the experiments performed in this work were made with reduced-scale cable 
systems that are representative of real scenarios. However, further experimental evidence at 
larger scales including the presence of rebar concrete walls and points of entry like window 
panes or doors are required in order to understand the penetration and diffusion of IEMI fields 
inside buildings under realistic conditions that are not easily modeled with the existing EM 
tools. 
The final objective of the EM modeling in the framework of IEMI studies is the estimation of 
the worst case scenarios for the induced voltages, currents, or power at the critical equipment 
input. Because of all the uncertainties that have been already mentioned, a deterministic solution 
to this problem turns out to be a challenging task. The presented models could be improved by 
including a more accurate representation of the cables’ dielectrics, terminations such as 
connectors and pigtails, and the effects due to the transfer admittance, which at large 
frequencies may play a significant role. A more efficient solution is to create random scenarios 
in which, variations in parameters such as cable lengths, material properties, and loading could 
be stochastically included. Once the statistical moments have been calculated, a study of the 
possible extreme values can be performed in order to predict the worst case results. 
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A.1 Introduction 
In this appendix, the adopted procedure to digitize the waveforms extracted from the relevant 
literature, and the processing steps to produce the wavecards containing the time domain and 
frequency domain parameters of the studied sources in Chapter 3 is presented. Also, a technique 
for an efficient evaluation of the Fourier transform of the signals and the extraction of their 
spectral characteristics is introduced. The technique is based on the use of a MPM to expand the 
time domain waveforms into a series of complex exponentials, whose poles and residues can be 
used to calculate waveform’s Fourier transform analytically. Finally, the use of the so-called 
Blumer index for improving the time required for estimating the bandratio of a given spectrum 
is illustrated. 
A.2 Selected waveforms parameter extraction 
A.2.1 Digitalization of the waveform 
The first step in the creation of the wavecard is to digitize the reported waveforms. To this aim, 
a scanner is used to digitize the paper-based documents and a PDF reader for the documents 
available in electronic format to obtain an image of the waveform. The Engauge digitizer© (free 
distribution tool) was used to convert the images into numerical vectors to be processed by the 
main software. It is important to highlight that digitizing a signal from paper does not ensure 
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that the whole spectral attributes of the signal will be correctly reproduced. Nevertheless, a fair 
approximation of the real measured signal and its properties is expected. 
To illustrate the process, an example of a waveform image and its digitized version after using 
the Engauge digitizer© is presented in Fig. A. 1. The waveform corresponds to the far voltage 
of the HPEM source reported in [197]. 
 
 
Fig. A. 1 Digitized image (right panel) of the far voltage waveform of the source reported in 
[197] (left panel). 
 
Since the waveform points provided by the Engauge digitizer© are not sampled with a uniform 
time step, the whole waveform is interpolated using 1024 points with a uniform time step. 
Notice that the selected interpolation sampling rate is independent of the sampling rate of the 
scope that was used to record the waveform. 
Once the waveform is digitized, the time-domain attributes of the source can be estimated. 
A.2.2 Waveform windowing 
It is normal that the digitized signals do not vanish to zero in the late times because of the 
truncation of the original waveform in the document or because of digitizing errors of the 
program. Therefore, the signals are windowed with a quasi-rectangular unitary pulse created by 
using the complementary error function [198]: 
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  (A.1) 
where ta-tb is the FWHM of the pulse, tr is the 10-90% risetime of the pulse, and tf is the 90-10% 
fall-time of the pulse.  
A plot of the erfc window for the case tr = tf = 5, ta= 90 and tb = 10 is shown in Fig. A. 2 
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Fig. A. 2 Plot of the uerfc function for tr = tf = 5, ta=90 and tb=10. 
 
To carry out the windowing of the selected waveforms, the time constants in Equation (A.1) are 
chosen so that the early rise of the window does not modify the early time behavior of the 
digitized signal. On the other hand, the fall time is also chosen so that the windowed signal 
smoothly converges to zero in the late times. Notice that the use of the erfc function ensures a 
smooth transition in the rising and falling edges of the window and, therefore, numerical 
spectral noise due to discontinuities is reduced.  
A.2.3 Zero padding 
After windowing the digitized signal, zero padding is performed in order to increase the 
resolution of the Fourier transformation that is performed in the next step. An example of the 
windowed version of the waveform in Fig. A. 1 is presented in Fig. A. 3. Note that the effect of 
the window is unnoticeable and a smooth transition to zero is ensured in the early and late 
times. 
 
Fig. A. 3 Windowed version of the digitized signal in Fig. A. 1. 
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A.2.4 Calculation of the signal spectrum 
The spectrum of the signal is calculated with an FFT. The resulting spectrum is used to calculate 
spectral attributes of the signal. 
The accuracy of the -3dB bandwidth and, consequently, the quality factor, depend on the 
frequency resolution of the FFT and, therefore, further zero padding can be used to reduce the 
frequency step. On the other hand, the estimation of the bandratio becomes time-consuming if 
the FFT of the spectrum has to be calculated over a large number of frequency points.  
The 90% energy bandwidth 90BW  is iteratively calculated by testing in all the possible 
frequency points of the discrete spectrum of the signal and, for each pair of tested frequency 
points, an integration procedure has to be performed. Thus, it is desired to compute 90BW  from 
spectra with a reduced number of points, but containing the necessary amount of information for 
correctly calculating the limits. Notice that traditional sampling schemes with reduced 
equidistant linear or logarithmic steps may fail to efficiently represent spectra since resonances 
may be lost.  
A.2.5 Alternative method for the estimation of the Fourier transform of the signal 
Due to the previously mentioned issues, an alternative method for estimating the frequency 
spectrum of the waveforms was used in this work. Consider the approximation of the digitized 
waveform ( )r t , as the sum of m complex exponentials: 
 
1
( ) ( ),
?
?? im s ti
i
r t Ae u t   (A.2) 
where the residues iA  and the poles is  are complex numbers and u(t) is the Heaviside function. 
The exponential nature of the basis functions will ensure the existence of the Fourier transform 
of ( )r t  since the real part of the complex poles is negative and, therefore, the signal must 
vanish at infinite times, i.e.: 
 , 0.? ? ?? ? ?i i i is j   (A.3) 
The Fourier transform of ( )r t  can be then approximated as: 
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  (A.4) 
Notice that in order to get a good approximation of the original waveform, a sufficient number 
of poles m has to be chosen.  
The interest of this method relies in the fact that if the residues and poles of the original 
waveform can be retrieved, its Fourier transform can be analytically estimated with the use of 
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Equation (A.4) at any desired frequency point, and the algorithms for calculating the bandratio 
can be improved since it is no longer required to sample the spectrum with a regular frequency 
step. 
A.2.5.1 Poles and residues estimation 
In order to retrieve the residues and the poles of the signals, we used the MPM in [199]. This 
technique has been proven to be very efficient in the extraction of the residues and poles of 
signals containing noise. To choose the number of poles that correctly reproduce the waveform 
(m), the signal is first expanded into an increased number of complex conjugated pole pairs 
(typically 25 pairs). It is expected that the poles that contribute most to the expansion of the 
signal are those having the largest residues. Thus, the retrieved poles are sorted according to a 
decreasing absolute value of their residues. Then, the number of poles m is chosen to minimize 
the normalized MSE between the original signal and the m-pole approximated signal [200]: 
 
2( ) ( )
,
( )
?
?
?
?
rec
t
t
r t r t
MSE
r t
  (A.5) 
where ( )recr t  is the signal reconstructed using Equation (A.2). 
Finally, the Fourier transform is calculated analytically using Equation (A.5) at the desired 
frequency points. 
A.2.5.2 Reconstruction example 
Fig. A. 4 presents an example of a measured signal and its reconstruction with the MPM. The 
time domain waveforms are presented in the top panel, and the frequency spectra are shown in 
the lower panel. The black signal corresponds to the vertical electric field generated by the 
EPFL switching oscillator connected to a monopole antenna [119]. The waveform plotted with a 
solid black was reconstructed by using 26 poles resulting in a MSE = 2.3 x 10-3. The spectrum 
plotted with dashed red lines was calculated by using a FFT of the original waveform and the 
spectrum in solid black from Equation (A.4). 
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Fig. A. 4 Example of the reconstruction of a measured signal with the MPM (top panel) and the 
analytical calculation of its Fourier transformation (bottom panel). 
 
Even though the reconstruction of the time domain signal is in very good agreement with the 
measurement, some differences can be observed in the spectra at low and high frequencies. The 
advantage of the analytical spectrum is that, since the reconstructed signal must vanish in the 
late times, it must give a causal Fourier transform. On the other hand, the spectrum calculated 
with the FFT may contain truncation errors. 
A.2.6 Estimation of the bandratio with the aid of the Blumer Index 
The calculation of the bandratio br and the 90% Bandwidth BW90 defined in Chapter 3, are not 
straightforward. It is required that the spectrum of the signal is calculated in a limited number of 
frequency points to reduce the algorithm’s calculation time. On the other hand, enough 
frequency samples are needed so that no spectral information is missing and that the frequency 
limits fl and fh are correctly calculated. If the spectrum contains a reduced number of 
frequencies, so that the resonances of the signal or important concentrations of energy are 
missing, the bandratio is not correctly calculated. Thus, a method to evaluate the accuracy of the 
spectra is needed.  
The Blumer index can be used to estimate the accuracy of a measured or numerically calculated 
spectrum [87]. The index serves as a tool to determine if the information contained in a discrete 
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spectrum is good enough to reproduce a causal signal, or if more frequency samples are 
required. The Blumer index is derived from the Hilbert transform properties of causal signals 
and it can be calculated as: 
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? ? ? ?
max max
min min
max max
min min
2 2
2 2
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1 100%,
Re ( ) Im ( )
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
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? ?
? ?
R R
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R R
  (A.6) 
where min max, and ? ? are the minimum and maximum frequency points in the spectrum, 
respectively, and ??  is the frequency step between consecutive frequency points. Notice that 
for an accurate causal spectrum, the Blumer index is B=100%; since the sum over the real part 
of the spectrum should be equal to the sum of the imaginary part to satisfy Hilbert transform 
properties. 
To overcome the above-mentioned issues for the estimation of the bandratio of the studied 
waveforms, the adaptive non-uniform sampling scheme proposed in [87] has been used. In this 
scheme, in the vicinity of spectral peaks, a large number of data points are sampled. On the 
other hand, at frequencies where the spectrum changes less rapidly, a lower sampling rate is 
used. To test the accuracy of the discrete spectral representation of the selected waveform, the 
Blumer index of the spectrum is evaluated. If the index is below a user-defined threshold 
(usually around 98-99%), the spectrum is sampled again with an iterative scheme until the 
threshold is reached. This procedure reduces the errors arising from the under-sampling of the 
spectrum, and/or from truncation the spectrum at the upper and lower frequency limits. As a 
consequence, the calculation time of the bandratio is significantly reduced because fewer 
frequency points need to be tested. Further details in the iterative selection of the frequency 
points can be found in [87]. 
To illustrate the use of the adaptive scheme, the Blumer index, and its influence in the 
estimation of the bandratio of a signal, the spectrum of the waveform presented in Fig. A. 4 was 
calculated by using the traditional FFT, and the analytical expression in Equation (A.4) with 
three different (and reduced) numbers of frequency samples: 10, 33, and 106 (see Fig. A. 5). 
The samples were obtained iteratively with the adaptive scheme with the following Blumer 
index thresholds: 77%, 97% and 99%, respectively. 
 
Fig. A. 5 Illustration of the use of the Blumer Index in the calculation of the bandratio. 
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A summary of the bandratio results obtained with the FFT and the proposed scheme using the 
Blumer index is reported in Tab. A. 1. 
Tab. A. 1 Comparison of the bandratio results obtained with the FFT and the analytical-Blumer 
index approach 
Scheme Samples Blumer index Bandratio 
FFT 1024 100% 3.6 x 108 
Analytical – Blumer 10 77.6% 3.00 
Analytical – Blumer 33 97% 2.50 
Analytical – Blumer 106 99% 2.43 
 
Given the damped oscillatory behavior of the waveform, a reduced bandratio is expected. 
Notice that the bandratio and the resulting BW90 estimated from the spectrum obtained with the 
FFT are not correctly calculated since the frequency-sampling scheme of the FFT is linear and, 
therefore, very large frequency steps are obtained, and some important resonances are missed. 
Also due to truncation effects, large energy content is assigned to the low frequency 
components. In order to reduce the frequency step size, zero padding could be used, but also the 
number of samples of the FFT would be increased, leading to an increase in the calculation time 
of the bandratio.  
On the other hand, with the adaptive scheme, the bandratio is estimated by using non-
equidistant frequencies that are chosen as the frequencies where the majority of the energy is 
concentrated. The obtained bandratios with the adaptive scheme correspond to a mesoband 
signal, as expected. Notice that the adaptive scheme already provides a Blumer index of 97% 
with about 33 samples, and 99% with 106 samples and, therefore the algorithm for estimating 
the bandratio requires much less time than with an FFT. 
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B.1 Introduction 
In this appendix, the used expressions to calculate the p.u.l. parameters of lossy coaxial and 
two-coated-wire lines that were used to represent the cross section of typical power and 
communication lines in Chapter 5, are presented. The p.u.l. resistance and conductance were 
approximated with analytical formulas for running faster parametric analyses. The constitutive 
parameters of the dielectrics were approximated with a constant relative permittivity and tangent 
loss. 
B.2 Complex permittivity 
The permittivity of a lossy dielectric is a complex number that can be written as: 
 0ˆ ( ' ''),? ? ? ?? ? j   (B.1) 
where 0?  is the free space permittivity, and ' and ''? ?  account respectively for the polarizability 
of the medium, and the loss (heat) due to damping of the vibrating dipole moments. 
By definition, the tangent loss of a dielectric accounts for the losses due to the conductivity of 
“free” charges inside the dielectric dK?  and the polarization losses ''?  are related to the 
displacement currents in the material [171]. In this work we neglected the conduction currents 
inside the dielectric and therefore: 
 Appendix B Parameters of Coaxial 
and Two-Coated-Wire Lines 
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 '' ''tan .
' '
? ?? ?? ?? ?
?? ?   (B.2) 
Thus, the complex permittivity of the dielectric materials was expressed as [171]: 
 0 0 0ˆ ( ' '') '(1 tan ) (1 tan ).? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?rj j j   (B.3) 
 
B.3 Lossy coaxial line 
Consider the cross section of a lossy coaxial line as shown in Fig. B. 1. The inner and outer 
conductors conductivity is ? , and are insulated with a dielectric with a constant relative 
permittivity ? r  and a tangent loss tan? . The inner wire radius is wr  and the coaxial dielectric 
radius is sr . The outer conductor thickness is T. 
 
 
Fig. B. 1 Schematic diagram of the geometry and the constitutive materials of a lossy coaxial 
line. 
 
The p.u.l. capacitance of the coaxial line in free space can be calculated as [88]: 
 00
2' .
ln( )
???
s
w
C r
r
  (B.4) 
And the p.u.l. inductance can be obtained according to: 
 0 0 0
0
' ln( ).
' 2
? ? ?
?? ?
s
w
rL
C r
  (B.5) 
Since the coaxial line is filled up with a homogenous medium, the calculation of the p.u.l. 
capacitance and conductance can be obtained from the free space p.u.l. capacitance 0'C [88]:  
2 wr
? ?, tanr
T
2 sr
?
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tan ' tan ' .
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? ? ?? ?
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C C
G C C
  (B.6) 
Notice that the p.u.l. conductance can be alternatively calculated if the p.u.l. complex 
capacitance ˆ 'C  is calculated with the expression for 'C  in Equation (B.6) by using the complex 
permittivity defined in Equation (B.3). In this case, '  and 'C G  will be related to the real and 
imaginary parts of ˆ 'C , respectively: 
 0ˆ ' ' ' (1 tan ) ' ' '.? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?R I r
jC C jC j C C G   (B.7) 
On the other hand, the self-impedance 1'Z  of the inner conductor can be estimated at low 
frequencies as [88]: 
 01 1 1 2
1' ' ' ,       if 2 ,
8
?? ? ??? ?? ? ? ? ?w swZ R j L j rr
  (B.8) 
where 02 / ( )? ?? ??s  is the skin depth at the working frequency.  
At high frequencies, the self-impedance of the inner wire can be estimated with [88]: 
 01 1 1
1' ' ' ,      if 2 .
2
??? ?? ?? ? ? ?w sw
jZ R j L r
r
  (B.9) 
The self-impedance of the outer coaxial conductor can be estimated with [184]: 
 2' coth( ).2
? ?? ?? sZ Tr
  (B.10) 
Notice that the inductance in Equation (B.6) neglects the self-inductance of the inner and outer 
conductors, and Equations (B.8) to (B.10) correct for their presence. 
Finally, the overall p.u.l. impedance and admittance of the coaxial line can be estimated as: 
 1 2
' ' ' ',
' ' '.
?
?
? ? ?
? ?
Z Z Z j L
Y G j C
  (B.11) 
B.4 Lossy two-coated-wire line 
The propagation of DM signals in LVP and/or TWP cables occurs in lines exhibiting cross 
sections that could be approximated to the one shown in Fig. B. 2. Two wires of radii wr  and 
conductivity ?  are coated with a dielectric characterized by its relative permittivity ? r  and 
tangent loss tan? . The outer radius of the dielectric coating is mr . 
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Fig. B. 2 Schematic diagram of the geometry and the constitutive materials of a lossy two-
coated-wire line. 
 
The free space p.u.l. capacitance of the line (i.e. with no dielectric coating) can be exactly 
calculated as [88]: 
 00
1
' .
cosh ( )
2
??
?
?
w
C s
r
  (B.12) 
And the p.u.l. inductance yields: 
 0 0
0
' .
'
? ??L
C
  (B.13) 
Since the line is immersed inside an inhomogeneous medium, the properties of the p.u.l. 
capacitance and conductance used in Equation (B.6) do not hold and therefore a numerical 
method has to be used for calculating the p.u.l. capacitance and conductance.  
In what follows, we will present an approximate analytical method for calculating the p.u.l. 
capacitance and conductance of coated wires by decomposing them into a set of coaxial cables 
that propagate a TEM mode between their outer conductors. A schematic diagram illustrating 
the decomposition is shown in Fig. B. 3. The capacitances between the inner conductors and the 
dielectric coatings 'cC  are in series with the capacitance between the two dielectric coatings 
tw'C . Notice that it has been assumed that the capacitance of the dielectric coatings is the same 
in both wires. 
 
2 wr
? ?, tanr
?
2 mr
s
8.2Appendix B Parameters of Coaxial and Two-Coated-Wire Lines 
 
193 
 
 
Fig. B. 3 Schematic diagram of the decomposition of a two-coated-wire line. 
 
Therefore, the total p.u.l. capacitance can be calculated as: 
 ' '' .
' 2 '
? ?
c tw
tot
c tw
C CC
C C
  (B.14) 
The presented analytical approach for calculating the total p.u.l. capacitance has been validated 
by using reference numerical calculations obtained using the code RIBBON in [88] and the code 
LAPLACE [201]. The analytical results were found to be in excellent agreement with numerical 
results. 
If the dielectric losses of the coated wires are taken into account, the conductance of the 
dielectric 'cG  needs to be included in the analysis and the circuit in Fig. B. 3 is modified as 
illustrated in Fig. B. 4. The p.u.l. conductance and the capacitance of the dielectric coatings in 
parallel can be transformed into an equivalent complex capacitance that will be added in series 
with the capacitance between the two dielectric coatings.  
 
 
Fig. B. 4 Schematic diagram of the equivalent p.u.l. conductance of a two-coated-wire line. 
'cC
tw'C twtot
tw
' '
'
' 2 '
c
c
C C
C
C C
? ?
'cC
tw
tot
tw
ˆ ' 'ˆ '
ˆ ' 2 '
c
c
C C
C
C C
? ?
'cG
tw'C
'cC
'cC'cG
'cC
'cC
tw'C tot'G tot'C
8.2Appendix B Parameters of Coaxial and Two-Coated-Wire Lines 
 
194 
 
Finally, the overall complex capacitance can be transformed into an equivalent p.u.l. 
conductance tot'G  and capacitance tot'C  by using the relations in Equation (B.7): 
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? ?
? ?? ?? ? ? ??? ?
? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ??? ?
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  (B.15) 
where  
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The p.u.l. self impedance of the wires w'Z  can be estimated as twice the self-impedance 
presented in Equations (B.8) and (B.9): 
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where 02 / ( )? ?? ??s  is the skin depth at the working frequency.  
Finally, the overall p.u.l. impedance and admittance of the two-coated-wire line can be 
estimated as: 
 w
tot tot
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  (B.18) 
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